S. HRG. 98-1232

HUMAN RESOURCES IMPACT OF U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

EXAMINING THE PROSPECT FOR MEANINGFUL UNESCO REFORMS, AND EXPLORING THE EFFECT A U.S. PULLOUT WILL HAVE ON OUR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS

DECEMBER 10, 1984

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HUMAN RESOURCES IMPACT OF U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1984

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE OF LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room 430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Orrin Hatch (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Hatch and Randolph.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HATCH

The CHAIRMAN. We will call this committee hearing to order.

Since the administration announced last December that the United States intends to withdraw from Unesco at the end of this year, there has been extensive public debate over the justification for that decision. Unesco has been discussed in congressional hearings, a State Department policy paper, a General Accounting Office study, and a number of publicly and privately commissioned reports.

After evaluating these materials, my own view is that given the present state of affairs at Unesco, the United States has chosen the proper course by announcing its intent to leave Unesco at the end of this year.

I know there are those here in this room today who agree with that decision, and there are those who disagree with it. But we are not here to debate whether or not it is the right thing to do. Instead, I would like to move the discussion forward.

The focus of this hearing is twofold: First, to examine the prospect for meaningful Unesco reforms; and, second, to explore the effect a U.S. pullout will have on our international educational, scientific, and cultural programs.

This is not the first time that the United States has withdrawn from an international body. In 1977, during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, we pulled out of the International Labor Organization, or the ILO. One of the main reasons we left the ILO is because it had become increasingly politicized. Our strategy was to encourage reforms by withdrawing 25 percent of the funds used at the ILO, or 25 percent of the ILO's total budget.

As former U.S. Ambassador Henry Catto noted in last Tuesday's Washington Post, that strategy was successful. After our withdrawal, the ILO instituted some important changes—such as secret

ballot procedures—that helped to create a more balanced atmosphere.

Because of these positive changes, the United States rejoined the ILO in 1980. In retrospect, I think we can all agree that global interests were well served by the reforms sparked by the U.S. pullout.

Likewise, it is my hope that our Unesco pullout can be the catalyst for meaningful reforms and that, in time, the United States can once again be an active participant in Unesco.

On behalf of the committee's members, I would like to welcome our witnesses. I would also like to ask them to summarize their testimony to permit us ample time for questions. Of course, the complete written statement of each witness will appear in the record.

In addition, the record will be kept open for 2 weeks to permit the submission of statements by other interested parties and for supplementary material.

Our first witness is the Honorable Gregory J. Newell, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. Accompanying Mr. Newell will be Ambassador Jean Gerard, the Permanent Representative of the United States to Unesco. We will be happy to take your statement at this time, Mr. Newell, and I have some questions for both of you.

STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY J. NEWELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. JEAN GERARD, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO UNESCO

Mr. NEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It gives me pleasure to appear before this committee to report on the administration's policy toward Unesco.

As you know, the administration announced last December the U.S. intention to withdraw from Unesco effective December 31, 1984. We said at that time that we would be in a position to recommend to the President that he reconsider the withdrawal decision if significant concrete and lasting reform occurred in Unesco in 1984.

The question now is not whether to withdraw from Unesco, but whether sufficient reform occurred in Unesco this year to justify reconsideration of a Presidential decision already made.

We are left, then, with the need to evaluate what occurred at the Executive Board and throughout the year at Unesco. Clearly, Unesco and its member countries made a welcome effort to bring about change, although some groups were much more active than others.

Beside the kinds of changes to which I have referred in my prepared text, others could be mentioned: The introduction of a question-and-answer session wherein the Assistant Directors General responsible for programs were made accountable to the Board directly; the mild treatment of the Arab-Israeli question at the fall Board; the departure of the official in the Unesco executive secretariat responsible for Unesco's human rights programs, of which we have been particularly critical; and the fending off of an anticipated attack upon Unesco's valuable Human Rights Committee.

Against these advances, however, we must balance a number of negatives. First, most of the temporary committee's recommendations have no implementing mechanisms. At this point, they must be taken on good faith.

Second, a number of changes in management practices failed to go as far as they could have and should have.

Third, the programs which we and most other U.S. groups, including the U.S. National Commission for Unesco, have been critical of, have not been eliminated or even reduced.

Fourth, no fixed, permanent steps have been taken, despite our strong urgings all year, to protect minority group interests.

In sum, viewed in relation to its own previous performance, Unesco this year has made some movement. Viewed, however, in relation to the concerns we expressed 1 year ago, an unacceptable gap remains.

We would be pleased to take any questions from you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newell follows:]

STATEMENT OF

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREGORY J. NEWELL

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECEMBER 10, 1984

MR. CHAIRMAN:

IT GIVES ME PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TO REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD UNESCO. AS YOU KNOW THE ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCED LAST DECEMBER THE UNITED STATES INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM UNESCO EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 31, 1984. WE SAID AT THAT SAME TIME THAT WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE RECONSIDER THE WITHDRAWAL DECISION IF SIGNIFICANT, CONCRETE AND LASTING REFORM OCCURRED IN UNESCO IN 1984. THE QUESTION NOW IS NOT WHETHER TO WITHDRAW FROM UNESCO BUT WHETHER SUFFICIENT REFORM OCCURRED IN UNESCO THIS YEAR TO JUSTIFY RECONSIDERATION OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ALREADY MADE.

OUR MAJOR EFFORT IN UNESCO THIS YEAR HAS BEEN TO ENCOURAGE ITS REFORM. WE WERE ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS IN THE WESTERN WORKING GROUP ON REFORM. WITHIN THAT GROUP, WE MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS WHICH WERE INCORPORATED INTO WESTERN POSITIONS AND PASSED ALONG TO A 13-NATION TEMPORARY COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH MAKING REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS. WE ALSO SUPPORTED THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S WORKING GROUPS ON REFORM. ALL THESE EFFORTS REACHED THEIR CULMINATION IN THE FALL SESSION OF UNESCO'S EXECUTIVE BOARD. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXPLAIN OUR ROLE AT THIS IMPORTANT MEETING AND TO DESCRIBE ITS OUTCOME.

The Fall Executive Board

By the time of the 120th Executive Board session in September and October, the shape of its main conclusions was already fairly predictable. UNESCO's Director General had already proposed actions in the management area on the basis of his working groups' recommendations. We also knew the recommendations of the Board's Temporary Committee on reform. Thus a reform package existed which, it was easily foreseen, would win the approval of the Board.

Having participated in the elaboration of the parts of this package, we were aware of its strengths and of its limitations. It was clear to us that, however welcome might be the changes it contained -- and the change in attitude it represented -- the package fell far short of answering, in concrete terms, the concerns we had expressed when we made our withdrawal announcement. Our strategy for the Board was to build upon what had been elaborated over the summer with proposals of our own that were more far-reaching.

We prepared for the Executive Board meeting by determining the areas in which UNESCO needed to go further and by drawing up proposals we thought appropriate. These proposals in great measure were not new: they had been widely discussed within the Western group and often with other member countries. We

ALSO MADE DEMARCHES ON BEHALF OF THIS STRATEGY IN ALL EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER CAPITALS BEFORE THE BOARD SESSION BEGAN.

AT THE BOARD SESSION ITSELF, THREE BROAD EFFORTS WERE MADE: FIRST, APPROVAL OF MANAGEMENT AND OTHER CHANGES ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AND RECOMMENDED BY THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE; SECOND, THE ELABORATION OF THE PROGRAM AND BUDGET RECOMMENDATION FOR THE 1986-87 BIENNIUM, WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED THE TESTING GROUND FOR ACCEPTANCE OF WESTERN IDEAS ON HOW THE NEXT PROGRAM AND BUDGET SHOULD BE SHAPED; AND THIRD, THE U.S. EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN OR MAKE OPERATIONAL THE MANAGEMENT AND DECISION-MAKING REFORMS THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE HAD GENERATED.

WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST EFFORT, UNESCO MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE WESTERN MEMBERS, GENERALLY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE FORMED A VALUABLE BODY OF AGREED CHANGES THAT OUGHT NOT BE JEOPARDIZED BY ATTEMPTS TO REOPEN THE ISSUES WHICH THEY ADDRESSED. WE AGREED THAT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S INITIATIVES AND THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS CONSTITUTED A GOOD BEGINNING, AND SHOULD BE ADOPTED. WE DID NOT AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD SHOULD STOP AT THAT POINT, AS I WILL EXPLAIN FURTHER.

WITH REGARD TO THE GUIDELINES FOR THE PROGRAM AND BUDGET, THE UNITED STATES AGAIN PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE, PRINCIPALLY BY SERVING AS ONE OF THE TWO WESTERN GROUP MEMBERS ON THE AD HOC DRAFTING COMMITTEE SET UP BY THE BOARD TO COMPOSE THE PROGRAM AND BUDGET GUIDELINES. THE OVERALL RESULT WAS AN IMPROVEMENT ON PREVIOUS SUCH GUIDELINES. AGAIN, HOWEVER, THE BOARD DID NOT GO AS FAR AS WE, AND OTHERS, BELIEVED NECESSARY. SPECIFICALLY, IT FAILED TO PASS, OR EVEN ADEQUATELY TO ADDRESS, A PROPOSAL BY THE NORDIC COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD HAVE PRIORITIZED UNESCO'S PROGRAMS, RECOMMENDING REDUCTIONS IN SOME AND THE ELIMINATION OF OTHERS. THE FINAL RESULT WAS THAT, ALTHOUGH SOME WELCOME EMPHASES AND NUANCES WERE INSERTED INTO THE GUIDELINES, NO PROGRAM OR ACTIVITY WHICH WE FOUND OFFENSIVE WAS ELIMINATED OR EVEN REDUCED.

IT WAS IN THE BUDGET AREA THAT THE WEST ENJOYED A POTENTIAL SUCCESS -- THE RECOMMENDATION OF A ZERO-GROWTH BUDGET FOR 1986-87. I USE THE WORD "POTENTIAL" BECAUSE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTRODUCED A NOTE OF UNCERTAINTY BY INSERTING AN AMENDMENT CALLING FOR A POSSIBLE 2% GROWTH, THOUGH WITH AN UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT THIS WOULD NOT COME FROM REGULAR BUDGET FUNDS.

WITH REGARD TO THE THIRD CATEGORY, REFORMS GOING BEYOND THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, MANY MEMBERS RESISTED ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION. WE PUT FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSALS, HOWEVER,

DISCUSSED THEM THOROUGHLY WITH OUR WESTERN INFORMATION GROUP COLLEAGUES, AND, AFTER TAILORING MOST OF THEM TO THE NEEDS AND SUGGESTIONS OF OUR FRIENDS TO SOME DEGREE, PRESENTED THEM TO THE ENTIRE BOARD.

THESE PROPOSALS COMPRISED BOTH FAIRLY MODEST REFORM SUGGESTIONS IN AREAS LIKE EVALUATION, PERSONNEL AND BUDGET REVIEW; AS WELL AS TWO FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS ON VOTING AND CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING. THE FORMER HAD WESTERN GROUP CO-SPONSORS; THE LATTER TWO DID NOT. UNFORTUNATELY, NONE WERE ACCEPTED BY THE BOARD. WE FOUND PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTING THE FACT THAT IN NO CASE DID THE BOARD SEE FIT TO OFFER ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THE CONCERNS RAISED.

Assessment of Reform This Year

WE ARE LEFT WITH THE NEED TO EVALUATE WHAT OCCURRED AT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AT UNESCO. CLEARLY, UNESCO AND ITS MEMBER COUNTRIES MADE A WELCOME EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE, ALTHOUGH SOME GROUPS WERE MUCH MORE ACTIVE THAN OTHERS. BESIDES THE KIND OF CHANGES TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, OTHERS COULD BE MENTIONED: THE INTRODUCTION OF QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSIONS WHEREIN THE ASSISTANT DIRECTORS GENERAL RESPONSIBLE FOR PROGRAMS WERE MADE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE BOARD DIRECTLY; THE MILD TREATMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION AT THE FALL BOARD; THE DEPARTURE OF THE OFFICIAL IN THE UNESCO

SECRETARIAT RESPONSIBLE FOR UNESCO'S HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, OF WHICH WE HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY CRITICAL; AND THE FENDING OFF OF AN ANTICIPATED ATTACK UPON UNESCO'S VALUABLE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE.

AGAINST THESE ADVANCES, HOWEVER, WE MUST BALANCE A NUMBER OF NEGATIVES. FIRST, MOST OF THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NO IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS. AT THIS POINT THEY MUST BE TAKEN ON GOOD FAITH. SECONDLY, AS NOTED ABOVE, A NUMBER OF THE CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FAILED TO GO AS FAR AS THEY COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE. THIRD, THE PROGRAMS OF WHICH WE, AND MOST OTHER U.S. GROUPS INCLUDING THE U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO, HAVE BEEN CRITICAL HAVE NOT BEEN ELIMINATED OR EVEN REDUCED. FOURTH, NO FIXED, PERMANENT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN, DESPITE OUR STRONG URGINGS ALL YEAR, TO PROTECT MINORITY GROUP INTERESTS.

IN SUM, VIEWED IN RELATION TO ITS OWN PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE, UNESCO THIS YEAR HAS MADE SOME MOVEMENT. VIEWED, HOWEVER, IN RELATION TO THE CONCERNS WE EXPRESSED A YEAR AGO, AN UNACCEPTABLE GAP REMAINS.

Foreign Reactions

As members of this body are no doubt aware, the United States is not the only country to have expressed serious misgivings about UNESCO during the process we have been describing. Communications have now been sent to the Organization urging sweeping reform by high officials of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic of Germany made similar views known in strong terms. As you also know, the United Kingdom, while welcoming the start that UNESCO has made, has at the same time found UNESCO's reforms inadequate, and has submitted its own letter of withdrawal from the Organization, effective at the end of 1985.

The One-Year Postponment Option

One course of action urged upon the United States by some groups here, and by some of our friends abroad, is a one-year postponement of the President's withdrawal decision. They argue that a postponement is necessary for concrete change to occur. There are sound reasons to believe, however, that such a course would only strike at U.S. credibility. A withdrawal on schedule, on the other hand, would be a powerful impetus for reform, not least because it would deprive UNESCO of a quarter

OF ITS RESOURCES AND COULD THUS FORCE THE ORGANIZATION TO PRIORITIZE ITS PROGRAM IN THE WAY THAT WE AND OTHERS HAVE URGED. IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY RULED OUT A POSTPONEMENT, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY.

IT IS INSTRUCTIVE IN THIS REGARD TO RECALL THE ILO PRECEDENT, DIFFERENT IN MANY RESPECTS FROM THE UNESCO CASE BUT WITH IMPORTANT SIMILARITIES AS WELL. IN BOTH CASES WE HAD WORKED WITH THE ORGANIZATION FOR SOME TIME TO GET CHANGES MADE, BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. IN BOTH CASES, ONE OF OUR MAIN COMPLAINTS WAS POLITICIZATION, I.E., THE TENDENCY FOR THE ORGANIZATION TO ACCORD PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO A PARTICULAR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND TO THOSE WHO PRACTICED IT. IN BOTH CASES, OUR WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT HAD A STRONGLY SALUTARY EFFECT. IN BOTH CASES, THE ORGANIZATION FAILED TO REPOND ADEQUATELY TO OUR COMPLAINTS DURING THE WITHDRAWAL NOTICE PERIOD. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT EVEN THOUGH THE ILO HAD TWO YEARS TO RESPOND TO OUR COMPLAINTS BEFORE WE WITHDREW, IT DID NOT DO SO. FINALLY, IT COULD WELL TURN OUT THAT IN UNESCO, AS IN THE ILO CASE, AN ACTUAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL MIGHT PRODUCE REAL CHANGE.

IN BRIEF, DECISIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN IN THE ILO CASE WHEN OTHER ATTEMPTS HAD FAILED AND, DURING OUR ABSENCE, THE ORGANIZATION HASTENED TO MAKE CONSTRUCTIVE IMPROVEMENTS. THE LESSON CONVEYED IS A STRONGLY APPEALING ONE.

MAY I CLOSE BY EMPHASIZING THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH UNESCO, THIS ADMINISTRATION REMAINS COMMITTED TO A PROGRAM OF ALTERNATIVE ACTIVITIES IN EDUCATION, SCIENCE, CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS, FOR WHICH WE WOULD REQUEST FUNDING. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE ACTIVITIES, WHICH WILL INCLUDE SELECTED PROGRAMS UNDER UNESCO'S UMBRELLA, WILL BE MORE COST EFFECTIVE AND THUS BE OF GREATER DIRECT BENEFIT TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

Supplemental Comments by Mr. Newell

Our requirements for re-entry into UNESCO if we withdraw are no different from the requirements we put forward this year for a reconsideration of our withdrawal decision. Most important among them, as described in my letter to the Director General of July 13, 1984, are (1) a concentration upon programs for which there is general agreement and the elimination of politically contentious activities on which no agreement is possible; (2) mechanisms to protect the interests of minority group members, including the Western Group, which contributes two-thirds of UNESCO's budget; (3) a return to member states of their rightful authority in the Organization through the reinvigoration of the governing bodies; (4) an end to UNESCO's gross mismanagment, as described in the November 30, 1984 GAO report; and (5) adoption of a zero real growth 1986/87 budget.

TO THE
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO)

PARIS FRANCE

July 13, 1984

Dear Mr. Director General:

I have been instructed to convey the following letter to you, in response to your letter CL 2898 of January 31, 1984, from the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs:

"Dear Mr. Director General:

It is with a special sense of responsibility that the United States is responding to your request for suggestions on the preparation of the Draft Program and Budget for 1986-87 (23 C/5). We hope, of course, for an early indication of UNESCO's willingness to undertake the kind of profound reform that we and others have urged. We feel that it is our responsibility both to re-state our objections to some current tendencies, programs and practices in UNESCO, and to highlight the kinds of activities for which general support exists among UNESCO's members, and on which, therefore, UNESCO should be concentrating.

Attached to this letter is a statement describing the United States' position, sector by sector, on UNESCO's program activities. It deals with each major program of the Second Medium Term Plan, and with those subprograms that, in our opinion, merit increased or decreased resources, or a shift in funding priorities. You will find our views on these items consistent with those we have repeatedly expressed in the past.

In order to put these program views into the context of our broader concerns, so that the rationale for the changes we are proposing will be clear, I wish in this letter to delineate those basic changes we regard as most necessary if UNESCO is to regain the confidence and support of all segments of its membership.

Among the reforms advocated by the United States and the other members of the Western Information Group, three are of fundamental importance. They involve, first, creation of a

mechanism to ensure that, in major matters, UNESCO decisions and programs enjoy the support of all geographic groups, including the support of the group that contributes the major part of UNESCO's budget; second, a return to concentration on UNESCO's original purposes, with which we can all agree; third, the assumption by member states of their rightful authority in the organization, through the strengthening of the General Conference and, in particular, its Executive Board. The budget and management changes which practically every speaker at the recent Executive Board session endorsed are of basic importance in achieving these objectives. All of these suggested reforms are relevant in considering the 1986-87 Program and Budget, as you have asked us to do.

The first major reform, creating mechanisms to assure that important UNESCO decisions and programs enjoy the support of all major groups, including the Western group, does not relate directly to the current exercise but should nonetheless be borne in mind in constructing the 1986-87 program and budget.

The representational principle of one-nation, one-vote, is not inappropriate in UNESCO. But it should be understood that the UNESCO decision-making system can be unrealistic, when it encourages the facile consensus adoption of programs which establish cumulative trends antithetical to the position of the geographic group that contributes an overwhelmingly large part of the budget.

As you know from our interventions at the recent Executive Board session, Mr. Director General, we do not think that the invocation of that type of consensus, which has often been practiced at UNESCO, responds to the need. That type of consensus does not sufficiently reflect minority interests. Though it is perfectly suitable for bridging differences in certain instances, UNESCO's kind of consensus has shown itself to be inadequate as a means of reconciling fundamentally different points of view on vital questions.

We have, for years, participated in UNESCO's consensus process, and have tried to protect our interests to the degree possible. But we now find ourselves in deep disagreement with the direction that UNESCO programs have taken in areas such as human rights, disarmament, budget, press freedom, and the role of the state vis-a-vis that of the individual. We find it no comfort to be told that the amounts of money involved in the activities and decisions we oppose are often small. The issues are large.

Not having found UNESCO's consensus process adequate, we must now seek mechanisms to improve the process. We would hope that the Executive Board would consider the following at its September-October session:

-- A strengthened drafting and negotiating group at the General Conference, directed to consider contentious issues, which issues would be decided only upon the basis of full agreement among all the geographic groups represented.

-- The introduction of a similar mechanism for the Executive Board.

-- A procedure for voting on the budget that would ensure that no budget would pass without the affirmative support of members who together contribute at least 51% of the organization's funds.

The second fundamental reform we seek bears directly on the program and budget formulation in which we are engaged: a return by UNESCO to concentration upon its original purposes, and deletion of programs and themes that are a source of contention among groups of member states. Education, science, culture and communication are ends in themselves. Most of UNESCO's activities fall into these categories. We urge that UNESCO pursue those core activities which are widely agreed upon, and abandon those that divide us.

Examples of divisive activities are found in certain uncritical and simplistic approaches to disarmament, economic theorizing, and global standard-setting (except where consensus is possible and the need for universal norms is widely felt in the international community, e.g., in the area of copyright). It is in areas such as these that UNESCO, instead of acting as a unifier of member states, becomes, rather, a partisan participant in existing quarrels, or even, in several cases, the initiator of new quarrels. It is, for example, in such areas as the promotion of "collective" rights and the creation of a "New World Information and Communication Order" that UNESCO has most visibly taken sides in the struggle between libertarians and statists, between those whose primary concern is for the individual and those who are willing to subordinate the individual's well-being to that of society or the state. This is not an appropriate role for a United Nations specialized agency.

The United States regards such a partisan role for UNESCO as an extremely unwelcome accretion upon UNESCO's original charge -- the promotion of peace through the promotion of international cooperation in education, science, culture, and communication. Indeed, we feel so strongly about the issue that we are not willing to stand by while the organization, to which we have been a prime contributor, now contributes so consistently to the creation of a future in which states become ever stronger and their citizens ever weaker.

The third fundamental reform, reassertion of the authority of UNESCO's members and governing bodies, clearly interests many member states. Indeed, two steps in this direction occurred at the May Executive Board session. There it was decided that Assistant Directors General would hereafter appear at Board meetings for question-and-answer sessions, and the Board requested the Director General to intensify consultations on the C/5 during the summer period between Board meetings.

This is a promising, if small, beginning. We see the following as further useful innovations in this regard, and we would hope for firm action on these suggestions at or before the autumn Executive Board session:

-- Swift and wholehearted initiation of freely-structured question-and-answer sessions between the Board and your principal collaborators (the Deputy and Assistant Directors General). This will require the allotment of an adequate time period and careful attention to follow-up documentation.

-- Mechanisms through which member states are given real decision-making power, including the ability to change or eliminate programs presented in the draft C/5. In the phase leading up to that draft, especially in the critical period between now and the autumn Board meeting, there should be direct consultations on the C/5 between Executive Board members and the Secretariat, to the extent that individual Board members desire them.

-- Consideration, at or before the autumn Board session, of means by which the effectiveness of the Board's subunits might be increased.

-- Establishment of some mechanism or procedures to ensure that individual member states, as represented by their Permanent Delegations, or in any other suitable

way, are given appropriate influence, and are accorded due respect and consideration by the organization's Secretariat.

Turning now to the budget and management areas, we also see a need for reform. The May Executive Board session gave evidence of ample support for changes in these areas, and we await with interest the recommendations of the Executive Board's Temporary Committee and the groups you personally set up within the Secretariat. In the meantime, we believe you should encourage the following important changes.

The substance of the budget, as you know, is a particularly important matter for the Western nations. Suspending, for the moment, consideration of our announced withdrawal and its financial impact upon the organization, we believe UNESCO should make an early commitment to drawing up the 1986-87 budget on the basis of zero real growth with maximum absorption of non-discretionary cost increases, as urged by the UNESCO Geneva Group in its joint statement of April 4. Further, we recommend that this zero real growth budget be achieved through a reordering of program priorities along the lines set forth in this letter, and in our attached comments on the individual subprograms.

Budget presentation also requires improvement. We hope your working group on the budget will consider simplification of the budget format to be a prime objective. The overall aim, of course, should be to increase member states' understanding of the breakdown of budgetary allocations for the activities funded.

Among management concerns, personnel management and recruitment must be addressed if UNESCO's employees are to implement the organization's programs well. By numerous accounts, morale is unacceptably low. Unbiased implementation of personnel regulations and proper delegation of decision-making powers are needed, with due attention to the concerns of employee unions and associations by those in authority. The recruitment process must be greatly speeded up if UNESCO is to attract top-flight talent. Consultants--which are costly--should not be employed for tasks that can be done within UNESCO itself by its employees.

Evaluation is a function that must be improved, as we have suggested on many occasions. We hold the view that it would be well to begin by fully implementing existing guidelines and by

effectively using existing resources. We will watch with great attention the work of the Temporary Committee of the Executive Board and the working group on evaluation that you have established.

Decentralization of UNESCO is also necessary. We welcomed your recognition of the importance of this matter at the May Executive Board session. Provision to promote more initiative and adaptation at the regional and local levels should be built into the 1986-87 program. Decentralization will not be effective without due delegation of authority.

We also believe the time has come to streamline UNESCO's programs in a major way. Quite apart from budgetary considerations, we have been concerned for some time over the steady accretion of programs which has unduly expanded UNESCO's activities. Matters have reached a point where even the largest member states find it difficult to keep abreast of all the Organization is doing, and yet we are expected to subscribe to all of its activities. The result is a combination of annoyance, frustration, indifference, helplessness, and pretense.

Pruning back these excessive accretions will be a difficult task, one that is hardly mechanical. This pruning will require your personal and thoughtful intervention. In this connection we reiterate our belief that UNESCO should undertake only those activities in which it can play a unique and necessary role, and to which recipient member states are prepared to give the necessary support and cooperation.

As you know, the Western Information Group, in its informal consultations prior to the submission of individual member states' recommendations on the 1986-87 program and budget, formulated a rank-order list of major subprograms, according to their worth and value in the estimation of of those member states. We believe that this rank-ordering is worth your consideration, not only for its expression of views about the programs themselves, but because the technique seems to us especially valuable. We believe, and recommend, that your first presentation to the Executive Board on the subject of the 1986-87 program and budget should include a rank-ordering of current subprograms. Whatever the specific judgments as to priorities contained in such a list (and we fully expect that your rank-ordering might be different from that prepared by the Information Group), its chief value would be that it would require member states to face the hard reality that there must

be some priority -- that judgments must be made, and programs must be adapted, changed, or eliminated, in an environment of limited resources. A genuine rank-order listing of programs would, it seems to us, be an invaluable intellectual and management tool.

Finally, we believe that consultations with members on the next C/5 must be made much more meaningful. A start has been made in this regard with the offer of Deputy Director General Knapp to meet with members on the C/5 throughout the summer. A further useful suggestion is to include in the next C/5 draft document, on a selective basis, choices to be made on major program issues. These could be issues about which you personally feel concern or hesitation, based upon the diversity of replies you will have received from member states. The presentation of such choices would help the Executive Board and member states in formulating comments on the draft. It would also assist you in preparing any revisions or proposals necessary to win final approval of the document at the General Conference.

In closing, Mr. Director General, my Government hopes that you will take the lead in seeking the reforms that this letter has urged. In fact, such far-reaching change can probably occur only with the personal support of the Director General. UNESCO needs imaginative leadership if it is to attract the enthusiastic support of all its members once again. For the Organization's future, we trust that you will do your utmost to ensure that desirable outcome.

Sincerely,

Gregory J. Newell"

Please accept, Mr. Director General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Jean Broward Shevlin Gerard
Ambassador

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Could you specifically describe what reforms, if implemented, would justify a postponement of the pullout or would justify our rejoining Unesco?

Mr. NEWELL. The three or four main concerns which we listed in our December 28 letter to the Director General deal with first, structural changes which would ensure recognition of the minority views of member states.

Second are structural changes which would correct the extraneous politicization; third, a zero-net-program-growth budget, which other U.N. system agencies have proposed to their member states; and, fourth, movement away from the statist theories such as the new world information and communications order, new international economic order, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. If the United States does withdraw from Unesco, could you please elaborate on the program of alternative activities for which the State Department will seek funding this next number of years?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes. Mr. Chairman, we have spent the past 11 months operating on two tracks in the State Department. The first was seeking reforms in Unesco. The second was seeking the alternative mechanisms which would be employed if we were to withdraw from Unesco.

We have used the expertise of departments and agencies throughout the U.S. Government as well as the private sector in looking for the alternatives to Unesco's education, science, culture, and communications programs. We will be committing the same level of funding, $47 million to these alternatives. We are very encouraged by what we see in these alternatives.

To contrast what this will mean to the developing world, Unesco currently expends 80 percent of its resources at its headquarters in Paris; 20 percent elsewhere. The mechanisms that are available to us now multilaterally, regionally, bilaterally, and through the private sector would provide a significant increase in what is delivered to the third world.

We foresee about 85 percent of these alternative funds going to three agencies: UNDP, AID, and USIA. These three have almost a direct reversal of delivering resources to the field, to the developing world, that Unesco has. Unesco has an 80:20 ratio; UNDP, a 20:80 ratio.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you comment on the view of some critics that there are no viable alternatives to Unesco's science programs, for example?

Mr. NEWELL. We have already made some positive steps with the scientific sector including the funding, $37,000, to review alternative science projects.

The original criticisms by segments of the science sector, we believe, have been eliminated in that they have seen that there are alternatives and that the alternatives are much more attractive than many of the current programs in Unesco.

The CHAIRMAN. I am familiar with the Cabinet-level committee formed prior to our pullout from the ILO. Does the administration intend for the Interagency Committee on Unesco to evolve into something like today's Presidential Committee on the ILO?

Mr. NEWELL. We are still addressing that question. We certainly would have some form of a panel which would look after changes which might come about in Unesco, but that has not yet been decided.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Can you tell me why such a group has not been formed to date?

Mr. NEWELL. A Cabinet-level group has not been formed. However, an interagency task force of about 20 departments and agencies has been working all year long on reforms and on alternatives. But a panel named by the President has not yet been deemed necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, to my knowledge, there is a wide consensus that U.S. participation in the ILO is far more effective with the President's Commission than it could be without it. Is there any reason not to do it? Or how does participation in Unesco differ?

Mr. NEWELL. We have not yet concluded what sort of interagency force there would be if the United States were to withdraw. I guess that we have not yet felt it was necessary. We do have senior members of this administration working from education, science, culture, and communications sectors on these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have had a year. Why wasn't it formed before now?

Mr. NEWELL. Pardon me?

The CHAIRMAN. Why haven't we formed something like that before now?

Mr. NEWELL. We felt that we were satisfactorily meeting our obligations with the interagency force that has operated for the past 11 months.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Is the administration assessing the value of withdrawing from any other U.N. organization?

Mr. NEWELL. Currently, no. You may recall, the backdrop against which the Unesco decision was made. We had evaluated 87 of the 96 multilateral organizations in which we participate against the priorities which this administration had established about 2½ years ago. It was through that process that we saw improvement in the ILO, the FAO, the World Health Organization, ITU, UNEP, and ICAO. That improvement was lacking in Unesco. We have no other organizations at this point in time that concern us as does Unesco.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

When will the United States make its final determination as to whether it is going to or not going to withdraw?

Mr. NEWELL. It must be made by the 31st of December of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any indication whether it will be made before that day?

Mr. NEWELL. Most likely, it will be made before that date.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. But you are not sure when?

Mr. NEWELL. We are not sure when.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Gerard, according to the GAO study, over 70 percent of all Unesco staff now work at Unesco's Paris headquarters, compared to an equal split between headquar-

ters and the field 10 years ago. What is your assessment of whether Unesco's role and programs justify such a trend?

Ms. GERARD. I don't believe that they do. I think you will see in that same report that there has been a large increase in ratio of general service to professional staff. I think it used to be one to one and it is now one to two.

There is too little effective work really being done in the field now. We have recommended decentralization and moving more of the projects into the field rather than simply doing studies back at headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Much has been said about the centralized decisionmaking that characterizes Unesco's present management. What effect do you think that decentralization would have on Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. I think if there is proper delegation of authority and responsibility, the programs can be much more responsive to the needs of the peoples in the various regions. If, on the other hand, the decisionmaking is kept tightly in Paris as it is now, decentralization would simply be adding another layer of bureaucracy which I think would be unhelpful.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Ms. Gerard. We have urged them to do serious review and to have the GAO look at this so they could determine a good way to go about the decentralization process.

The CHAIRMAN. I am concerned that about 70 to 80 percent of the total staff are working right there in Paris rather than out in the field where it would appear to us that the bulk of the work should be done.

Ms. GERARD. We agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I understand that according to a 1983 Unesco staff association poll, only about 13 percent of Unesco's 1,151 staff members who responded believed that their employer, Unesco, allowed them to participate satisfactorily in the management of Unesco. Now, this poll was cited in the recent GAO study, and I am sure you are familiar with it.

Madam Ambassador, will you please comment on the morale of the Unesco employees as you have observed it? And, in your opinion, if the morale is low, what steps should be taken to improve this situation?

Ms. GERARD. From what I have seen the morale is low at Unesco, and I think that there are various steps that should be taken. One is to more effectively include the staff members in the decisionmaking process. Another is to have fewer people on fixed-term contracts. Over 80 percent of the staff are on contracts of 2 years or less, and I think that makes for a great deal of insecurity in the staff. Of course, you don't want everybody to have tenure, because that, then, can stultify an organization, too. But I think an intermediate step would be very useful.

Perhaps after someone has had two or three 2-year contracts, they could then be given a longer term, say at least a 6-year contract, so that they could feel that they were there for a more secure time and that, therefore, they could be developing programs on a longer range basis.

The CHAIRMAN. If morale is low, to what would you attribute the major reason for its being so low?

Ms. GERARD. I think many of the people there feel that the work is not as effective as it should be; that they are not really doing the work that the organization was set up to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that?

Ms. GERARD. According to a staff poll of last year, I think, only 2.5 percent of the employees that felt that they were getting promotions on the basis of merit and efficiency in their work. I believe that is another element in the low morale.

You asked why is it that they don't feel their work is as effective as it should be. For example, in the science sector, many of them feei that the programs are not on the cutting edge of science the way that they had been in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that about 80 Americans are currently employed by Unesco. What will be their status if the United States withdraws from Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. Of course, it all depends on their contracts. There are, I think, roughly 85 professionals and about 50 in the general service. They are international civil servants. The Soviets have called for their removal, as well as for the dismissal of any U.K. citizens who are in the Secretariat, that would be totally contrary to international civil service procedures.

Of course, those who are on a short-term contract do face the possibility of somebody else being put in that position when their contract is up.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that if the United States withdraws from Unesco, a U.S. observer mission would be set up in Paris. Could you please elaborate for us on how this mission will function, what will be the rank of the mission head, and do you believe that this person will be well received at Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. I believe the U.S. observer mission will be well received. Of course, we would have to ask for observer status. We certainly intend to have people there, particularly looking after such programs as the communications sector and the science sector. We feel these are some of the very useful, good programs going on at Unesco and in which we could participate even from the outside. We can continue our participation in the IOC because we are members of the International Scientific Union.

I think the rank of the head of the mission has not yet been settled. There is always great interest in having our scientific and technical expertise so there is not going to be any lack of desire to continue cooperating with us as much as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You indicated that the Russians have suggested that the American employees and United Kingdom employees be dismissed or gotten rid of. How much of the budget does the Soviet Union presently contribute to Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. Together with their two satellites the three votes that they got from the beginning—they pay a little over 12 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. A little less than half of what we are paying.

Ms. GERARD. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. How appropriate do you think Unesco's one-nation-one-vote system is in light of the fact that certain countries do bear a disproportionate share of Unesco's total budget?

Ms. GERARD. The concept of one nation, one vote is something that was proposed by us in the beginning. But there is a definite lack of checks and balances which I think are important to protect minority interests.

We put forth various proposals during the year to try to rectify that inequity. Some of the other U.N. organizations like UNIDO and IFAD do have protective mechanisms so that minority interests are taken into account. I think this would be a very healthy thing for Unesco as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Newell has indicated that the changes at Unesco, though there have been some, have been unsatisfactory. Do you share his viewpoint? And what is your recommendation with regard to whether or not we should withdraw from Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. I do feel that although there were changes, they were not satisfactory, particularly in that they did not even address the problem that we have with the politicization of the programs. There is a great resistance on the part of many to making any change whatsoever in the program, and of course, the Soviets are very vocal in not wanting to put aside the disarmament education program, which they find very useful.

I am afraid the management side—there again, it has been more promises than actual concrete action so far as to corrections.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your response to those who will say, and who do say, that it will be impossible to reform Unesco from an "empty chair," if we withdraw from Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. One answer, of course, is what you, yourself, cited, what happened with ILO. Our commitment to reform is clear. Whether we are in the organization or working as an observer mission from outside, we are certainly going to be pushing and with our allies and friends around the world to see to it that Unesco does become an effective organization. It is too important to have our work in the field to be allowed to become less and less effective. For example, UNDP and World Bank, which used to give projects to Unesco to execute amounting to about 30 percent of their budget, have found Unesco to be ineffective to the extent that they have reduced that level of projects to where they are now roughly 3 percent of the budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you comment on the view expressed by opponents of the pullout that improvements in the ILO resulted from the President's Commission, and that many of Unesco's flaws came from the failure by the United States to form a President's Commission on Unesco?

Ms. GERARD. Frankly, I don't believe that that is the case. I think we have worked hard. As Secretary Newell said, the interagency task force has been working throughout the year and the monitoring panel has been looking for reform. I think, of course, there is always more you can do. We would be hoping to propose some more far-reaching changes which our allies on our behalf would be putting forth this coming year.

With a general conference coming up in 1985, many of the things which people said could not be addressed this year can in fact be addressed next year—structural changes, far-reaching program changes, et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it only in anticipation of the Unesco pullout that the interagency committee was formed? Why wasn't it really formed years ago?

You can answer that, also, Mr. Newell, or any of these other questions. I didn't mean to indicate that you should not.

Mr. NEWELL. Well, Unesco is one of 96 organizations in which we participate. The ILO was somewhat different in that there is very, very strong interest in labor matters here in this country.

The ILO is also a tripartite organization where there is not only just the government participating but employers and employees as well. Unesco does not have that type of constituency in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any comments on that?

Ms. GERARD. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any other comments you would care to make, Madam Ambassador?

Ms. GERARD. No, just that I appreciate your interest in the question, and I know that from your experience and your knowledge of the ILO situation, you could make some very useful suggestions as to what might be done to make such an organization more effective. That change would also be beneficial to the whole U.N. system.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if you would do me a favor, I would like you, by about the 10th of January, to make a list of all the things you feel are wrong with Unesco, and a definitive list of what you think simply has to be done—assuming we pull out—before we could come back into Unesco. Would you submit that to the committee? I would like to have it by the 10th of January. If you need a little longer, that would be fine with me. I could give you until Inauguration Day. How is that?

Ms. GERARD. All right. Thank you.

[Information supplied follows:]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OBSERVER MISSION AT UNESCO

January 11, 1985

Senator Orrin G. Hatch
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Hatch:

When we last met in Washington, you asked me about my views on the future of our relations with UNESCO. Let me address this question for two different time frames. First, the short term strategy towards this particular organization within the next year or so, and, secondly, the long term approach to our nation's multilateral relations in the area of science, education, and culture.

In my opinion, we should be willing but not over-anxious to rejoin UNESCO. We have taken a drastic step which we should not reverse without achieving the majority of our objectives. Therefore, we should focus immediately on what our bottom line is on reforms we would like to secure, both looking at UNESCO itself as well as at the wider implications such reforms would have on the whole United Nations system. These reforms should be carefully and early coordinated with our friends and allies.

We have discussed these reforms on different occasions, and they fall into three areas:

(a) Structural changes - We want to strengthen the role of the governing bodies of the organization. The Executive Board should function like a board of directors of a corporation, setting policies and supervising the management of the organization. In this analogy, the function of the General Conference would be similar to that of a meeting of the shareholders. Secondly, we want to see the rights of minorities protected, especially in

the budget area where a small Western minority contributes the majority of the funds. It is not acceptable that an irresponsible majority, whose financial contributions add up to only a fraction of the budget, can dictate what the US taxpayer should contribute, particularly when we feel there is mismanagement, inefficiency, and excessive politization. The recent restraint by the Executive Board on the budget issue was the direct result of our notice of withdrawal. We need to get the rights of the paying minority embodied in the rules and procedures of the organization and an adoption of a policy of zero budget growth because we cannot send our withdrawal notice every time the budget comes up. Finally, we need to introduce checks and balances in the system to help ensure that the organization does not deteriorate again in a short period of time. An inspector general, reporting to the Executive Board, or similar structures could serve this purpose. It might be better to have the comptroller elected by the General Conference, and responsible directly to the General Conference and the Executive Board. I agree with the GAO that it would be useful to establish a small independent body established along the lines of the ACABQ to control management, financial and personnel practices, and to change the terms of reference for the external auditors so that they would be similar to those of the GAO.

(b) Program changes - Here we want to see the organization return to its original purposes and balance restored between Western, democratic approaches and statist approaches as advocated by the Eastern bloc and their sympathizers in the Third World. I believe this can be achieved if we insist on instituting mechanisms which ensure that all of UNESCO's programs enjoy the unanimous or at least overwhelming support of its member states. The UNESCO programs which we object to do not have this support. A useful step in this direction was proposed by the Nordic countries during the last Executive Board meeting. Unfortunately, the Board was not willing to act on this resolution. The programs should be only those which can be performed exclusively by an international organization, and should generally have a practical emphasis.

Furthermore, we have to insist on concentration and streamlining of existing programs in UNESCO. There is much overlap of programs within the organization as well as with other international organizations. Our

Government Accounting Office supported this view by stating "The Secretariat's program planning efforts provide no systematic control over program growth. New programs are developed without identifying ineffective, obsolete, or marginally useful programs that could be eliminated or combining existing programs that overlap and duplicate each other."

(c) Management - Unesco's management is a mess. Its inefficient management practices, which we have described on many occasions, and which were put into relief by the GAO report, must be corrected. We need more transparency in its personnel practices and in program implementation. We need a credible evaluation effort and improved financial controls. It is unfortunate that the governing bodies of UNESCO have to address and insist on what seems to us nothing but sound management practices. This, especially since some of the structures and proper procedures do exist - at least on paper.

In all frankness, I am not overly optimistic that the majority of the UNESCO member states and, particularly, the present management of UNESCO, are ready to take the drastic and bold steps in the near future which would be required to return this organization to a condition where it would enjoy again our wholehearted support.

Therefore, we should also begin fairly soon a study of our multilateral relations in the area of science, education, and culture. The United Nations' system of specialized agencies has grown uncontrolled over the last two decades with much overlapping and duplication. We should use the crisis of UNESCO as an opportunity to take stock of the present situation, asses the costs and benefits of bilateral, regional, and universal arrangements, and measure them against our national interest. Hearings on the Hill could be a critical contribution to such a process of developing a coherent strategy for the next decade. This is the bigger challenge we should accept. UNESCO, after all, is only a small piece in the puzzle of our international relations, and we should take advantage of all the opportunities for change which exist or which we can cause to emerge.

Thank you for the opportunity to expand on my short remarks in Washington. I would be happy to answer any additional questions you might have.

Sincerely,

Jean Broward Shevlin Gerard
Ambassador

The CHAIRMAN. Is that OK? We would like to have that as soon as we can, because I think it is important that we have your expertise on this matter, and of course, I would appreciate it, Mr. Newell, if the State Department would do the same for me.

I would like to see it from her perspective as Ambassador, but I would like to see it from the State Department's perspective as well.

Mr. NEWELL. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

We will turn to Senator Randolph. We are happy to have him with us this morning.

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Is it proper or correct to refer to Mrs. Gerard rather than "Ambassador" or some other name? I am asking, really.

Ms. GERARD. Senator, whatever is your pleasure.

Senator RANDOLPH. Well, Mrs. Gerard and Mr. Newell, of course, the positions you hold, I understand them. I am knowledgeable, to a degree, on Unesco, as I am on the programs within the larger focus of the United Nations.

As our chairman knows, it was not many days ago that a delegation from the Congress of the United States, both Senate and House, journeyed for the important discussions within the 16 nations of the NATO organization meeting in Brussels. Those meetings, as I am sure our chairman of this committee knows, were, I think, informative. But, for the record, I want to say that I found that we were discussing more of the minor matter than the major matters, as I see it, that look toward a hope for understanding and ultimate peace among the peoples of the world.

For the record, I will say that members of the subcommittee on which I was serving—we spent an hour and a half as to change of name of the subcommittee. That is a very important matter. [Laughter.]

That could have been discussed, of course, not formally, for that length of time. But I am not a carping critic in any sense, and I come to the discussion of all of these problems with an understanding of the desires of the nations of the world, in a world where time and distance are no more, and we must recognize that fact.

We attempted, of course, to recognize it at the time when the meeting to establish the United Nation was held in San Francisco that I attended, and that is a long time ago—1945, if you will recall. There have been many attempts since then to bring us closer together.

I will ask, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, to place in the record what I believe is perhaps a controversial article, but it is, I think, an article which is attempting to be objective with Unesco, which was published a few days ago in the New York Herald Tribune.

Now, I have just come, late last night, from Madrid, where I have attended, not as a Member of the Congress of the United States but as an individual, a meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, which you are familiar with, and that conference was, to a degree, I thought, very helpful. There were approximately 100 persons, both men and women, who were there, and we discussed these matters that I think are upon us now.

I am not going to try to overdo what I am now saying, but we are on the cutting edge of the destruction of the world as we know it. It cannot be otherwise. When the armaments of whatever country, large or small, are being directed to those items of weaponry which, if they were used—I am not saying they will be used, and I pray they will never be used—but if they are, what is now happening, with the death of two of our representatives of the United States killed in the recent Mideast hijacking—yes, there were two Americans that were killed—but terrorism, I say, is all over the world. We must not forget that as we sit here this morning in comparative peace and quiet and discuss, as we hope we are, in constructive manner, these problems that are before us.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I believe you did say that that article, which is, I think, an article which will help to make this record, which you desire to be a record of Unesco and the United Nations and those programs that are being carried out—I am not certain, getting in so late—did I ask you for that privilege?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you very much.

Now, I would like simply—and I will not continue my questioning—I may have questions, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, that I would use during this hearing, or if there are subsequent hearings before I leave the Senate on January 4—but I am very, very concerned—concerned in greater degree than when I came to the Congress in 1933, and later into the Senate in 1958—I am more concerned about the world going up in flames than I have ever been before, and I do not like to say that.

But I think it is a statement at least of fact as I understand it, from a more than cursory study of the whole of the items that are on our agenda.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for going into these problems, into the support of the programs in one degree or another, including the actual dollars that are advanced by the Soviet Union or other countries in connection with these programs.

It has always been a little difficult for me to understand—I believe perhaps it may be shared by others—that you can stay in an organization and not pay your dues. What do you think about that, Mrs. Gerard?

Ms. GERARD. That is true. You don't lose your voting rights at Unesco unless you are behind in your dues for 2 years. We think, frankly, that this is not the way to go about business. You don't want to be accused of being a deadbeat.

I think it is well known that the United States can afford to pay its contribution. It is simply that we feel that the money should be well spent and effectively used. Therefore, if Unesco is going to be turning more and more to ideological confrontation issues, to excessively theoretical issues, to duplicatory programs which are done as a primary mandate by other U.N. agencies we will cease funding those items. In order to help the developing world and thus ourselves as well, we want to see our moneys channeled in the most effective ways.

Senator RANDOLPH. Then you are saying that in Unesco you feel that we can withhold payments? Is that what you are saying?

Ms. GERARD. No. I said I know we could, but I don't think that we should.

Senator RANDOLPH. Oh, yes. Payments are being withheld to the United Nations, is that not correct, to the overall body, not by the United States for the moment? Are there other countries?

Ms. GERARD. There are countries who are not up to date in their payments. That is correct.

Senator RANDOLPH. The Soviet Union?

Ms. GERARD. That is correct, they are in arrears to the United Nations. However, we don't pay the percentage of our contribution that is going to programs for the PLO.

Senator RANDOLPH. Could we have the status of the dues-paying structure as it is at the beginning of this hearing, or during the hearing, made a part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will be happy to do that if you will provide that for us. Will you, Mr. Newell?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes.

[Material supplied follows:]

Annex II

STATUS OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1984
(United States dollars)

MEMBER STATES	1984 SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS	CONTRIBUTIONS PAYABLE AS AT 1 JANUARY 1984			COLLECTIONS IN 1984	CONTRIBUTIONS OUTSTANDING AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1984		
		PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL		PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL
AFGHANISTAN	.01	58 834	64 969	123 803	58 834	-	64 969	64 969
ALBANIA	.01	94 834	64 969	159 803	150 000	-	9 803	9 803
ALGERIA	.13	-	844 591	844 591	844 591	-	-	-
ANGOLA	.01	164 905	64 969	229 874	72 797	92 108	64 969	157 077
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	.01	60 631	64 969	125 600	-	60 631	64 969	125 600
ARGENTINA	.71	299 271	4 612 766	4 912 037	370 000	-	4 542 037	4 542 037
AUSTRALIA	1.57	-	10 200 062	10 200 062	9 668 631	-	531 431	531 431
AUSTRIA	.75	-	4 872 640	4 872 640	3 861 656	-	1 010 984	1 010 984
BAHAMAS	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
BAHRAIN	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
BANGLADESH	.03	-	194 905	194 905	194 905	-	-	-
BARBADOS	.01	14 617	64 969	79 586	20 760	-	48 646	48 646
BELGIUM	1.28	30 853	8 315 974	8 346 827	3 970 853	-	4 375 974	4 375 974
BELIZE	.01	-	64 969	64 969	5 136	-	59 833	59 833
BENIN	.01	118 003	64 969	182 972	58 834	59 169	64 969	124 138
BHUTAN	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
BOLIVIA	.01	110 769	64 969	175 738	-	110 769	64 969	175 738
BOTSWANA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
BRAZIL	1.39	12 250 833	9 030 627	21 281 460	4 685 438	7 565 395	9 030 627	16 596 022
BULGARIA	.18	724 923	1 169 434	1 894 357	616 000	108 923	1 169 434	1 278 357
BURKINA FASO	.01	57 933	64 969	122 902	-	57 933	64 969	122 902
BURMA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
BURUNDI	.01	119 283	64 969	184 252	10 869	108 414	64 969	173 383
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC	.34	1 850 942	2 338 867	4 189 809	1 170 003	680 939	2 338 867	3 019 806
CAMEROON	.01	124 963	64 969	189 932	121 724	3 239	64 969	68 208
CANADA	3.08	-	20 010 313	20 010 313	20 010 313	-	-	-
CAPE VERDE	.01	110 040	64 969	175 009	-	110 040	64 969	175 009
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	.01	127 361	64 969	192 330	44 829	82 532	64 969	147 501
CHAD	.01	191 366	64 969	256 335	58 814	132 552	64 969	197 521
CHILE	.07	-	454 780	454 780	454 780	-	-	-
CHINA	.80	4 179 092	5 717 232	9 896 324	5 643 448	-	4 252 876	4 252 876
COLOMBIA	.11	-	714 654	714 654	104 325	-	610 329	610 329
COMOROS	.01	194 777	64 969	259 746	75 494	119 283	64 969	184 252
CONGO	.01	38 762	64 969	103 731	95 015	-	8 716	8 716
COSTA RICA	.02	160 919	129 937	290 856	138 722	22 197	129 937	152 134
CUBA	.09	742 742	584 717	1 327 459	716 277	26 465	584 717	611 182
CYPRUS	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	.76	2 355 235	4 937 609	7 292 844	1 097 000	1 258 235	4 937 609	6 195 844
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	.01	177 957	64 969	242 926	60 484	117 313	64 969	182 282
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-

MEMBER STATES	1984 SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS	CONTRIBUTIONS PAYABLE AS AT 1 JANUARY 1984			COLLECTIONS IN 1984	CONTRIBUTIONS OUTSTANDING AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1984		
		PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL		PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL
DENMARK	.75	-	4 872 640	4 872 640	4 872 640	-	-	-
DJIBOUTI	.01	110 040	64 969	175 009	-	110 040	64 969	175 009
DOMINICA	.01	104 575	64 969	169 544	73 906	30 671	64 969	95 640
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	.03	267 177	194 905	462 082	67 177	200 000	194 905	394 905
ECUADOR	.02	122 100	129 937	252 037	136 729	-	115 308	115 308
EGYPT	.07	-	454 780	454 780	454 780	-	-	-
EL SALVADOR	.01	193 736	64 969	258 703	60 727	133 007	64 969	197 976
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	.01	166 926	64 969	231 895	43 380	123 546	64 969	188 515
ETHIOPIA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
FIJI	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
FINLAND	.48	-	3 118 490	3 118 490	3 118 490	-	-	-
FRANCE	6.51	4 357 157	42 294 525	46 651 682	42 294 525	-	4 357 157	4 357 157
GABON	.02	193 086	129 937	323 023	123 344	69 740	129 937	199 677
GAMBIA	.01	89 397	64 969	154 366	-	89 397	64 969	154 366
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	1.39	3 063 005	9 010 627	12 073 632	8 663 981	-	3 409 651	3 409 651
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF	8.54	-	55 483 141	55 483 141	55 483 141	-	-	-
GHANA	.02	-	129 937	129 937	129 937	-	-	-
GREECE	.60	-	2 598 741	2 598 741	2 234 151	-	364 590	364 590
GRENADA	.01	194 174	64 969	259 143	88 066	106 108	64 969	171 077
GUATEMALA	.02	-	129 937	129 937	-	-	129 937	129 937
GUINEA	.01	1 211	64 969	66 180	66 180	-	-	-
GUINEA-BISSAU	.01	176 411	64 969	241 380	31 130	145 281	64 969	210 250
GUYANA	.01	126 290	64 969	189 259	172 250	-	17 009	17 009
HAITI	.01	100 654	64 969	165 623	-	100 654	64 969	165 623
HONDURAS	.01	57 676	64 969	122 645	67 607	-	55 038	55 038
HUNGARY	.23	1 506 039	1 494 276	3 000 315	1 399 275	106 764	1 494 276	1 601 040
ICELAND	.03	-	194 905	194 905	100 000	-	94 905	94 905
INDIA	.36	337 662	2 338 867	2 676 529	617 782	-	2 058 747	2 058 747
INDONESIA	.13	-	844 591	844 591	844 591	-	-	-
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)	.58	4 611 441	3 768 175	8 379 616	4 695 645	-	3 683 971	3 683 971
IRAQ	.12	774 195	779 623	1 553 818	1 553 818	-	-	-
IRELAND	.18	-	1 169 434	1 169 434	1 169 434	-	-	-
ISRAEL	.23	2 864 417	1 494 276	4 358 693	368 344	2 496 073	1 494 276	3 990 349
ITALY	3.74	-	24 298 237	24 298 237	24 298 237	-	-	-
IVORY COAST	.03	200 403	194 905	395 308	-	200 403	194 905	395 308
JAMAICA	.02	-	129 937	129 937	-	-	129 937	129 937
JAPAN	10.32	-	67 047 543	67 047 543	67 047 543	-	-	-
JORDAN	.01	-	64 969	64 969	-	-	64 969	64 969
KENYA	.01	71 451	64 969	136 420	117 725	-	18 695	18 695
KUWAIT	.25	-	1 624 214	1 624 214	1 624 214	-	-	-
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	.01	58 834	64 969	123 803	-	58 834	64 969	123 803
LEBANON	.02	-	129 937	129 937	28 000	-	101 937	101 937
LESOTHO	.01	-	64 969	64 969	-	-	64 969	64 969
LIBERIA	.01	47 056	64 969	112 025	10 148	36 908	64 969	101 877
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	.26	1 529 705	1 689 182	3 218 887	-	1 529 705	1 689 182	3 218 887

MEMBER STATES	1984 SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS	CONTRIBUTIONS PAYABLE AS AT 1 JANUARY 1984			COLLECTIONS IN 1984	CONTRIBUTIONS OUTSTANDING AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1984		
		PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL		PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL
LUXEMBOURG	.06	-	389 811	389 811	389 811	-	-	-
MADAGASCAR	.01	104 846	64 969	169 815	66 685	38 161	64 969	103 130
MALAWI	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
MALAYSIA	.09	-	584 717	584 717	584 717	-	-	-
MALDIVES	.01	74 077	64 969	139 046	-	74 077	64 969	139 046
MALI	.01	121 753	64 969	186 722	102 229	19 524	64 969	84 493
MALTA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
MAURITANIA	.01	187 310	64 969	252 279	91 502	95 808	64 969	160 777
MAURITIUS	.01	58 834	64 969	123 803	108 834	-	14 969	14 969
MEXICO	.88	-	5 717 232	5 717 232	2 798 616	-	2 918 616	2 918 616
MONGOLIA	.01	57 672	64 969	122 641	63 292	-	59 349	59 349
MOROCCO	.05	-	324 843	324 843	324 843	-	-	-
MOZAMBIQUE	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
NEPAL	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS	1.78	-	11 571 822	11 571 822	5 754 071	-	5 817 751	5 817 751
NEW ZEALAND	.26	-	1 689 182	1 689 182	1 689 182	-	-	-
NICARAGUA	.01	116 283	64 969	181 252	-	116 283	64 969	181 252
NIGER	.01	134 688	64 969	199 657	119 651	15 037	64 969	80 006
NIGERIA	.19	129 845	1 236 402	1 366 247	50 900	79 945	1 236 402	1 313 347
NORWAY	.53	-	3 443 395	3 443 395	3 443 395	-	-	-
OMAN	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
PAKISTAN	.06	-	389 811	389 811	10 000	-	379 811	379 811
PANAMA	.02	-	129 937	129 937	129 937	-	-	-
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
PARAGUAY	.01	172 411	64 969	237 380	55 098	117 313	64 969	182 282
PERU	.07	810 535	454 780	1 265 315	471 306	339 189	454 780	1 093 969
PHILIPPINES	.09	208 270	584 717	792 987	380 858	-	612 129	612 129
POLAND	.72	10 192 866	4 677 735	14 865 601	10 796 000	7 397 866	4 677 735	12 075 601
PORTUGAL	.18	-	1 169 434	1 169 434	1 169 434	-	-	-
QATAR	.03	-	194 905	194 905	-	-	194 905	194 905
ROMANIA	.19	2 180 581	1 236 402	3 416 983	520 000	1 660 581	1 236 402	2 896 983
RWANDA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
SAINT LUCIA	.01	120 283	64 969	185 252	-	120 283	64 969	185 252
SAINT VINCENT	.01	-	64 969	64 969	32 485	-	32 484	32 484
SAMOA	.01	134 121	64 969	199 090	-	134 121	64 969	199 090
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	.01	-	64 969	64 969	-	-	64 969	64 969
SAUDI ARABIA	.84	-	5 587 296	5 587 296	5 587 296	-	-	-
SENEGAL	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
SEYCHELLES	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
SIERRA LEONE	.01	75 785	64 969	140 754	58 929	16 856	64 969	81 825
SINGAPORE	.09	-	584 717	584 717	584 717	-	-	-
SOLOMON ISLANDS	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
SOMALIA	.01	2 543	64 969	67 512	-	2 543	64 969	67 512
SOUTH AFRICA	.61	19 122 404	2 683 716	21 806 120	-	19 122 404	2 683 730	21 806 134
SPAIN	1.93	-	12 538 929	12 538 929	12 538 929	-	-	-

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MEMBER STATES	1984 SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS	CONTRIBUTIONS PAYABLE AS AT 1 JANUARY 1984 PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL	COLLECTIONS IN 1984	CONTRIBUTIONS OUTSTANDING AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1984 PRIOR YEARS	CURRENT YEAR	TOTAL
SRI LANKA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
SUDAN	.01	-	64 969	64 969	-	-	64 969	64 969
SURINAME	.01	-	64 969	64 969	-	-	64 969	64 969
SWAZILAND	.01	2 195	64 969	67 164	39 364	-	27 800	27 800
SWEDEN	1.32	-	8 575 848	8 575 848	8 575 848	-	-	-
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	.03	194 510	194 905	389 415	-	194 510	194 905	389 415
THAILAND	.08	-	519 749	519 749	519 749	-	-	-
TOGO	.01	85 997	64 969	150 966	-	85 997	64 969	150 966
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	.03	-	194 905	194 905	194 905	-	-	-
TUNISIA	.03	-	194 905	194 905	194 905	-	-	-
TURKEY	.32	1 660 575	2 084 594	3 745 169	1 169 623	490 952	2 084 594	2 575 546
UGANDA	.01	59 334	64 969	124 303	-	59 334	64 969	124 303
UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC	1.32	5 907 441	8 575 848	14 483 289	4 305 614	1 601 479	8 575 848	10 177 327
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	10.34	41 171 764	66 474 874	109 646 638	34 095 949	7 075 815	66 474 874	75 550 689
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	.16	-	1 039 497	1 039 497	-	-	1 039 497	1 039 497
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	6.67	-	30 340 332	30 340 332	30 340 332	-	-	-
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	.01	70 243	70 094	140 337	-	70 243	70 094	140 337
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	25.00	27 434 158	190 520 626	217 954 784	24 422 780	3 241 378	190 520 626	193 762 004
URUGUAY	.04	477 435	259 875	737 310	453 135	24 300	259 875	284 175
VANUATU	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
VENEZUELA	.55	932 515	3 573 269	4 505 784	15 552	916 963	3 573 269	4 490 232
VIET NAM	.02	117 670	129 937	247 607	10 000	107 670	129 937	237 607
YEMEN	.02	84 834	64 969	149 803	85 295	-	64 508	64 508
YUGOSLAVIA	.46	3 984 985	2 968 552	6 953 537	3 935 259	29 726	2 968 552	3 018 278
ZAIRE	.01	183 054	64 969	248 023	10 000	183 054	64 969	248 023
ZAMBIA	.01	-	64 969	64 969	64 969	-	-	-
ZIMBABWE	.02	117 670	129 937	247 607	129 937	-	117 670	117 670
TOTAL	100.00	170 116 258	677 [illegible] 899	847 919 157	433 641 307	59 953 900	354 323 950	414 277 850

37/124. Joint Inspection Unit [*]

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Joint Inspection Unit on its activities during the period 1 July 1981 to 30 June 1982,[27] the work programme of the Joint Inspection Unit for 1982[28] and the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit,[29]

1. *Notes with appreciation* the report of the Joint Inspection Unit;

2. *Welcomes* the intention of the Joint Inspection Unit to undertake an assessment of its own work, including methods of increasing the effectiveness of its recommendations, and to make proposals for improving the process whereby the intergovernmental organs take decisions on those recommendations;

3. *Reiterates* the request made in paragraph 7 of its resolution 2924 B (XXVII) of 24 November 1972 and the decision contained in the operative part of its resolution 32/199 of 21 December 1977;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, when submitting comments on reports of the Joint Inspection Unit, to include summaries indicating which recommendations of the Unit should or should not be implemented, in accordance with General Assembly decision 36/454 of 18 December 1981.

109th plenary meeting
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37/125. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations [**]

A

The General Assembly

Resolves that

1. The scale of assessments for the contributions of Member States to the United Nations budget for the financial years 1983, 1984 and 1985 shall be as follows:

Member State	*Per cent*
Afghanistan	0.01
Albania	0.01
Algeria	0.13
Angola	0.01
Antigua and Barbuda	0.01
Argentina	0.71
Australia	1.57
Austria	0.75
Bahamas	0.01
Bahrain	0.01
Bangladesh	0.03
Barbados	0.01
Belgium	1.28
Belize	0.01
Benin	0.01
Bhutan	0.01
Bolivia	0.01
Botswana	0.01
Brazil	1.39
Bulgaria	0.18
Burma	0.01
Burundi	0.01
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	0.36
Canada	3.08
Cape Verde	0.01
Central African Republic	0.01
Chad	0.01
Chile	0.07
China	0.88
Colombia	0.11
Comoros	0.01
Congo	0.01
Costa Rica	0.02
Cuba	0.09
Cyprus	0.01
Czechoslovakia	0.76
Democratic Kampuchea	0.01
Democratic Yemen	0.01
Denmark	0.75
Djibouti	0.01
Dominica	0.01
Dominican Republic	0.03
Ecuador	0.02
Egypt	0.07
El Salvador	0.01
Equatorial Guinea	0.01
Ethiopia	0.01
Fiji	0.01
Finland	0.48
France	6.51
Gabon	0.02
Gambia	0.01
German Democratic Republic	1.39
Germany, Federal Republic of	8.54
Ghana	0.02
Greece	0.40
Grenada	0.01
Guatemala	0.02
Guinea	0.01
Guinea Bissau	0.01
Guyana	0.01
Haiti	0.01
Honduras	0.01
Hungary	0.23
Iceland	0.03
India	0.36
Indonesia	0.13
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.58
Iraq	0.42
Ireland	0.18
Israel	0.23
Italy	3.74
Ivory Coast	0.03
Jamaica	0.02
Japan	10.32
Jordan	0.01
Kenya	0.01
Kuwait	0.25
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.01
Lebanon	0.02
Lesotho	0.01
Liberia	0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.26
Luxembourg	0.06
Madagascar	0.01
Malawi	0.01
Malaysia	0.09
Maldives	0.01

[*] See also sect. X.B.7, decision 37/429.

[27] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 34* (A/37/34).

[28] A/37/103, annex.

[29] A/C.5/37/28.

[**] See also sect. X.B.7, decision 37/408.

Member State	*Per cent*
Mali	0.01
Malta	0.01
Mauritania	0.01
Mauritius	0.01
Mexico	0.88
Mongolia	0.01
Morocco	0.05
Mozambique	0.01
Nepal	0.01
Netherlands	1.78
New Zealand	0.26
Nicaragua	0.01
Niger	0.01
Nigeria	0.19
Norway	0.51
Oman	0.01
Pakistan	0.06
Panama	0.02
Papua New Guinea	0.01
Paraguay	0.01
Peru	0.07
Philippines	0.09
Poland	0.72
Portugal	0.18
Qatar	0.03
Romania	0.19
Rwanda	0.01
Saint Lucia	0.01
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.01
Samoa	0.01
Sao Tome and Principe	0.01
Saudi Arabia	0.86
Senegal	0.01
Seychelles	0.01
Sierra Leone	0.01
Singapore	0.09
Solomon Islands	0.01
Somalia	0.01
South Africa	0.41
Spain	1.93
Sri Lanka	0.01
Sudan	0.01
Suriname	0.01
Swaziland	0.01
Sweden	1.32
Syrian Arab Republic	0.03
Thailand	0.08
Togo	0.01
Trinidad and Tobago	0.03
Tunisia	0.03
Turkey	0.32
Uganda	0.01
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	1.32
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	10.54
United Arab Emirates	0.16
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4.67
United Republic of Cameroon	0.01
United Republic of Tanzania	0.01
United States of America	25.00
Upper Volta	0.01
Uruguay	0.04
Vanuatu	0.01
Venezuela	0.55
Viet Nam	0.02
Yemen	0.01
Yugoslavia	0.46
Zaire	0.01
Zambia	0.01
Zimbabwe	0.02
	100.00

2. In accordance with rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the scale of assessments given in paragraph 1 above shall be reviewed by the Committee on Contributions in 1985, when a report shall be submitted to the Assembly for consideration at its fortieth session;

3. Notwithstanding the terms of regulation 5.5 of the Financial Regulations of the United Nations, the Secretary-General shall be empowered to accept, at his discretion and after consultation with the Chairman of the Committee on Contributions, a portion of the contributions of Member States for the calendar years 1983, 1984 and 1985 in currencies other than United States dollars;

4. For the year 1981, Vanuatu, Belize and Antigua and Barbuda, which became Members of the United Nations on 15 September, 25 September and 11 November 1981, respectively, shall contribute amounts equal to one ninth of 0.01 per cent;

5. For the year 1982, Vanuatu, Belize and Antigua and Barbuda shall contribute amounts equal to 0.01 per cent;

6. The contributions of the three new Member States for 1981 and 1982 shall be applied to the same basis of assessment as for other Member States, except that, in the case of appropriations approved under General Assembly resolutions 35/45 A of 1 December 1980 and 36/66 A of 30 November 1981 for the financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and Assembly resolutions 35/115 A of 10 December 1980 and 36/138 A of 16 December 1981 for the financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the contributions of those States, in accordance with the group of contributors to which they may be assigned by the Assembly, shall be calculated in proportion to the calendar year;

7. In accordance with rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, States which are not Members of the United Nations but which participate in certain of its activities shall be called upon to contribute towards the 1983, 1984 and 1985 expenses of such activities on the basis of the following rates:

Non-member State	*Per cent*
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.05
Holy See	0.01
Liechtenstein	0.01
Monaco	0.01
Nauru	0.01
Republic of Korea	0.18
San Marino	0.01
Switzerland	1.10
Tonga	0.01

the following countries being called upon to contribute:

(a) *To the International Court of Justice:*

Liechtenstein,
San Marino,
Switzerland;

(b) *To international drug control:*

Holy See,
Liechtenstein,
Monaco,
Republic of Korea,
Switzerland,
Tonga;

(c) *To the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific*:
Republic of Korea;

(d) *To the Economic Commission for Europe*:
Switzerland;

(e) *To the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*:
Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
Holy See;
Liechtenstein;
Monaco;
Republic of Korea;
San Marino;
Switzerland;
Tonga;

(f) *To the United Nations Industrial Development Organization*:
Holy See;
Liechtenstein;
Monaco;
Republic of Korea;
Switzerland;

(g) *To the United Nations Environment Programme*:
Switzerland

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B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, 1927 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2118 (XX) of 21 December 1965, 2961 C and D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 31/95 A and B of 14 December 1976 and 34/6 B of 25 October 1979,

Recalling also its resolution 36/231 A of 18 December 1981,

Having examined the report of the Committee on Contributions[31] and the addendum thereto,[32]

Recognizing once again the need for an improved methodology to assess the real capacity to pay of Member States, in order to increase the fairness and equity of the scale of assessments,

Taking into account the difficult economic and financial situation of Member States, in particular developing countries,

Mindful of the obligation of Member States to bear the expenses of the Organization as apportioned by the General Assembly according to the capacity to pay,

Noting the views expressed by Member States on the new scale as well as on the integrity of the Committee on Contributions,

1. *Reconfirms* that the real capacity to pay of Member States is the fundamental criterion on which the scale of assessments is based;

2. *Decides* that the Committee on Contributions may extend its sessions, as necessary, in order to:

(*a*) Submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the study called for in paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 36/231 A, together with its proposals for methods which it should use in determining future scales of assessments;

(*b*) Submit to the General Assembly not later than at its thirty-ninth session a set of guidelines for the collection and presentation of data as requested in paragraph 2 of resolution 36/231 A, taking into account the views expressed by a number of delegations concerning in particular the comparability of national income data;

3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to provide the Committee on Contributions with the facilities it requires to carry out its work and, if requested by the Committee, necessary supplementary assistance;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Contributions, in carrying out its mandate pursuant to resolution 36/231 A, to pay attention, *inter alia*, to the following:

(*a*) The need to ensure that the Statistical Office of the Secretariat receives or obtains standardized data and statistics in respect of methodology and technical bases, including those on exchange rates and national income expressed in current prices;

(*b*) The need to study ways and means of avoiding excessive variations by utilizing objective criteria when finalizing the scale of assessments;

5. *Requests* the Committee on Contributions to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in carrying out the work called for in the present resolution.

109th plenary meeting
17 December 1982

37/126. Report of the International Civil Service Commission

The General Assembly,

Taking note with appreciation of the eighth annual report of the International Civil Service Commission,[33]

Reaffirming the importance of the acknowledged role of the Commission in the development of a single, unified, international civil service through the application of common personnel standards, methods and arrangements as stated in article 9 of its statute,

Reaffirming the importance of respect for these common standards, methods and arrangements by all member organizations of the common system,

Noting the difficulties in reaching a consensus in the Commission on the interpretation and application of the Noblemaire Principle,

Aware of the difficult global economic situation affecting Member States, in particular developing countries,

Desirous of ensuring adequate financial support for programme delivery,

I

1. *Approves* the procedure for adjusting cost-of-living differential factors applicable to retirees from the Professional and higher categories where those factors are applied and where the rates of taxation are zero or lower than those implicit in the amounts of base pensions provided under the United Nations staff pension scheme;[34]

2. *Approves* the recommendation of the International Civil Service Commission[35] and of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board[36] that no reduction factor be applied to the retirees from the General Service and related categories;

[31] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 11* (A/37/11).
[32] A/37/11/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1.

[33] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 30* (A/37/30).
[34] *Ibid., Supplement No. 9* (A/37/9 and Corr.1-4), annex X.
[35] *Ibid., Supplement No. 30* (A/37/30), para. 42.
[36] *Ibid., Supplement No. 9* (A/37/9 and Corr.1-4), annex X, sect. B.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I interrupt you for 1 second, Senator?

Senator RANDOLPH. Yes; I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

As I understand it, one of the major criticisms by Great Britain, the United States, and now, increasingly, other Western nations, is that the Western nations provide large percentage of the budget but yet seem to be constantly under attack or at least their viewpoints are not considered by the present leadership of Unesco.

Currently, how much do the Western countries pay of the Unesco budget, and are those allegations true?

Mr. NEWELL. The contribution from the West is about 73 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are saying the West pays about 73 percent of the Unesco budget?

Mr. NEWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And have I summarized it accurately that the West feels, or at least the United States and Great Britain at this point—and some other countries have raised complaints as well—that the West is not given much consideration in the overall operation and management of Unesco and the programs and approaches that it has been taking recently?

Mr. NEWELL. That is true in our judgment, and that is one of our criticisms of the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Well, I personally believe a President's Commission would be a very helpful thing. It was helpful in the ILO, and I think it would be helpful here. So I recommend to you that you consider that. That may be one of the best ways of resolving these issues. A lot of people are concerned about us pulling out of Unesco. On the other hand, if you look at the ILO experience, it seemed to turn out to be a pretty good experience, because I don't think anybody can say we were trying to manipulate the ILO. I think we wanted some reforms, and we got them.

For instance, after President Carter took us out in 1977—and, by the way, our 25 percent contribution to the ILO budget—the ILO instituted meaningful reforms and became less politicized. In 1978 the ILO criticized Czechoslovakia for the first time for discrimination in employment; in 1979, they questioned the Soviet Union on human rights violations; secret ballots were adopted in certain ILO proceedings; and, of course, an anti-Israel Arab-sponsored resolution was defeated in 1978, and none was introduced in 1979. These were things that just had not occurred before. You are familiar with those.

Mr. NEWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that a Presidential Commission may be very helpful. It was very helpful in the ILO situation, and I would recommend you consider it here.

I want to thank both of you for coming. I would hope that you could get these materials to me, both of you, from your separate bailiwicks and with your separate imprints on them, before the end of the year, but I will give you until Inauguration Day to get them in. But I would like to have as much information as I possibly can for this record so that we can disseminate this record and have people realize and understand what some of the complaints and

some of the criticisms and arguments really are, in addition to what you have said here today.

Well, thank you so much. We appreciate both of you being here.

At this point, I would like to place into the record a statement by Representative Gerald B. Solomon to this committee dated December 10.

Without objection, we will also place the article by Henry E. Catto, Jr., "Where Hardball Works," published in the Washington Post on Tuesday, December 4, 1984, into the record at this point.

[The material referred to follows:]

THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

Statement by

Representative Gerald B. Solomon

to

The Committee on Labor and Human Resources,

United States Senate

December 10, 1984

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,

One year ago our Government gave formal notification to the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization about intentions to withdraw American membership from U.N.E.S.C.O. on December 31, 1984. I fully expect our Government to prpceed with its plans. A formal confirmation can be anticipated any day.

Few foreign policy decisions by the Reagan administration have excited more controversy than this one. As a member of the Sub-committee on Human Rights and International Organizations, I have participated in numerous public hearings and private briefings that have served to acquaint members of the House of Representatives with the issues at stake in this decision. I am fully convinced that the decision to withdraw American membership from U.N.E.S.C.O. is correct, justified, and, if anything else, long overdue.

I regret to say that our Government's decision has been received in some quarters with reactions that border on the hysterical. Sober analyses of what has gone wrong with U.N.E.S.C.O. have been obscured by expressions of outrage by U.N.E.S.C.O. clients in the United States and elsewhere.

But if U.N.E.S.C.O. is to fulfill the high purposes for which it was established, and for which our country has made a strong commitment by word and deed over a period of many years, then the organization must be held accountable to its own principles and procedures. And the primary issue is precisely that -- the problem of accountability. Make no mistake: the decision by our Government to withdraw from U.N.E.S.C.O. is not a case of picking up our marbles and going home because the game is not going our way. It is, rather, a recognition that U.N.E.S.C.O. has an important mission -- a mission that is going unfulfilled because of any number of serious problems within the organization itself.

If our Government is to continue providing 25% of the financial support for U.N.E.S.C.O., we have every right, indeed, the duty, to ask where the money is going and whether or not U.N.E.S.C.O. is truly living up to the ideals for which it was established.

WHAT IS U.N.E.S.C.O.'S PURPOSE?

U.N.E.S.C.O. is mandated to serve four functions: to develop programs aimed at eradicating illiteracy; to assist in the preservation of historic sites and monuments; to facilitate the exchange of scientific information; and to promote communications systems. All of these purposes are praiseworthy and deserving of our support.

But even a casual glance at U.N.E.S.C.O. today will reveal an organization that has strayed far from its original mandate, that routinely engages in political manipulation and propaganda exercises, and that has become a bureaucratic and administrative nightmare. Significantly, some 24 other Western countries, who together with the United States contribute funds amounting to over 80% of U.N.E.S.C.O.'s budget, have submitted proposals calling

for major reforms at U.N.E.S.C.O.. The Government of Great Britain has announced its intentions to withdraw from U.N.E.S.C.O. on December 31, 1985 if substantive reforms are not forthcoming.

My own judgment leads to the conclusion that Great Britain will be joining us next year at this time. No matter how many delegates and other officials at U.N.E.S.C.O. may have expressed willingness this past year to consider reform, the fact remains that real power in the organization has been usurped by the Director-General and the Secretariat. The legitimate policy functions of the General Conference and Executive Board have been reduced to the point of irrelevance. In my judgment, a serious commitment by the Director-General to return U.N.E.S.C.O. to its original mandate and to clean up the management practices of the organization is the only thing that will prevent an eventual exodus of Western nations from U.N.E.S.C.O.. The cosmetic reforms agreed to this past year are simply not enough. And the good intentions of people who nevertheless lack real authority within the organization are not enough either.

The problems afflicting U.N.E.S.C.O. can be illustrated in many ways. I have chosen a few dramatic examples that reveal the depth of what is going on.

A LOST MANDATE

As noted before, one of U.N.E.S.C.O.'s primary missions is to assist in the eradication of illiteracy. And, in fact, the largest single allocation in the U.N.E.S.C.O. budget goes for education. However, less than half of these funds for education actually go into the fight against illiteracy. What subjects does U.N.E.S.C.O. find of other interest than its own mandate? Consider these items

contained in the 1984-85 biennial budget:

> $106,000 to study the educational use of leisure time;
>
> $183,000 to promote an international convention on the recogntion of the importance of academic studies;
>
> $2,500,000 to promote education in peace and disarmament, including a $273,000 study to help educators develop "a frame of mind conducive to the strengthening of disarmament."

I need not belabor the point. Where the efforts to fight illiteracy fit into all of this is anybody's guess.

Some of the most compelling testimony before our Subcommittee came from Ambassador Owen Harries, who served as the Australian Ambassador to U.N.E.S.C.O. from February 1982 to August 1983. Ambassador Harries told the Subcommittee:

> "I went to U.N.E.S.C.O. neither as a starry-eyed innocent nor as a cynic.../having/ recently completed a book-length study of the Third World for the Australian government in which I argued for a sympathetic and constructive approach to the problems of developing countries. So I went to Paris in anything but a negative or hostile frame of mind.
>
> "By the time I left U.N.E.S.C.O., however, I had reached the conclusion that the organization did not serve the interest of educational and cultural cooperation; that its main function was to act as a center for the dissemination of anti-Western propaganda and patronage for Third World elites; and that it is badly and wastefully managed.
>
> "...The programs on communication, economic development, human rights and peace and disarmament, in particular, attacked Western values, interests and institutions."

The essential thrust of the testimony by Ambassador Harries was confirmed in numerous private discussions I held with American officials and representatives of private organizations that monitor developments at U.N.E.S.C.O.. But perhaps the most damning indictment of all came from within U.N.E.S.C.O. itself when Mr. Peter Lengyel, who served for 22 years as the editor of The International Social Science Journal, submitted his resignation to the Director-General last May 30.

Mr. Lengyel's six-page resignation letter is a litany of charges against the senior executives of U.N.E.S.C.O.. Himself an official in the U.N.E.S.C.O. Secretariat for over 30 years, Mr. Lengyel describes "an atmosphere of cynical hilarity" characterized by "demagogic disregard for orderly procedures" and the "willful destruction of professionalism." He laments a U.N.E.S.C.O. Secretariat that is "paralyzed by unyielding centralization of power." Mr. Lengyel concludes that the "demoralized Secretariat" at U.N.E.S.C.O. has become "an overwhelmingly ambitious Jack-of-all trades...a poor instrument for any purpose...Much moral capital acccumulated through past successes has been squandered and U.N.E.S.C.O.'s image is in tatters, the worst profligacy being perhaps default in maintaining and handing on a repository of skill and knowledge to serve education, science and culture globally."

A PROPAGANDA FORUM

Part and parcel with U.N.E.S.C.O.'s disregard for its own mandate is the emergence of the organization as a propaganda forum for harranguing the United States, its democratic values and its allies. In one sense, this is a reflection of trends in other components of the United Nations system as well. Columnist George Will, for example, once described the U.N. General Assembly as "the moral equivalent of a Nuremburg rally." That is, before the United States made known its intentions to withdraw from General Assembly if the nonsense did not stop and if Israel was in some way excluded.

But U.N.E.S.C.O. rumbles on, its latest budget allocating $120,000 to monitor Israeli activities in "occupied territories," the only such country singled out for this kind of treatment. The budget

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includes a $454,000 training project for prospective political leaders, with the "students" being provided by the P.L.O. and other so-called "national liberation movements." A total of $266,000 is also earmarked for projects involving Palestian refugees. All of the refugees in the rest of the world can divide up a $76,000 pie.

Another powerful witness before our Subcommittee was Mr. Burton S. Levinson, Chairman of the National Executive Committee of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Mr. Levinson outlined a systematic campaign in U.N.E.S.C.O., underway since the late-1960s, that seeks "to undermine the Jewish state and its supporters." After reciting a catalogue of anti-Semitic, anti-democratic policies and actions undertaken by U.N.E.S.C.O. during the last 15 years, he noted that the organization sponsored a conference last December to mark the 100th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx.

But in perhaps no other action has U.N.E.S.C.O. exposed itself more thoroughly for being "the anti-democratic apparatus /that/ it is" than in its encouragement of the "New World Information Order." Mr. Levinson told the Subcommittee:

> "Rather than seeking to introduce and encourage the flowering of the notion of a free press, U.N.E.S.C.O. has cavalierly and mischievously tampered with our cherished principles of freedom of speech and freedom of the press by seeking to enact press limitations. Even its name -- 'New World Information Order' -- conjures up an Orwellian chill within those who see in its promotion the hand of the Soviet Union, its client states, and those Third World nations which live under authoritarian and and totalitarian rule."

Less well known are U.N.E.S.C.O.'s bizarre forays into the area of human rights, where so-called "people's rights" -- human rights in a collective sense -- are emphasized in opposition to individual rights, liberties, and dignity. If you detect in this an effort by Third World elites to perpetuate themselves and their

regimes in power, you can understand why U.N.E.S.C.O. has become such a sacred cow, an organization in which fully half of the membership contributes a combined total of funds amounting to less than 2% of the budget.

A BUREAUCRACY IN CHAOS

Just as U.N.E.S.C.O.'s programs have almost invariably a statist emphasis, so the administration of U.N.E.S.C.O. itself reflects a systemic inertia engendered by a top-heavy bureaucracy. Fully 80% of U.N.E.S.C.O.'s budget is spent at headquarters in Paris. And fully 80% of U.N.E.S.C.O.'s employees are posted there as well. It is a general consensus among observers on all sides of the question about whether the United States should withdraw that U.N.E.S.C.O. has, nevertheless, been the least responsive component in the entire U.N. system to the calls for belt-tightening and fiscal responsibility.

I believe that, even disregarding the political issues, the reckless mismanagement of people, resources, and money is reason enough to pull out of U.N.E.S.C.O.. Consider for a moment the budgetary priorities U.N.E.S.C.O. has established for itself. As noted earlier, the largest single allocation in the U.N.E.S.C.O. budget is for education. For every dollar that U.N.E.S.C.O. has spent on education this year another 95¢ have been spent on what is called "program support" -- virtually all of which has gove to the bureaucracy in Paris. Another 93¢ have gone for what is called "general administration," another euphemism for the headquarters bureaucracy. And still another 54¢ have gone into so-called "cooperation and external relations" -- read into that public relations and self-promotion.

But not even that kind of largess can keep people happy. At least 20 senior members of the Director-General's staff have quit in the last four years. On the way out, one of them described to The Sunday Times (London, January 8, 1984) the "bureaucratic terrorism which has led to total intellectual suffocation." Small wonder that a recent survey shows only 4% of U.N.E.S.C.O. employees believing that well-qualified persons are recruited for the organization and that promotions are based on merit.

Three known K.G.B. agents remained in the U.N.E.S.C.O. Secretariat and collected paychecks for more than a year after they were publicly exposed in 1983. During the same year, only one American was hired at U.N.E.S.C.O., out of more than 120 recommendations for positions. A total of $25 million that was budgeted in 1982 to fill 322 staff positions disappeared through the cracks. The positions were never filled and no accounting was ever given for the money.

Returning to Mr. Lengyel's resignation letter, one reads that at U.N.E.S.C.O. "managerial practices contravene the most elementary principles...professional functionalism and its derived lines of authority /are/ threatened with overall collapse...financial and administrative officials who attempt to apply the rule are regularly overridden." Another departing official took the advantage in his resignation letter to criticize the "climate of suspicion, prejudice, intolerance, incoherence, arbitrariness, fear and servility" at U.N.E.S.C.O. headquarters.

There is no need to belabor this point either. No private organization, relying on voluntary donations, could ever hope to survive under the dual load of administrative overhead and bureaucratic infighting that is characteristic of U.N.E.S.C.O..

IT IS TIME TO GET OUT

Some critics of the Reagan administration's decision to withdraw American membership from U.N.E.S.C.O. contend that the timing is wrong. Let us not rush into something before we know all of the implications, they say. In my judgment, doing the right thing is always timely.

And the beauty of this decision is that it places the United States in a favorable position either way. If U.N.E.S.C.O. should respond to American withdrawal by making a conscientious attempt to return the organization to its original mandate and to sound administrative practices, then the United States will happily rejoin. There is ample precedent for this: Consider the American withdrawal from the International Labor Organization in the 1970s. When the I.L.O. subsequently cleaned up its act, the United States came back.

But should U.N.E.S.C.O. continue on its present course, without the United States and with an ever-increasing Soviet influence, our allies will be compelled to withdraw. As they pull out, taking with them the lion's share of U.N.E.S.C.O.'s funding, U.N.E.S.C.O. will be exposed as the corrupt and complacent organization that it is. Its prestige will be gone and we and our allies will be well poised to create a new organization.

The best way to demonstrate support for U.N.E.S.C.O.'s worthy mission in this modern world is to demand that the organization return to that mission. If it does not, then let us start a new one.

THE WASHINGTON POST

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1984

Henry E. Catto Jr.

Where Hardball Works

Theodore Roosevelt urged the United States to "speak softly and carry a big stick." Ronald Reagan's corollary seems to be ". . . and use that stick to rap knuckles." Nowhere has this policy worked better than in the dusty recesses of the United Nations.

The flamboyance of the General Assembly seems a long way from the quiet activities of U.N. specialized agencies, but in two of these, the International Labor Organization and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organizations dramatic events have taken place.

The ILO, a unique organization composed of representatives of government, labor and business, aims toward "the creation of more jobs, in a climate of sound industrial relations, based on full respect for basic human rights and freedoms." But in recent years, these goals, fully supported by the U.S. government, the labor movement and the business community have played second fiddle to more political ones.

Part of the problem arose when the U.S.S.R. joined in 1954. The communist system allows no distinction between labor, employers and government, so the uniqueness of the ILO was put to a test, and the East bloc moved quickly to distort its original thrust. The autonomy of workers' and employers' groups was attacked; Soviet violations of conventions on freedom of association were ignored, political polemics raged, and committee packing with East-bloc members was attempted.

Politicization of the ILO took place in 1974 in another area as Arab and African states, with the gleeful support of the U.S.S.R., condemned Israel for alleged racism and discrimination, without waiting for the results of an investigation into the matter, thus shredding the concept of due process. In 1975, the PLO was admitted as an observer, and U.S. patience, with AFL-CIO President George Meany as its good, ran out. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in accord with ILO procedures, sent a letter of intention to withdraw within two years unless changes were made. In 1977, President Carter took us—and our 25 percent contribution to the ILO budget—out.

The results were quick in coming. [illegible] bureaucrat, gratuitous or otherwise, likes to see his empire crumble. In 1978, the ILO criticized the Czechs for discrimination in employment. In 1979, the ILO questioned the Soviets on human rights violations. Secret ballots were adopted in certain ILO proceedings. An anti-Israel Arab-sponsored resolution was defeated in 1978 and none was introduced in 1979.

Although the organization was scarcely perfect, by May 1980, the United States felt sufficiently satisfied to rejoin, remaining vigilant against any new deviation. To date, this judgment seems justified, particularly in light of the fact that the Poles have recently announced their intention to withdraw in the face of ILO criticism of violations of freedom of association.

The U.S. intent to withdraw from UNESCO was regarded as a typically Reaganite action—until Great Britain joined in.

In the case of UNESCO, the United States criticized UNESCO's statist approach to development; the obnoxious politicization of almost every subject dealt with; its blatant disregard for the opinions of the Western democracies, which provide more than 70 percent of its budget; irregularities in its bureaucracy; and, the focus of the most attention, attacks on freedom of the press, with calls for licensing of journalists and the [illegible] seen as governmental [illegible]. In [illegible] the United [illegible] its intent to withdraw. Director [illegible] [illegible] all [illegible] Australia, Singapore, acting [illegible] a multi-[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to join the United States, it was a [illegible] blow. The two nations contribute about a third of the ILO budget. Proponents of a strong approach have now been reinforced, the likelihood of other countries joining in is increased, and the hope for reform strengthened.

One fact has been overlooked: the United States intends to spend its UNESCO monies on projects in other agencies such as the U.N. Development Program and the OAS, where overhead (80 percent at UNESCO) is not so high and the dollar goes further.

Some critics of the U.S. and British moves say if we do not play in the UNESCO game, we cannot influence the organizations. Others say the Third World countries will become spiteful and angry and will thwart reforms out of pique.

Yet Lane Kirkland, current AFL-CIO president, feels there is "nothing wrong with objecting when your own money is used to subvert human values you stand for." And Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., feels that in both the ILO and UNESCO, "organizations were twisted to serve values antithetical to their own charters and to human freedom." She adds: "The ILO experience demonstrates that U.S. departure from a U.N. organization isn't necessarily forever. ILO reforms returned it to its original purpose."

In short, it seems clear that a willingness to stand for principle and to call a halt to hypocrisy pays off. It is not only psychically satisfying: It works.

The writer, a contributing editor to Washington Journalism Review, is a former Reagan administration official. From 1976 to 1977 he was U.S. ambassador to the European Office of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness will be Mr. Owen Harries. He is the John M. Olin fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and he previously served as Australia's Ambassador to Unesco in 1982 and 1983.

We are very happy to have you with us today, Mr. Harries. We have asked witnesses to summarize their testimony so we can ask questions, so if you can, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF OWEN HARRIES, JOHN M. OLIN FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, AND FORMER AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO UNESCO

Mr. HARRIES. Thank you, Senator.

May I say at the beginning that, as an Australian, I am very grateful and very honored to be asked to testify before you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. HARRIES. The written testimony I have submitted is mainly concerned with rebutting the arguments advanced by those who oppose withdrawal. But I now understand that you wish to focus this hearing on the future, on what should happen after America withdraws, assuming that withdrawal is now going to occur. I agree very much that this is the most appropriate focus at this time.

So, with your permission, sir, I shall not talk directly to my written submission but instead try to supplement it with some remarks about the future.

Specifically, I should like to address two points, two questions: First, what strategy should the United States adopt during the next crucial years? Second, what changes must occur in Unesco in order to justify America's return to the organization?

On the first, the strategic question, I would like to say first that I agree very much that the United States should not simply turn away, turn its back on Unesco, but should be involved fully in the process of attempting to reform it and bringing it back to its original purposes.

I agree, also, that to give its negotiation and its whole position credibility, and also because it is right to do so, the money withheld from Unesco should be clearly earmarked to promote scientific, educational, and cultural cooperation by other means.

Bearing that in mind, I would go on to say that in an organization which is heavily politicized, it seems to me that the United States will have to appreciate that the process of reforming Unesco is a political process requiring a political strategy. The point may appear obvious, and I make it only because some seem to deny it.

It is said sometimes that we must not play politics in this matter, and there was something of that apparent in the administration's approach during the last year when, after announcing its own withdrawal, it said that it would make no attempt to influence any other country to do likewise.

It is also said that Unesco is a debating forum or a "think tank" in which it is enough to advance a sound case and let that case stand on its merit. I believe that this description of Unesco is very misleading. In my experience as Ambassador and subsequently as a close observer, to Unesco, there is very little or no genuine debate

in Unesco. I saw no minds changed by argument during my time there.

As to the claim that it is a significant think tank, again I would challenge anyone to identify a single idea having any originality or striking interest which has emerged from the organization.

So for the present, unfortunately, I think one must accept that one is dealing with, a thoroughly politicized organization in which people act and react politically, and that it will be necessary, in order to change it, to take this into account.

I would maintain that the United States should not commit itself in advance to achieving a successful outcome to the negotiation; should not say that it is dedicated to this task. I think it should make it absolutely clear that, if necessary, it can live with failure in this respect—failure to agree—and is prepared to stay out indefinitely if Unesco is not thoroughly reformed; that the United States is not interested in half-measures or merely cosmetic changes.

I think it should do these things because, first, only such a negotiating stance is consistent with the position it has taken; and, second, because anything else would weaken its negotiating position. It is an elementary point, but one that I think is frequently overlooked, that anyone who is publicly committed in advance to achieving agreement thereby weakens his own bargaining position.

For the same reason, I believe that the United States should not tie itself in advance to a Western consensus on what constitutes acceptable reform, either formally or informally, because at least some Western countries will be likely to settle for much less than should, in terms of its stated aims, satisfy the United States. That is, I am suggesting that it will be appropriate for the United States to maintain independent stance and certain distance, while being prepared to cooperate. Cooperation, yes; solidarity, not necessarily.

Lastly, on this aspect, I think that in order to avoid the trap that negotiations become an end in themselves, that their own rhythm and momentum dominate behavior—which is always a danger in a protracted negotiation—it is essential that those who represent the United States during the next year should have a clearly defined set of objectives and should keep these clearly in mind. Flexibility as to means, that is, it should be combined with firmness and clarity as to aims and outcome.

This brings me to the second question I would like to say something about. That is, what changes, at a minimum, must be sought? In this respect, Senator, one could construct a long list, because many things are wrong with Unesco as it is now constituted. But I will restrict myself to three points that I consider crucial.

First, I think that some way must be found to close the gap between the making of decisions about programs and activities, on the one hand, and the financing of those programs on the other. The present system whereby those who have the votes do not bear the brunt of the costs resulting from their decisions, and those who pay do not have the votes, is an incitement to irresponsibility, particularly with respect to program proliferation, which has been such a marked feature of Unesco over recent years, and particularly with respect to ideological behavior.

I think there are various ways that one can think of whereby this gap could be closed. One way would be by making it possible

for individual countries to choose whether or not to participate in individual programs, to give them the right to opt out of a particular program if they so wished; and if they chose not to participate, their contribution to Unesco would be reduced by their assessed percentage of the cost of that program. That is, in the case of the United States, for example, if it were not to participate in program x, its payment to Unesco would be reduced by 25 percent of the cost of that particular program.

Another way of closing this gap would be by setting up a small program and budget committee whose membership was weighted to reflect contributions and which had real teeth. That is, its consent would be required for any program to be implemented.

I advance these as suggestions. They and other possible options would, of course, have to be, considered and elaborated upon in detail before anything was taken up.

Second, I think it is absolutely crucial that the Secretariat must be restored to an impartial, neutral, international civil service. It must be depoliticized. In my experience, this was one of the worst features of the organization. When one talks about excessive politicization in Unesco, one is not merely talking about rhetoric on the floor; one is talking about a Secretariat which has been turned very substantially into a political instrument.

I believe that professionals must be protected against intimidation and manipulation; that hiring and promotion procedures must be insulated from political and ideological elements; that rules preventing politically biased activities by members of the Secretariat must be implemented strictly and, where necessary, strengthened.

The third and last point that I would make in this respect is that there must be a change of the top management of Unesco. The reason why this is necessary, I think, should be clear.

First, the charge of very poor management is clearly substantiated. If there was any previous doubt, it should have been removed by the recently completed GAO review.

Second, the present management has itself become a divisive, contentious factor in the whole Unesco issue, making the process of reform more complicated and difficult than it should be or need be.

Third, the reputation of the organization is now so tarnished and lacking in credibility that the appointment of a new director general and a new team at the top is essential if Unesco's prestige and status are to be restored. I think a man of proven international integrity and ability is needed to symbolize as well as to implement a new beginning for the organization.

And, fourth, negotiating and implementing reform with those who have brought Unesco to the brink of disaster and who have a vested interest in the current state of affairs is, in my opinion, unlikely to succeed.

In this respect, Senator, I have to say that while I support the general policy followed by the administration and admire it in many ways, I believe that the hands-off policy toward the present director general—and, indeed, the praise of the present director general—has produced an element of incoherence and illogicality into America's position over the last year. Because if it is true that Unesco is in an abysmal state, as the administration rightly asserts it is, and if it is also true that the affairs of Unesco are dominated

by a director general with enormous power, as the GAO review and virtually every other observer rightfully agrees they are, then it inescapably follows that much of the responsibility for the poor performance belongs to the director general. I think that a change at the top is absolutely necessary, though far from sufficient, condition for thoroughgoing reform.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harries follows:]

U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO

Testimony given by Owen Harries, John M. Olin Fellow at The Heritage Foundation on December 10, 1984. Mr. Harries served as Australia's Ambassador to UNESCO in 1982-83.

I do not intend to spell out yet again what is wrong with UNESCO. That has been done many times and, as even most of the best informed critics of the U.S. decision to withdraw agree that the organization is in poor shape, I propose to take the validity of the charges of excessive politicization and abysmal mismanagement as established.

What I would like to do, in order to try to clarify the issues, is to consider some of the arguments used by those who oppose withdrawal and to indicate why I disagree with them.

For some, withdrawal is an appalling prospect. They argue for the rescinding of the U.S. decision to withdraw, or at least, for delaying its implementation for a year or two. They urge that "working from within" --not quitting--is the way to reform UNESCO. They assert that UNESCO's shortcomings are largely the fault of the U.S., which has "failed to play its role fully and to exercise its strengths." They maintain that the loss to the U.S. would be great--particularly in the scientific field--if it were to withdraw. They claim that getting out would hand UNESCO over to the Russians, who would then exploit it without

inhibition. Last, they express great concern about the violation of the principle of universality.

I do not doubt the sincerely and conviction of those who advance these arguments. But I do not find them convincing, for the followings reasons:

1. The U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO has generated a greater momentum for reform in the last nine months than has existed in the previous 20 years. The momentum created has not yet yielded much in the way of tangible results, and it is essential that the pressure be maintained. An America that has declared its intention to withdraw, or which actually withdraws while making it clear that it will return when UNESCO has been cleaned up, has infinitely more leverage on the situation than one attempting to work from within. On the other hand, should America go back on its decision at the last moment, it will lose most of its credibility, and the momentum for change will wane. It is relevant that when the U.S. withdrew from the International Labor Organization in 1977-79, its action resulted in significant improvements and it was able to return in 1980.

2. As UNESCO is now constituted, "working from within" will fail. It has, after all, been tried quite vigorously in recent years--without success. As the GAO audit makes clear, it would necessarily involve attempting to negotiate

with the all-powerful Director-General M'Bow to reform a state of affairs of which he is the principal architect and beneficiary. And it would involve doing so in circumstances in which he controlled the game and called the shots. Why, in these circumstances and in the absence of compelling and convincing sanctions, should M'Bow concede anything? For "working from within" to have any chance at all, it would have to be preceded by the departure of M'Bow and his replacement by someone not committed to the existing way of running things, a person of proven integrity and commitment to fair and sound administrative practices.

3. As for the assertion that the responsibility for the deplorable condition of UNESCO lies largely with the U.S., the first thing to say is that it represents a particularly blatant example of the "blame America first" syndrome, recently identified by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Second, it seems to be based on the assumption that a better "performance" on America's part (a more forceful presentation of views, the allocation of more and better people, greater preparation for meetings, and so on) would make a decisive difference. This is a fallacy. The problem is not one of presentation and performance; it is political and can only be resolved by political means. It is not a case of the Director-General and the Third World not understanding U.S. views and interests; they understand them perfectly well and oppose them.

4. The assertion that the U.S would suffer seriously, particularly in the field of science, as a result of withdrawal seems based on the false assumption that no effective substitutes for UNESCO could be formed or created. Yet Dr. William A. Nierenberg, the Chairman of the Committee on International Science of the National Science Board, told the House Science and Technology Committee:

> The summary effect (of withdrawal), as far as my investigations today go, on the U.S. scientific effort would be minimal, particularly because in almost every case there are adequate alternatives.

He pointed out that membership in such important bodies as the International Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and the Scientific Committee for Ocean Research (SCOR) was not conditional on UNESCO membership. To be sure, other scientists think that U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would be costly. But they seem to overlook two key points: (a) as every other country benefits more from access to U.S. scientific knowledge than the U.S. benefits from access to theirs, all countries would have an interest in quickly creating alternative cooperative mechanisms involving the U.S.; and (2) if, in the end, there are net costs involved in the scientific field, these must be weighed against the other American interests served by withdrawal. Scientific benefits, unless they are of overwhelming importance, cannot determine American foreign policy.

5. Far from enhancing the value of UNESCO to the Soviet Union, the U.S departure would diminish it. As a propaganda forum to project Soviet views on "peace," "Western imperialism," and "a better balanced flow of information," UNESCO is only effective to the extent that it has legitimacy and authority. An American withdrawal would go far to deprive it of these (and the withdrawal of two or three other Western countries as well would destroy them entirely). Also, far from "driving the Third World into the hands of the Russians," as some maintain, such a withdrawal would force the more moderate and pragmatic Third World countries to reconsider their strategy and to ponder the wisdom of continuing to let a radical minority lead them by the nose in the name of solidarity. Most developing countries are well aware of the USSR's abysmal record as an aid giver, when anything other than arms is involved, and would recognize that UNESCO goose dependent on the Soviet Union would produce no golden eggs. Apart from these political aspects, U.S withdrawal would deprive UNESCO of one of its greatest practical attractions for the Soviets: it would cut off the easy access to American scientific and technological data which the Organization now provides. Again, the ILO example is illuminating: American withdrawal resulted in the Organization's adopting a tougher, not a softer, attitude towards the Soviet bloc.

6. As for the principle of universality, it is perhaps worth pointing out that this is not enshrined in the U.N. Charter . It is also worth noting that many of those who now appeal to it have supported the effective exclusion of South Africa and that at least some of them would exclude Israel tomorrow, if they could.. But even if it is assumed that universality is a desirable goal, two things need to be said. First, it is not and cannot be an overriding and unconditional goal. The first duty of American foreign policy is to serve American interests, and if, in the best judgment of those responsible for conducting that policy, membership of UNESCO works against those interests, then that consideration overrides a commitment to universality. Second, in so far as the principle of universality is accepted, it carries a responsibility, particularly on the part of those who constitute the majority, to maintain conditions which make it possible and bearable for all member states to continue to be members. That is, it requires a moderation and tolerance in the conduct of affairs. Those qualitites have not characterised UNESCO in recent years.

Mr. Chairman, I will end with one further point. Even apart from the merits of the case, the fact that the U.S. has taken the decision to withdraw, after due deliberation, is in itself a compelling reason for not retreating from it or delaying its implementation. In the absence of a change of

circumstance which produces an overwhelming case to the contrary, a great country which values it reputation should carry out what it has solomnly announced it will do. To do otherwise is to invite derision and contempt. It is also to increase the danger that in other cases in the future, the seriousness of U.S. interest may be underestimated. In that respect, the implementation of the UNESCO decision has a significance extending well beyond UNESCO itself.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Harries.

In many of your statements, you emphasize the need to replace Director General M'Bow before meaningful Unesco reforms can occur. Others have expressed the view that he is not the basic problem, but that power centralization is the problem. Could you elaborate on that point?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes, sir.

What we have here is an organization that, by widespread, if not common consent, is the worst in the U.N. system at present. To explain why this is so, I don't think, first of all, that one can point to factors that are common to all constituent parts of the U.N. system. You have got to point to something which is distinct. Otherwise, they would all be equally bad.

Second, in accounting for why Unesco is worse now than it was 15 or 20 years ago, again you cannot explain that in terms of factors that have been constant throughout the whole history of Unesco. You have to identify something that is peculiar to the last decade or so.

In both of these respects, it seems to me that the clearest factor—particularly given the enormous power that he has—the factor that is peculiar to Unesco and which accounts for the fact that it performs worse than others, is the fact that Mr. M'Bow has been its Director General for the last 10 years. He is the variable which differentiates Unesco, both from its own earlier history, and, from other U.N. agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you answer critics about the U.S. pullout in their argument that the United States is unlikely to effectuate reforms from an empty chair standpoint?

Mr. HARRIES. We have heard already about the ILO example, and one has to contrast getting out with staying in.

On the basis of my own experience and in terms of the logic of the situation, I think there is very little chance of effecting change from within, precisely because it involves negotiating with the man who is the principal architect of, and the principal beneficiary of, the present state of affairs, in circumstances in which he controls the negotiating process.

I think the events of last year show that the United States is preparing to go out can have great leverage on the situation. There has been a greater interest in an impetus toward reform over the last year than there has been in the whole history of the organization, and I think that that will continue if the United States does, in fact, withdraw.

The CHAIRMAN. You say in your prepared testimony that the assumption that a better performance by the United States in Unesco would make a decisive difference is fallacious. Would you care to expand on that?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes, sir.

What I mean there is that the view has often been advanced by those who oppose withdrawal that if the United States were to commit more resources, if it were to prepare more meticulously, if it were to be more active within the organization, that somehow things would change.

I simply think that this is wrong. I think it is unfair to the present permanent delegation to Unesco, which has been well pre-

pared, which has been active, which has been forceful, but it is not an organization where simply a strong presentation of one's case prevails. It is essentially a political organization, and reform will or will not come about insofar as successful political leverage is brought to bear on the organization, not in terms of simply presenting the American case more effectively or thoroughly, because, as I said earlier, in my experience, mere argument does not change minds in the Unesco context.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Randolph?

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is it true, Mr. Harries, in your judgment, that an organization, Unesco, is primarily part of an effort of the nations of the Earth, including the United States, to have meaningful dialog which might lead to hoped-for world peace? Is that true?

Mr. HARRIES. Senator, I think that was the original purpose and intent of the organization, but I think that in recent times it has lost its way and drifted away from that very noble and worthwhile goal.

Far from there being real dialog, has degenerated, as so often said by those working in the organization, into a sort of dialog of the deaf.

What has characterized Unesco in recent years is a substantial shift away from those areas of activity where cooperation is possible to those areas where conflict is inevitable. I think that has been done to some extent deliberately; to some extent it simply reflects the spirit of the age, I suppose. But it has certainly happened.

Senator RANDOLPH. I would ask you, Mr. Harries, whether the Heritage Foundation—is it correct that the president of the organization is Edward Feulner?

Mr. HARRIES. Feulner, yes.

Senator RANDOLPH. How is that spelled?

Mr. HARRIES. F-e-u-l-n-e-r.

Senator RANDOLPH. Yes, that is correct.

Now, within that organization, as I understand it—and you correct me—you have had an overriding desire to foster, promote, or cooperate in the matters of understanding with peoples. Is that correct?

Mr. HARRIES. I would think that the organization would see that as one of its purposes. Yes, sir.

Senator RANDOLPH. Is that the end of your statement?

Mr. HARRIES. Yes; it is. Would you like me to elaborate?

Senator RANDOLPH. Yes; you might elaborate and tell us why the president of that organization called those of us who were working for an Academy of Peace, an institute of peace, he used the term that those working in the Congress, particularly in the Senate, toward that end, were the "Jane Fondas of the U.S. Senate."

Mr. HARRIES. I had better make it clear, Senator, that I am here in my own capacity and not as a representative of the Heritage Foundation.

Senator RANDOLPH. I withdraw the question, then.

Mr. HARRIES. But I am quite prepared to talk to it if you wish me to.

Senator RANDOLPH. I would wish you to.

Mr. HARRIES. Well, I do think that those in the Heritage Foundation, as many elsewhere, do have a certain skepticism about many proposals for, or initiatives for, peace studies, because they believe that the cause of peace has been misused for political purposes very often. So that I think it would be true that many people in that organization, in the Heritage Foundation, would be very cautious and skeptical about the uses to which peace as a cause has been put in recent years.

Whether that skepticism is justified or not in a particular instance is a matter for study. I certainly have no knowledge of the instance you talk about, and whether that was a mistaken application of that skepticism or whether it was justified, I simply don't know, sir.

Senator RANDOLPH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that our witness now has certainly spoken in a way that I am appreciative of his reaction. Only for the record, I would want to say that it is difficult for me to understand that the Heritage Foundation, which I have studied carefully through several months, that it could have called a Senator like Sam Nunn of Georgia a Jane Fonda of the Senate.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You are welcome.

At this particular point, we will place in the record a backgrounder by Mr. Harries from the Heritage Foundation entitled "The U.S. and Unesco at a Crossroads," a statement by Representative Jim Leach dated December 10 before this committee, submitted to this committee, and a statement by Representative Leach before the U.S. House of Representatives on May 9, 1984.

Without objection, we will place those in the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

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THE U.S. AND UNESCO AT A CROSSROADS

Owen Harries*

INTRODUCTION

The United States is conducting what is officially described as a "fundamental reappraisal" of its policy toward one part of the U.N. system, UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). It is certainly needed, for the U.S. now stands at a crossroads in its relationship to UNESCO. The direction that Washington will take is sure to have profound impact not only on UNESCO but the U.N. as well.

The decision to "reappraise" the U.S. role in UNESCO was taken after a period of mounting American discontent with the performance of UNESCO and increasing tension between the Director General of the Organization, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, and American representatives. The latter culminated in June 1983 at a meeting between M'Bow, the U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO, Jean Gerard, and Gregory Newell, the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, at the State Department. At that meeting the Director General clearly implied that the United States was racist in its dealings with him and the Third World and asserted that it had "a deep psychological problem" which it needed to attend to urgently.

The fact that the reappraisal is taking place is the good news. Good, because UNESCO's activities and rhetoric are pretty consistently inimical to American interests and values; and good also because the United States does not, as of now, have a coherent and effective political strategy for dealing with the Organization.

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* Owen Harries is John M. Olin Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Formerly he was Australian Ambassador to UNESCO (1982-1983) and senior adviser to Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser.

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

The bad news is that although the reappraisal was decided on as long ago as July, according to the State Department, its results are not expected until January 1984. This is bad in two respects. First, it means that the United States will go to the UNESCO General Conference, which begins on October 24 and runs through November--a conference which will deal with a series of important long-term issues--in a state of suspense and uncertainty concerning its future aims and posture. Second, and more seriously, the delay suggests a rather lukewarm commitment on someone's part. There is no reason for a six month gestation period. The facts are already well known and are not highly technical or complicated. What is needed is a decision on how, in terms of its interests, the U.S. should respond to those facts; and what that requires is some concentrated clear thinking followed by an exercise of will in making some fundamental policy choices. An extended period of time is not going to improve the process or the outcome.

While this "fundamental reappraisal" seems to have escaped attention in the United States itself, moreover, it is well known in UNESCO. This is a fact of considerable political importance, for it means that future American credibility in UNESCO now depends largely on the outcome of the reappraisal. If it turns out to be timid and ineffectual, it powerfully will confirm and reinforce the view already widely held in UNESCO of the United States as a paper tiger--that it may complain and bluster and threaten but that in the last resort it will not do anything significant and has no real option but to accept UNESCO as it is

Having made known its intention to reappraise its position, the United States must now carry the matter through effectively or end up creating an even worse situation than that which provoked the reappraisal in the first place.

THE WORST CASE MODEL

Though most of UNESCO's characteristics are shared by most other U.N. bodies, there is a crucial difference of degree. UNESCO represents a worst case model of the U.N. system. It demonstrates virtually all the objectionable features of that system in an extreme, even caricatured form.

The most serious of these features is a consistent and malignant anti-Western bias. There are some who would concede the existence of this bias but would belittle it as "rhetoric," "merely symbolic," or "ritualistic " In a century which has given devastating evidence of the importance of rhetoric and symbolism in activating extremist political action, however, this represents an extraordinarily naive and dangerous response.

This anti-Western bias has received most publicity in the field of communication, because of UNESCO's efforts to create a "new world information and communication order." The intended purpose of this order is to end an alleged dominance of the

Western media, which is seen as a threat to the "cultural identity" of Third World countries and the minds of those unflatteringly described as "mere passive receivers." Imbalances are to be corrected by restrictions on the Western media and the promotion of Third World structures. Communicators will be required to be more "responsible," in the sense that they will be expected to shape what they have to say in order to promote objectives approved by UNESCO.

The objects of attack are the "monopolies" of the West. The scheme has little to say about the real monopolies of the state controlled communications systems of Communist and Third World countries. Indeed, here as elsewhere, UNESCO sees the power of repressive states as part of the solution, not as the heart of the problem. Nothing exposes the true nature of the proposed "new order" more clearly than the fact that it poses no major problem for the Soviet Union, a country that controls and manipulates communications more systematically than any other in the world.[1]

In the economic field, UNESCO is an enthusiastic supporter of another "order," a New International Economic Order, and a consistent denigrator of the market economy. The enormous achievements of the latter in recent decades are briskly dismissed. The plight of poor countries is accounted for almost entirely in terms of the free market international economic system, with no responsibility attributed to the shortcomings of their own domestic policies. Ignored are the successes of Singapore, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, South Korea or the Ivory Coast--all countries that have made remarkable progress under the existing system, despite the fact that most of them are not well endowed with resources.

In its treatment of human rights UNESCO has two main concerns: First, it is concerned to elevate virtually anything which the Third World considers desirable to the status of a human right. In the documents of UNESCO, vague and undefined concepts like "the right of solidarity," "the right to communicate," "the right to cultural identity" appear out of the blue. The objective is to legitimize Third World claims and objectives; the long term result must be to cheapen and debase the whole notion of human rights.

UNESCO's second aim is to elevate "the rights of peoples" at the expense of traditional, individual rights. Yet the custodians of these "rights of people" will be governments. While traditional human rights usually have represented claims against the state, designed to limit its power over individuals, the "rights of peoples" propagated by UNESCO represent devices for giving additional power to the state. The potential use of such concepts

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[1] For a fuller account of the communications issue, see Thomas G. Gulick, "The IPDC: UNESCO vs. the Free Press," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 253, March 10, 1983. See also Backgrounders 221 on UNESCO and Education and 233 on UNESCO and Culture by the same author.

as "the right to solidarity" and "the right to cultural identity" to crush the claim of minorities hardly needs elaboration.

Then there is the program concerned with peace and disarmament. The UNESCO view is that military expenditure is "sheer waste"--except for the expenditure incurred by developing countries "compelled" by circumstances (e.g., "the theats of conquest") to acquire arms. The Organization is firmly on the side of the organized peace movements. Over the next few years it intends "to make certain categories of [university] students, such as future researchers and those training for posts of responsibility, aware of their rightful role in averting threats of war." The Soviet Union, confident that none of its "categories of students" will be exposed to the program, has shown particular enthusiasm for this aspect of UNESCO's work.

Ideological bias is not UNESCO's only problem. It is also an inefficient, wasteful and, as far as the Secretariat is concerned, a demoralized organization.

Its inefficiency can be witnessed most spectacularly at the many conferences it organizes. When these are not technical in nature, they generally are characterized by organizational chaos, contempt for proper procedures and blatant manipulation. The Conference on World Culture in Mexico City in 1983, supposedly a UNESCO showpiece, was classic in this respect: deadlines for the acceptance of resolutions ignored; a failure to distribute translations of key documents; delegates required to vote on what they had not had time to consider in an intelligible language; a refusal to set up regular drafting and negotiating procedures and a consequent last minute reliance on manipulative ad hoc arrangements; the arbitrary variation of time given to speakers (Jack Lang's notorious speech attacking American "cultural imperialism" ran for roughly three times his alloted time; others were gavelled down strictly). The highly experienced and usually reticent head of an Asian delegation walked away from the whole thing, declaring with disgust that it was the worst international conference he had ever attended. Yet it was only marginally worse than many other UNESCO conferences.

This performance is symptomatic of a deeper and wider malaise. Morale in the Secretariat is low. Able people leave or are sidelined, while promotions go to the ideologically sound or the nominees of favored countries (a recent poll of members of the Secretariat confirms this appraisal; only 3 percent of those polled considered that UNESCO recruited high quality people--despite the exceptionally favorable terms of employment--or was making promotions on the basis of professional efficiency). Bureaucracies are never known for their boldness, but the UNESCO Secretariat is exceptionally cowed and timid, to the extent that during Director General M'Bow's frequent absences, it is difficult to make any progress on important issues. Key documents--such as the Medium Term Plan (1984-1989)--appear months late. Beyond this, well placed observers maintain that a close investigation

would reveal significant corruption. (Despite these conditions, dedicated people, to their credit, still manage to do useful work in UNESCO, particularly in those fields least amenable to ideological manipulation.)

UNESCO, moreover, is greedy. An example is the proposed 1984-1985 budget, due to be voted on at the coming General Conference. While most of the specialized agencies of the U.N. have recognized current economic realities and restricted their budget estimates to very small or no growth, M'Bow has insisted, over the objections of the principal donors, that UNESCO's budget be increased by between 4 and 6 percent in real terms. The draft budget actually goes far beyond these limits. Conservative Western estimates calculate that this exceptionally opaque document calls for a real increase of over 10 percent; some (including American experts) put the increase as more than double that.

It is not that the amounts are enormous: the proposed budget for 1984-1985 is about $430 million. The real point is that UNESCO's attitude toward the budget symbolizes so much that is wrong with the Organization: contempt for the major donors on whose money its activities depend, greed as compared with other comparable agencies, an unrealistic refusal to face the reality of its own unpopularity in the West, and deception in the presentation of its demands.

WHY IS UNESCO SO BAD?

If one believes that the U.N. system in general works in ways which are damaging to American interests, there is no problem involved in explaining why UNESCO is bad. For it shares with the other components of that system those structural and political characteristics which make them unsatisfactory from the West's point of view:

- the strategy of group solidarity pursued by the numerically dominant but poor Third World countries;
- the divorce of decision making and funding (in UNESCO, 88 percent of member states, a majority, collectively contribute only one percent of the budget; the United States, with one vote, contributes 25 percent);
- the fact that the Third World majority is motivated by an ideology generally hostile to the West and indulgent to the Soviet Union and its clients.

What does need to be explained is why UNESCO is so bad even by U.N. standards. Three factors explain this.

1) UNESCO deals with issues which are at the same time ideologically inviting and which in most cases are not directly related to the hard, material interests of the Third World majority. Irresponsible behavior, therefore, does not involve immediate penalties,

and there is not the same incentive for the majority to exercise restraint and self-discipline as there is in some other U.N. specialized agencies. On the contrary, UNESCO is an arena in which they can indulge themselves and work off some of the frustrations they experience in other forums.

2) The Western countries have given the Third World considerable latitude in UNESCO because the West has considered the Organization to be of marginal importance, a talk shop dealing in symbols and rhetoric. Balancing what they consider to be at stake in UNESCO against their wider interests, Western countries have been reluctant to make an issue of its behavior. Over a period of time the Third World majority has come to realize this and has become more and more assertive. Whether one considers Western countries to be wise in taking this complacent and indulgent attitude will depend more than anything on the importance one attaches to the competition of ideas and values in international politics.

3) Most important, UNESCO has become what it is today because of the dominant role of its Director General, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow. Formally, M'Bow is the principal servant of the member states of UNESCO and sometimes, in the face of criticism, he will draw attention to this and claim that he does no more than carry out the wishes of those states. For anyone at all acquainted with UNESCO, anyone who has sat through one of his seven or eight-hour lectures to the Executive Board, or seen him publicly dress down a Western ambassador or Head of Delegation, or listened to the subservient praise heaped on him by Third World delegates, or seen him flatly refuse to amend texts to take account of major Western concerns, or seen him impose his will on a general conference and manipulate its procedures, this is simply laughable.

With an assured majority behind him; with enormous patronage to dispense in the form of well paying jobs, grants to governments and agencies, travel to conferences in glamorous cities, membership in innumerable study groups; with a large and intimidated Secretariat to carry out his commands, M'Bow is indisputably the boss in UNESCO. It is his will that shapes and dominates its affairs.

His approach to his work is thoroughly partisan. Not for him the role of mediating and finding compromises, of adjusting interests and seeking accommodations. Ideologically, he is openly and militantly a spokesman for the radical wing of the Third World. He sees UNESCO as an instrument to right past wrongs and to redistribute powers and wealth in favor of developing countries. Temperamentally he is confrontationalist and combative, with a strong urge to dominate and considerable intellectual vanity. He does not merely respond to the demands of Third World members but takes the lead in formulating those demands in an assertive and uncompromising form (and this tendency has grown as he has tested the ground and found that he can go a long way without meeting effective resistance). He thus creates

an atmosphere in which conflict is maximized, restraint and moderation are discouraged, and realism is firmly subordinated to what can most kindly be termed aspirational politics.

According to some well placed observers, in recent years he has also drawn closer to the Soviet Union and its satellites, particularly Bulgaria.

M'Bow is also exceptionally ambitious and power seeking. Under him, UNESCO has relentlessly expanded its areas of activities into specialized fields where it has no demonstrable expertise and which are the primary responsibility of others: economic theory, strategic doctrine and disarmament, among others. Within the U.N. system he expands whenever there are ideological issues to be exploited. One of the results is that UNESCO's limited resources are spread hopelessly thin and the quality of its work in its areas of real concern suffer.

As an administrator, M'Bow combines authoritarianism with inefficiency. On the one hand he is concerned to keep a tight hold on the Secretariat and to ensure that it is responsive to his will. Compliant men thrive while enterprise, individual initiative and decentralization are not encouraged (despite the lip service payed to the latter). At the same time, however, the Director General has a great taste for foreign travel (in the grand style) and is away from Paris often and for long periods at a time. As a result, the Secretariat often is partially immobilized for weeks on end.

This combination of characteristics in its dominant figure, more than anything else, accounts for what UNESCO is today.

UNESCO GAMES

Different groups of countries play different games in UNESCO. The one that sets the ground rules for all the others is that played by the Director General and the Third World. It is an aggressive game of maximizing demands on the developed countries, seizing what they view as the moral high ground and insisting on the historical "guilt" of these countries, insisting that no importance should be attached to the size of the country's contribution to UNESCO, and refusing to accept the obligation to be "responsible" or "reasonable" in the sense of adjusting claims to current realities. It is a game played with panache and enthusiasm by radical Third World countries and a little apologetically and shamefacedly by the moderates in the group, who plead the binding obligation to express solidarity with their colleagues.

All the other games are reactive to this one. The communist countries, by and large, are content to sit back and enjoy the conflict between the Third World and the West, particularly the United States, offering support and encouragement but leaving the running to the developing countries. In return they expect, and

usually get, two things: 1) reciprocal support on matters of particular concern to them, the most important of which are "peace and disarmament"; and 2) the framing of Third World demands and accusations in a way that will minimize embarrassment to them. This implicit deal lies at the heart of UNESCO affairs.

The other game that the Soviet Union plays in UNESCO is, of course, espionage. When the French expelled 49 Soviet agents earlier this year, a quarter of them were UNESCO based: nine from the Soviet delegation and three from the Secretariat. The latter still are drawing salaries.

The game played by the majority of European states and Japan is damage limitation. They long ago gave up any significant positive expectations of UNESCO. At the same time, either because they lack the energy and conviction or because they do not consider the issues and the forum important enough, they are not inclined to make much of a fuss about the way things are going. Whether their attitude is realistic, cynical or resigned, their characteristic gesture is a fatalistic shrug. They try, with varying degrees of success, to modify the more excessive demands of the Third World, but being always on the defensive, always reactive, it is generally a question of how slowly they can make their descent down the slippery slope.

While the inclination of some Western delegates is to behave much more robustly, instructions they receive from their governments forbid such action.

There are exceptions within the Western group. France plays its own Gaullist game of attempting to exploit the advantages to be gained by deliberately distancing itself from other Western states (particularly the U.S.) and nurturing its own "special relationships" with the Third World. While it aggressively insists on a leadership role within the Western group, it does not hesitate to break ranks with the other members of the group when it thinks there is an advantage to be gained. The Scandinavian countries, meanwhile, take the Third World rather more seriously than most of their Western colleagues and make strenuous efforts to address the issues and to make sense of Third World demands. Internal conflict and disunity are thus characteristic parts of the Western game.

And what of the United States? It has no game. It has an admirable Ambassador and a strong delegation. They well understand UNESCO and the problems it presents. But their position is unenviable if not impossible, because the U.S. simply does not know what it wants to do at or with UNESCO. The U.S. is temperamentally and institutionally unsuited to adopt the realistic cynical approach of the Europeans. At the same time, it has so far refused to face what would be involved in taking that "war" seriously as far as UNESCO is concerned.

Consequently the United States, devoid of a consistent position or a coherent strategy, is poised uneasily between piecemeal damage limitation, expressions of indignation and outrage, and disassociation with what is going on. The problems this uncertainty generates are not theoretical or abstract; they are most practical: whether to demand drafting and negotiating groups or to welcome their absence as a means of avoiding being compromised; whether to work for the best possible consensus or to stand apart in principled opposition; how much weight to give to solidarity with allies and friends, and so on. Until more basic questions are addressed, these matters have to be answered in an improvisational, ad hoc way, usually under intense pressure, and the interests, influence and image of the United States suffer accordingly.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

To soldier on under existing conditions would make nonsense of the "fundamental reappraisal" and leave the United States in a very weak position. This thus gives the U.S. two basic options: to make a serious effort to improve things at UNESCO or get out.

Getting out has the virtue and attraction of decisiveness. But if the ideological struggle in UNESCO is considered important, the United States should continue to participate if it is at all possible to get reasonably fair conditions for that participation. And if the the United States is to withdraw, it should have, and should be seen to have, exhausted other alternatives first. On the other hand, it is true that changes are only likely if the United States has made a clear and credible commitment to withdraw if they are not forthcoming.

What these considerations point to is the need to combine the two options rather than to treat them as mutally exclusive alternatives.

The United States should announce formally that it will withdraw from UNESCO in one year unless there are substantial changes in the Organization. A senior spokesman of the Administration should attend the first available forum--this month's General Conference; it is not too late--to explain fully why Washington has come to this decision, the changes it deems necessary, the actions it proposes to take to encourage such changes and what it will do if they are not forthcoming.

He should make it clear that:

* The United States is not launching a general attack on the U.N. system but is taking specific action against a member of that system whose performance has been particularly and, to the United States, offensively bad.

* The United States is not demanding perfection of UNESCO, but it does require, as a condition of its continuing membership, that UNESCO at least adhere to the standards of other parts of the U.N. system.

* During the next year, whatever decisions are taken on the UNESCO budget, the United States will restrict its own contribution to the current level, adjusted for inflation. If this is unacceptable, it will withdraw forthwith.

* Further, while the United States will continue to fund programs that are of no direct interest to it or even one which seems to it to be of dubious merit, it will have no hesitation over the next year in reducing its contribution by one-quarter of the total cost of all programs which it finds positively subversive of its own values and interest (the U.S. contribution being a quarter of the total budget).

He should also spell out what kinds of changes in the functioning of UNESCO the United States has in mind. These should include, as a minimum:

- o a strict adherence to proper procedures at all times;

- o the acceptance by the Secretariat of UNESCO of standards of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity appropriate to an international bureaucracy, and an ending of the treatment of sensitive issues in Secretariat drafts in a tendentious and biased way;

- o a proper respect for the interests and view of minorities;

- o a recognition that while the principle that he who pays the piper calls the tune need not and should not be adopted, due regard must be paid to the views and circumstances of those who shoulder the burdens of paying for UNESCO programs;

- o a respect for the limits of UNESCO's area of competence and a withdrawal from areas which belong properly to other agencies and institutions.

It should also be stressed to the member states of UNESCO that most of these objectives require, more than anything else, fair, impartial and competent leadership from the Director General of UNESCO; that in the view of the United States this has not been forthcoming in recent years; that the United States has grave doubts as to whether it can be forthcoming from the present Director General; and that it therefore invites members to consider his replacement. In saying this the United States should make it clear that it has no objection to another Director General from a Third World nation.

Finally, the United States should consult with other countries to explain its actions carefully and to invite them to adopt similar policies. This approach should be made at a high level; bureaucrats in charge of foreign policy, believing only too often that maintaining good relations should take precedence over interests, are usually part of the problem, not the solution. The U.S. should make it clear that, while it would value the support of other Western countries and be prepared to discuss the modalities of implementing such a policy, its own decision is not conditional on such support.

Whether the policy outline above would succeed in making UNESCO a less objectionable organization is not certain. If it did not, the United States should withdraw in 1984.



JIM LEACH

IOWA'S CONGRESSMAN
FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT

Statement by
REPRESENTATIVE JIM LEACH
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

December 10, 1984

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with you on the subject of UNESCO, the reform process underway in that organization, and the impact which U.S. withdrawal might have on education, science, and culture. I would also like to ask permission to sumbit for the record a copy of a statement I made on the House Floor on the subject of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO on May 9, 1984.

The Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, of which I am the Ranking Minority Member, and the Subcommittee on International Operations --both of the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- have held extensive hearings this year on the subject of the U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO. I commend the record of those six hearings to you in your review of the potential impact of U.S. withdrawal on human resources and on international cooperation in education, science, and culture.

In addition, I would commend to you the "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review" which was prepared by the Department of State and submitted to Congress earlier this year. It is a useful document in terms of outlining the benefits to the United States of various UNESCO programs, the problem areas in each, the potential consequences of a U.S. withdrawal, as well as possible alternatives for future international cooperation in education, science, culture and communications in the event of a U.S. departure from UNESCO.

I will not go into detail with regard to the kinds of issues raised in that document but would mention a couple of examples which should give us serious pause before a hasty withdrawal. For example, in the area of education, the Review warns: "U.S. withdrawal would risk increasing the already sizeable influence in UNESCO of Soviet bloc and radical Third World countries. Western interests in education would be more weakly defended with the U.S. absent. Many countries view U.S. participation in UNESCO as an essential element in containing the influence of the USSR and its allies." In the area of science, again, the Review warns: "The U.S. would lose its present access to an important international framework for scientific cooperation and data gathering." The review discusses other potential consequences for U.S. withdrawal in both education and ucience, as well as in culture, communications, human rights and other UNESCO activities.

Mr. Chairman, I would like, with your permission, to address the issue of U.S. policy toward UNESCO a little more broadly.

Many of us are cognizant of the serious problems at UNESCO, both in terms of the manner in which the agency has been managed as well as in the rhetoric that has surrounded various program initiatives. Those problems are not uncommon in the U.N. system. Nevertheless, it does not appear that Congress has yet been presented with evidence which would suggest that withdrawal is an appropriate or effective remedy. Quitting is not the American way. To the contrary, on a whole range of issues and particularly on two of chief concern to the Congress -- Israel's right to participate and free press issues -- strong U.S. advocacy has thwarted the antagonistic efforts of those with different philosophical and strategic interests than our own.

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To make a publicly compelling case justifying withdrawal, it has become necessary for Administration spokesmen to exaggerate and overstate the problems in the institution, to understate U.S. effectiveness in the past in dealing with various issues and to obscure the value of a variety of educational, scientific and cultural programs which have been praised both by U.S. government agencies and by highly respected non-governmental organizations. Lets be honest. The real victims of a withdrawal will not be our adversaries, but the world's children, scientists, educators and others.

I will not repeat in detail here the weaknesses I feel were manifest in the Administration's original position, but would like to mention briefly some of the highlights of the promising reform process which has been set in motion at UNESCO. As one knowledgeable observer pointed out, the world may not have changed, but UNESCO is changing. The Executive Board -- which was the only one of the two UNESCO governing bodies to meet this year -- established a special committee to identify needed reforms in the organization and later extended the mandate of that committee to oversee implementation of those reforms. The Director General also set up five working groups to examine personnel, budgeting techniques, evaluation, programming and public information and has, since receiving the reports of those groups, begun to take steps to improve the management and administration of UNESCO. He also cooperated with the U.S. General Accounting Office's recent review of budget, personnel, and management practices at UNESCO.

The Fall Session of the UNESCO Executive Board responded directly to major U.S. budgetary concerns by approving a recommendation for zero growth in the budget for the next biennium (1986-1987). It also gave the Director General clear guidance on the content of the next program as well. For example, it called on the Director General to give particular attention to those programs which have a high degree of support, thereby offering him the opportunity to identify and avoid those programs with the least support or which cause -- for political or other reasons -- the greatest division among the Member States of UNESCO. An emphasis is placed on action-oriented programs, such as the training of literacy teachers, the installation of communications facilities and equipment, and pilot projects in scientific fields.

In other areas of political concern to the U.S., the Board, in its program and budget resolution, made no mention of the New International Economic Order and called on the Director General to convene a panel of counsellors to review the program covering two of the most controversial areas from a U.S. perspective -- disarmament and peoples' rights. UNESCO has also stated that it does not plan to help provide funding for a conference to be held by other organizations next year in Mexico on the protection of journalists which is, as always, a sensitive subject for Western journalists who fear state controls over the press or the licensing of journalists.

U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO, Jean Gerard acknowledged that there appeared to be "much progress" in the program and budget resolution, and that the guidelines reflected a "good sense of priorities."

One could, of course, go into much greater detail on the efforts behind, and the results of, the reform efforts this year. It is important to bear in mind that the Director General and the Executive Board can only take certain steps or recommend that others be taken. A General Conference is needed for final decisions to be taken in any area of substantive significance. In light of these circumstances, I would ask in what areas of U.S. complaints has UNESCO not taken steps to address those concerns?

It would seem to me to be preferable for the United States to take credit for the reform progress being made and, rather than snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, to defer a decision on possible withdrawal for another year. The U.S. bears a special responsibility to participate in a constructive fashion so as to ensure that the reforms which have been recommended are implemented and that present trends favorable to the U.S. and western democratic interests continue. Far better, it would seem, would be to adopt a one-year deferral and to assess whether the reform process so clearly underway is reflected in substantive action at next year's General Conference. To walk out at this point would appear arrogant if not impudent and might endanger the reform process.

Furthermore, deferral would give the U.S. additional time to pursue a variety of our own reform initiatives, aired just recently at the Fall Executive Board meeting, and an opportunity to upgrade our own participation in the institution.

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It should also be noted that while the Administration continues to talk of "alternatives" to UNESCO in the areas of international education, science, culture and communications, the Congress has not to date seen what those alternatives are, what they will cost, or whether they will adequately protect and advance U.S. national interests in these areas. One of the assessments of possible alternatives already made public by the Office of International Affairs of the National Research Council concludes, "there is at present no viable overall alternative for UNESCO's science programs." It further suggests that it may be advisable, if the U.S. withdraws, to simply continue funding specific UNESCO science programs, as one alternative which it seems to me brings us back to where we started. Furthermore, is it worth the administrative chaos, fragmentation and disruption of going through the transition to alternatives in all of the areas of science, education, culture, and communications, if, after the General Conference a year from now, there is sufficient reform for us to rejoin? Thus, an additional year's delay would allow the U.S. itself more time to identify and prepare for an orderly transition to alternatives should that untimately become necessary. Finally, the recent British decision to submit a notice of intent to withdraw from UNESCO will have the effect -- if that's what we are seeking -- of escalating the pressure on UNESCO to reform without our having to withdraw this year.

I remain as deeply concerned as ever that the impetus for withdrawal from UNESCO derives as much an ideological anti-U.N. bias as from a pragmatic concern for certain institutional problems often attendant to our participation in UNESCO, and that UNESCO is being sacrificed as one of an array of social compact issues with the so-called New Right.

I remain as unconvinced as ever that the United States can effectively advance its national interests and protect its allies, such as Israel, from an empty chair. It is doubtful that a cut-and-run policy is likely to advance our interests within UNESCO. More importantly, the precedent established and logic applied in abandoning UNESCO may well be a first step toward withdrawal from other more critical international institutions. If reasonable people do not take a stand here, where will the ideological axe fall next?

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JIM LEACH

IOWA'S CONGRESSMAN
FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT

Statement by

CONGRESSMAN JIM LEACH
before the
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 9, 1984

Empty-Chair Diplomacy in UNESCO

Mr. Speaker, it was my intention tonight to introduce an amendment requiring that the President not go forth with his stated intention to withdraw the U.S. from UNESCO, absent specific authorization from Congress. However, given the opposition of committee leadership of both parties to consideration of such an amendment to this bill and the commitment of Chairman Mica of the International Operations Subcommittee and Chairman Yatron of the Human Rights and International Organizations Subcommittee to push for early consideration of legislation to postpone withdrawal at least a year, I have agreed not to press such an approach at this time. I do think it important, however, to provide a perspective for the record of the UNESCO issue.

The U.S. decision to leave the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has enormous philosophical as well as practical implications for the foreign policy of the United States. It is therefore incumbent on Congress to review the Administration's decision carefully and present alternative perspectives, if warranted.

As a former delegate to the U.N. General Assembly, I have witnessed first-hand the corruption in rhetoric that plagues the U.N. system today. American representatives have a responsibility to stand up foursquarely not only for U.S. interests but for the principle of rational dialogue. But in diplomacy, as in sports, it does matter how you play the game, and I am apprehensive that joining too stridently in intemperate word games at the U.N. is not only immature but potentially counterproductive. More profoundly, deserting a principal U.N. agency appears at this time to be an unjustified response to an exaggerated problem.

Quitting is not the American way. Under the circumstances, it implies that we can't stand the heat in the crucible of North-South and East-West debate.

As its name implies, UNESCO deals principally with international education, scientific and cultural concerns. But our decision to abandon ship has extraordinary strategic implications. Indeed, it might well be argued that the Administration's ideological cut-and-run policy imperils U.S. security. After all, in the 20th century, no nation is an island. Security is collective rather than self-willed.

As Americans, we simply must come to grips with the reality that the United States does not now, nor will it ever again, claim as great a percentage of the world's economic and military might as it did at the end of World War II, when the United Nations system was established. Hence, in a very practical sense, our national security today requires that greater emphasis and sensitivity be applied to relations among States and to major international institutions such as the U.N. In a world which appears to have shifted, as Pope John Paul II recently warned, from a "post-war" to a "pre-war" mentality, responsible governments have an obligation to seek to strengthen rather than deprecate the U.N. and its affiliate organizations, like UNESCO.

The Administration needs apparently to be reminded that the UNESCO withdrawal decision is being made at the precise time U.S.-Soviet tensions have returned to dangerous Cold War levels and major bilateral arms control talks have been suspended. War rages in two parts of the Middle East, in Afghanistan, in Central America, and in vital areas of Africa. International terrorism is on the rise, placing the internal security of many nations in jeopardy. In addition, UNICEF tells us that some 40,000 children will perish daily from lack of adequate diet and sanitary drinking water. The scale of human suffering, particularly today in Africa, is staggering.

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Given the fact that weapons of mass destruction have proliferated and that for the first time in world history civilization itself is jeopardized by man's war-making capacities, the leadership of restraint has emerged as the only rational philosophical imperative of state-to-state relations. Existing international institutions and procedures may be flawed, but the case for retreat from international dialogue is non-existent.

It is in this larger context that we need to examine the Administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

The Constitution of UNESCO begins with these well-known words:

> The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare: That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. . . .

Since UNESCO's inception 37 years ago, the United States has played a major role in it and the majority of its programs.

As the Administration's recently released "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review" acknowledges: "UNESCO leads the international effort to eradicate illiteracy." UNESCO has done valuable work in education planning and training in developing countries, in collecting statistical data not easily available elsewhere, in coordinating educational efforts internationally, and in the education of the aged, disabled, and women.

In the science sector, the Administration report notes that "UNESCO has been an effective international forum for encouraging scientific debate and cooperation." UNESCO promotes research, broadens access to research data, organizes international scientific efforts on a cost-sharing basis, and offers scientific and technological help to developing countries. Major UNESCO science programs in which the U.S. has an interest include the International Brain Research Organization, the International Center for Theoretical Physics, the International Geological Correlation Program, and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, which provides marine data to the U.S. Navy and the U.S. scientific community. In addition, the Man in the Biosphere Program, which fosters an integrated approach to the world's ecosystems, is widely acclaimed as one of UNESCO's most successful projects.

In the cultural sector, the U.S. has long supported UNESCO's preservation and conservation activities, and major U.S. institutions, such as the Smithsonian Institution, USIA, the National Endowment for the Arts, and National Endowment for the Humanities, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and the National Park Service, have participated in UNESCO-related projects. The cultural heritage program, as the Administration's report points out, has been exceedingly successful. The U.S. was one of the major contributors to the preservation of the Abu Simbel monument in Egypt and has, itself, eight natural and four cultural sites on the World Heritage List.

Even in one of the more controversial sectors of UNESCO activities -- communications -- the Administration's report has a number of positive things to say. Because of UNESCO's activities in this area, the United States has had the opportunity to promote and defend U.S. values and methods in communications. The U.S. has not only not lost in any major debate but has prevailed in efforts to create the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC), which has given impetus for Third World countries to focus on practical as contrasted with ideological communications problems. In addition, UNESCO with our support, assisted in the establishment of Africa's first community radio station in Kenya and was instrumental in giving guidance to the user-owned Caribbean News Agency. UNESCO also funds training fellowships in the U.S. as well as the procurement of U.S. communications equipment.

I take the time to point out the merits of these UNESCO programs because they have been obscured by the Administration's sweeping criticisms and because they are representative of much of the evidence gathered during the Administration's policy review of UNESCO. A careful reading of the Administration's own documents does not convincingly lead to the conclusion that the weight of the evidence favors U.S. withdrawal. In fact, I would argue quite the reverse.

The Administration's singular focus on UNESCO's shortcomings has also given short shrift to the interests and views of U.S. domestic constituencies in the educational, scientific, and cultural area. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, established by law, voted 41-8 (prior to the U.S. decision to withdraw) in favor of continued U.S. participation in UNESCO. In a November 8, 1983, letter to Assistant Secretary of State Newell, prior to the withdrawal decision, Dr. James B. Holderman, President of the University of South Carolina and Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, reported that "... the Commission is convinced that the best means of serving U.S. interests in UNESCO is to press for reform from within." It is also

interesting to note a sampling of comments which a survey of 20 national associations yielded:

> International Reading Association: "UNESCO has become a convenient whipping boy... UNESCO reinforces U.S. interests in many ways."
>
> American Newspapers Publishers Association: "...We feel that in order to continue strong U.S. support for the principles of free expression, freedom of the press and the international free flow of information, the U.S. should remain in UNESCO."
>
> American Association for the Advancement of Science: "...[T]he U.S. should continue and enhance its active participation in UNESCO affairs."
>
> National Education Association: "...[W]e urge the continuance of United States participation in UNESCO. We believe that a means can be found to improve the performance of UNESCO functions without overt financial intimidation of the institution and its Secretariat."

In testimony to Congress on May 2, Dr. Holderman reported that after submitting the results of his survey to Assistant Secretary Newell, Mr. Newell "called me to ask if there weren't some negatives that we could add to our report, to give it what he termed 'credibility.'" It is difficult to escape the impression that the Administration chose for ideological reasons to ignore perspectives which did not match its preselected policy option. It is simply a myth to assume that outside a few political appointees in the Administration there is much institutional support for U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO.

The League of Women Voters, testifying on May 2, stated that it is "opposed to the Administration's proposed withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO" and that the U.S., by withdrawing, "would abdicate an important leadership role."

Dr. Walter Rosenblith reported to the Foreign Affairs Committee that an interagency assessment of UNESCO's natural sciences programs prepared under the supervision of the National Science Foundation and submitted to the State Department prior to the decision to withdraw states: "...the scientific benefits the United States derives from participation in UNESCO clearly warrant our continued participation." He noted that the National Academy of Sciences is "deeply concerned" with the potential impact of the U.S. decision to withdraw and that a preliminary review conducted by the Academy last fall concluded that in the area of the sciences at least, at the present time, there is "no real alternative to UNESCO."

Dr. Hans Weiler, a professor at Stanford University, testified that the loss of the U.S. financial contribution would deal a particularly heavy blow to UNESCO's educational programs and that termination of U.S. membership would also deprive UNESCO of the "tremendous pool of professional talent and human resources that is available in the educational community of this country." U.S. withdrawal, he said, would "send a signal to the rest of the world that the United States of America is turning its back on the one international institution which many of the world's poorer countries have come to regard as their last remaining hope for ... their fledgling educational systems."

Professor Weiler also cautioned against the assumption that the U.S. educational community is professionally self-sufficient and notes, "From its beginning, and not just in education, scholarship and professional life in this country has derived much of its vitality from interacting, communicating, and collaborating with professional colleagues and groups around the world. The remarkable influence of people like Montessori, Piaget, Steiner and others upon educational thought and practice in this country would not have been possible without a tradition of wide open channels of communication and interaction. [W]e can ill afford to place ourselves outside of the one functioning network of communication that is provided by UNESCO."

With respect to the disarmament programs which the Administration has criticized, Dr. Harold K. Jacobson, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and now visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, noted, "In recent years U.S. social scientists have participated in and organized UNESCO sponsored conferences dealing with such topics as arms control and disarmament education." Jacobson noted that education about disarmament and arms control is quite separate from the issue of negotiation, which is more properly the responsibility of other U.N. bodies. In this regard, it should be stressed that a growing number of U.S. universities have courses on peace and disarmament subjects and that the U.N. General Assembly has urged UNESCO to increase its consideration of these issues.

Ironically, U.S. opposition to UNESCO activities in this area leaves the impression that peace is a Soviet initiative. This defies our traditions and runs counter to a decade-long effort of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to point out the

costliness of the arms race to all countries in the world. Arms control must be led by the superpowers, but it is the responsibility of all, with the cost implications greater in the developing world than in our own society. Far from being irrelevant to UNESCO activities, arms control is central to the capacity of many countries to provide adequate resources to education and development.

Everyone who is familiar with UNESCO is well aware of the problems plaguing that institution. They are serious. The Administration's statement of December 29, 1983, announcing the decision to withdraw, charged that UNESCO "extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with," "has exhibited hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press," and "has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion."

Congress has been fully cognizant of the problems in UNESCO as in many other U.N. agencies and in the General Assembly itself. It is precisely because of this awareness and concern that Congress has, by law, authorized the Administration to take action if Israel is illegally expelled or in any other fashion denied her right to participate, or if UNESCO implements any policy or procedure which has the effect of licensing journalists or imposing censorship or restrictions on the free flow of information. In the case of the first scenario, involving Israel, Congress has authorized the U.S. to suspend its participation and withhold payment of its assessed contribution until any illegal action against Israel is reversed. In the case of the second scenario, in which actions might be taken against a free press, U.S. funding to UNESCO is to be suspended.

Because Congressional concern is so deep as to be reflected in statute it is instructive to examine where UNESCO stands on these two issues at present.

In the case of the Israeli question, Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell acknowledged at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations on February 7, 1984, that the Israeli question was not a problem for the U.S. and that this particular concern was not a reason for the U.S. withdrawal.

Ambassador Edmund Hennelly, head of the U.S. delegation to the 22nd General Conference in the Fall of 1983, also testified in Congressional hearings April 25, 1984, that at the last General Conference, "There was no challenge to Israeli credentials. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was nearly non-existent."

In a report to Congress in February 1983 (required under Section 108 of P.L. 97-241) the Administration stated, "While there have been a number of unacceptable resolutions on Middle East questions ... the worst excesses have been avoided." It further said that efforts to deny Israel her right to participate, such as had taken place in the IAEA, "have not prospered in recent years in UNESCO." Why? Largely, the report explains, because of the "forceful presentation of U.S. Government views, skillful diplomatic intervention by the Director General, and help of moderates in the Group of 77." Clearly, on this major issue, the U.S. has forcefully presented its case and successfully carried the day.

Not only has UNESCO moderated on the Israeli issue, but, according to a January article in the Manchester Guardian, "The Israeli Government, concerned about the threat to its own membership, made strenuous efforts to stop the United States leaving UNESCO." The Israeli concern, the article went on to say, "was raised in a confidential 'action memorandum' sent to the Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, on December 16, last year ..." Later the article says, in quoting the same memorandum, "'The Israelis have expressed concern that with the United States absent, Israel would eventually be ejected from UNESCO.'" As one well-informed diplomat observed, the U.S. decision to withdraw places Israel in a particularly awkward position. Israel's enemies are always looking for ways to deny it participation in international organizations, consequently, Israeli policy is premised on efforts, often strenuous, to join and stay in as many as possible. But, if the U.S. decides at the end of the year to withdraw, and Israel finds itself forced by circumstances to follow it will have a far more difficult time rejoining UNESCO in the future than will the U.S. Those who want to de-legitimatize Israel will be given an enormous boost.

It is unclear to me how the United States can actively defend our own interests, let alone the right of Israel to participate in UNESCO, from an empty chair.

With respect to issues of a free press and freedom of communication, which is the second area in which Congress has taken a firm stand, the Administration reported to Congress on February 29, 1984, "The Department of State concludes that UNESCO is not, at this time, actively implementing any policy or procedure proscribed by Section 109 of Public Law 97-241. None of the programs included in the Second Medium Term Plan (adopted in late 1982) or approved in the Program and Budget for 1984-85 pose any active, direct threat to a free press." Section 109 of PL 97-241, as

my colleagues will recall, states that U.S. funds cannot be used for payments to UNESCO "if that organization implements any policy or procedure the effect of which is to license journalists or their publications, to censor or otherwise restrict the free flow of information within or among countries, or to impose mandatory codes of journalistic practice or ethics."

The Administration's February 1984 report continues by saying that marginal gains were made at the 22nd UNESCO General Conference in the communications sector:

> On the ideological level, our view that any NWICO is "an evolving, continuous process," not an established, defined order, was accepted. Also accepted was our contention that any study of a "right" to communicate must take into account traditional human rights (as opposed to collective, second generation rights). We successfully introduced new studies to the work program for 1984-85 concerning the "watch-dog" role of the press, role of the private media, censorship and self-censorship, and ways to strengthen freedom of information. We were also successful in eliminating projects calling for studies of the "tasks" of the media, safety of journalists and grants to journalist organizations to study "codes" of conduct, and implementation of the Mass Media Declaration.

In the Administration's "U.S./UNESCO Policy Review," the Administration also admitted that "the recent 22nd General Conference debate on this subject gave evidence of a new and welcome degree of moderation..." Although questions remain whether that moderation will increase or diminish, it doesn't take skilled guesswork to figure out that the hand of the Soviets and Third World radicals will be strengthened if the preeminent advocate of democratic values absents itself from future debate.

Dana Bullen, executive secretary of the World Press Freedom Committee, which speaks for various free press organizations in the West, was also quoted in the New York Times on November 17, 1983, as saying, "If anyone is looking for an assault on the media at this conference serious enough to justify United States withdrawal, they won't find it."

In Congressional hearings April 25, 1984, Leonard Sussman, Executive Director of Freedom House and representative for the U.S. on many of the most controversial communications issues at the last General Conference, testified that over the years, "The Soviets have been repeatedly rebuffed," and that Director General M'Bow "has quietly helped block Soviet press-control initiatives." He warned that "if we leave, the chances for greater use of UNESCO's considerable forum to debate press-control measures will increase, not decrease..."

To document how the Soviets have been rebuffed, Sussman notes: "In 1970 the USSR's mild communications draft was put off. In 1972, the USSR's stronger draft was put off. In 1976, the USSR's outrageous draft was defeated. In 1978 came the showdown. The harshest Soviet draft of all was killed the night before it was to have been debated. It was killed by Director-General M'Bow's personal intercession. In place of the Soviet draft, a Western-oriented version was substituted."

Like the Administration's report, Sussman's testimony indicates that free press advocates at the 1983 General Conference were successful in strengthening UNESCO's communication program. He also reported that a Soviet draft on monitoring the press was negotiated out of existence and thus never received serious consideration. In an earlier radio interview, Mr. Sussman also indicated that it became very clear to him at the General Conference that the word had come down from the UNESCO Director General that the conference was not to be raucous or anti-Western on communications issues and that it was instead to try to accommodate the concerns of the West, particularly those of the U.S. In a letter to the New York Times, Sussman again noted that the World Press Freedom Committee, Editor and Publisher magazine, and a number of newspaper editorialists "reported that for the first time in years these communications negotiations generally favored the Western free-press position."

We must keep in perspective that UNESCO did not invent censorship, nor the idea of a state-controlled press. Rather, it has become a forum for a debate on these practices. As such, we should not shy away from the opportunity the institution provides to argue for our values -- for a free press and freedom of expression. An activist human rights policy, one would think, would include active advocacy of the principles embedded in our Bill of Rights. The Administration is correct to object -- and object strenuously -- to efforts to sanction controls on a free press. But to retreat when proper advocacy is prevailing strikes many UNESCO observers as an ironic, if not counterproductive, strategy.

It would also appear somewhat ironic for the U.S. to object too strenuously to the politicization of UNESCO while also advocating freedom of communication and freedom of expression. It would be contrary to Western traditions and democratic principles to imply that fair -- perhaps even unfair -- criticisms of the U.S. and the West

should not be tolerated in international organizations. Our traditions as codified in the Bill of Rights are based upon the premise of Thomas Jefferson that in the free airing of views, truth would triumph over error. We have a right to be concerned, even enraged at times, over the excessive political rhetoric displayed within the U.N. system, particularly the trashing of the U.S., its allies and Israel by some of its more radical members. But our refusal to participate in UNESCO could well send a message that the U.S. is reluctant to rely on the outcome of the ongoing battle of words and that we are not confident our philosophical position will prevail. Some might also conclude that the flip side of refusing to do battle with words is a potentially excessive reliance on military means to resolve international disputes.

We must all acknowledge that although the U.S. may be the target of considerable criticism that lacks justification there is an element to that kind of free expression of views that is quite healthy. To repeat a point made in a different context earlier, it is difficult to understand how we can more effectively protect our national interests in a free press and the free flow of information from an empty chair.

Likewise, the Administration also objects to other "statist" concepts debated at UNESCO such as the "New International Economic Order" and the "rights of peoples." The merits of our position aside, I fail to understand how the U.S. will defend the interests of its business community, promote the idea of a free market and stand up for its human rights principles if it absents itself from the fora at which competing ideas are debated.

Ambassador Hennelly, again in testimony before a Congressional Committee, noted that there was a "victory" for the free enterprise position when proposals to bring UNESCO into the business of establishing a "code of conduct" for transnational corporations was, after a great deal of behind-the-scenes maneuvering and debate, reduced to a meager call for further study.

In the area of human rights, Ambassador Hennelly noted that an appropriate distinction was made between traditional human rights and people's rights and that "Language introduced by the United States in key places in the Program and Budget document was adopted by consensus." "The effect," he noted, "is to distinguish between traditional human rights 'which are universally accepted' and 'people's rights,' which require additional study."

Again Leonard Sussman, as Executive Director of Freedom House, presented a compelling argument in his testimony to Congress for active U.S. engagement in -- not withdrawal from -- the debate over "people's rights." Sussman noted that the concept of people's rights did not originate with the Soviets but at an all-African conference in 1976 and is incorporated into the Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). He testified that the U.S. position in the human rights debate from 1982 on has essentially been to work toward killing the term "people's rights" rather than influencing the debate to effect a real improvement in its substance. Sussman then continues by saying:

> Yet Americans, above all, have a stake in the proper defining of human rights. Which other country has a longer tradition of pressing for self-determination of peoples? Wilson's Fourteen Points are peoples' rights! The Soviet Union cannot possibly support such a traditional definition of the term. The USSR is the largest violator of peoples' rights: in the Baltic countries, Afghanistan, the Ukraine, among the Tartars, the Jews and in Eastern Europe... Rightly defined, peoples' rights should be seen as a central aspect of the democratic tradition. The term "peoples' rights" is admittedly ambiguous, but the ambiguity cuts both ways. On the one hand, it seems synonymous with rights of states, particularly economic and security rights, but on the other hand, the new terminology seems to place the existence of "peoples" above and prior to that of states...
>
> It is a continuing scandal that the U.N. has been allowed to see self-determination as applying only to the former colonies of European powers and the United States. "Peoples' rights" offer the West a needed opportunity to redress this mistake. The countries ruling over captive peoples today are generally communist tyrannies and that point should be driven home.
>
> We should not let the implication become accepted that because democracy begins with a consideration of the rights of individuals, it does not recognize as essential to their expression, collective institutions that secure these rights in a community or among communities composed of many individuals with necessarily conflicting rights.

Sussman also states that UNESCO's Committee on Conventions and Recommendations, which hears in private the complaints of violations of human rights by member states, allows for organizations such as Freedom House to bring human rights cases before the defendant country's peers. He concludes that this committee is "more effective

and fairer than the United Nations Commission on Human Rights" and that it has been responsible for the "release of individuals who suffered long and unjust imprisonment, and often torture."

I might add here that while some would argue that if the U.S. withdraws it could count on other Western and like-minded governments to defend our interests, one of the American delegates to the UNESCO conference observed privately that on a series of international corporate issues, European interests were best served by isolating -- not protecting -- the U.S. position and that it is risky business to assume that our competitors will not want to take advantage of certain issues where they can. But, even if one were to assume a synoymity of interests, the notion of conducting a global campaign to get others to join us in our walk-out leads to the inevitable question that if an empty-chair diplomacy doesn't make sense, how will a half-empty table make matters better for Western and democratic values?

Finally, some comments on the budget issue are in order. Fiscal restraint is the watchword these days in Washington and around the world. However, it is curious to note that while the Administration is correct in charging UNESCO with program growth, the Administration's budget figures show an actual decline of some 13 percent in UNESCO's 1984-85 biennium as calculated in nominal dollars. Because of that nominal cut in UNESCO's budget, a rebate on last year's payment and the strength of the U.S. dollar, U.S. assessed payments to that organization will decline from some $49.79 million in 1983 to $24.8 million in 1984. UNESCO has done a better job in restraining its budget in the last two years than the Reagan Administration and Congress have our own. And it may prove to be exceedingly difficult for the Administration to argue we should leave UNESCO because of unrestrained budget growth when all the evidence points to a major savings in UNESCO's budget costs to the American taxpayer this year.

It is also important to note that the budget growth has not been as "unrestrained" as the Administration asserts. The original budget proposed by UNESCO called for an increase of some 10 percent in program growth but due to efforts by member states to bring that growth rate down, a "Nordic Compromise" was finally accepted by the General Conference which brought the growth rate down to the 3.8-5.5 percent range. It is precisely because of budget concerns expressed by the U.S. and other significant donors that UNESCO moderated its position. Again, it would appear we are cutting and running, despite substantial success in getting our way.

It should also be pointed out that UNESCO expenditures under that budget have significant spin-off benefits for the U.S. The Administration reported last year that "fellowships to Americans and foreign students studying in the United States, procurement of U.S. equipment, and consultant's fees and payments to American staff, amount to about 40 percent of the value of the U.S. contribution. Similarly, United States prominence in UNESCO's science and education sectors creates markets for U.S. scientific and educational products and materials."

It is worth noting here that the Administration has not, to date, conducted an extensive assessment of the potential impact of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO on U.S. economic interests in international trade and commerce. While the Administration argues that it is working to identify bilateral and multilateral alternatives to UNESCO, it is difficult to know how expensive these will be or if the Administration can promise OMB support for them, no matter what the cost. A go-it-alone approach appears not only to be irresponsible from a diplomatic perspective, but is almost surely to be the most expensive. The Administration is also making the dubious argument that one approach might be to leave UNESCO but continue participating in certain UNESCO-related activities in the area of copyrights, oceanography, and special projects. While that might be possible, the U.S. would no longer be represented in the main UNESCO policy-making bodies dealing with issues in these areas and thus absent from policy debates which might ultimately have an effect on those activities in which we continue to have an interest. To participate in any serious endeavor while forgoing leadership responsibilities in the making of policy ill befits a great country with great interests.

Other management and personnel complaints are frequently raised by the Administration about UNESCO, many of them justified. However, it is important to establish a balanced record in this regard. For example, it is significant that there are roughly twice as many Americans in professional positions at UNESCO as Soviets. At the end of 1983, the United States had over 80 citizens in professional jobs at UNESCO. The Soviets had only 36. Of this number, certainly more than a few are likely, alas, to be agents of the KGB. This is a sorry aspect of all U.N. organizations. Critics of UNESCO would bolster their arguments for U.S. withdrawal on this sad phenomenon, but it must be pointed out that such an argument applies to all U.N. agencies and the U.N. itself. The KGB represents tough, no-nonsense opposition, but its existence should be recognized, not cowered from. The U.N. and its specialized agencies provide more advantages to U.S. foreign policy than agents of our principal geostra-

tegic rival can subvert. Care must be taken not to allow the KGB agent argument to set a precedent that could lead either to the ending of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or to U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. itself.

It is difficult to understand what caused the Administration to take so drastic an action as to serve notice of its intent to terminate membership in UNESCO. It is unclear what other alternatives -- short of total withdrawal -- were considered nor why they were rejected in favor of this radical option.

In the report to Congress last year required under Section 108 of PL 97-241, we were told by the Administration that "U.S. interests are generally well served by UNESCO programs, which are, for the most part, non-political and which can most effectively be pursued through international cooperation." The same Administration report also said "UNESCO is a major forum for U.S. multilateral diplomacy. As such, it provides the U.S. with an opportunity to promote U.S. (and Western) values and methods -- particularly in the Third World."

Why then has the Administration taken the decision it has to withdraw from UNESCO? And, if the latest General Conference was as constructive as the Administration reported it to be, why has the U.S. concluded that UNESCO is more beyond hope this year than last? Why is the U.S. now engaged in a cut-and-run policy?

As recently as February 3, 1983, at a meeting of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Assistant Secretary of State Newell discussed the results of a 1982 special meeting of the commission and recalled, "The basic thrust of that special meeting was the unanimous recommendation that the United States not only continue to remain a member of UNESCO, but that the effectiveness of U.S. participation in the work of the organization be increased." He then added: "I fully support your review then and support the conclusions of that meeting now." There appeared to be little in the Secretary's prepared statement that would hint of a 180-degree turnabout and a decision within the year to actually withdraw from UNESCO.

It is difficult to conclude anything except that the impetus for withdrawal derives as much from an ideological, anti-U.N. bias as a pragmatic concern for certain institutional problems attendant to our participation in UNESCO.

Ironically, the most telling argument against U.S. withdrawal comes by analogy from the first Republican President, Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln, we will recall, rejected the approach of those abolitionists who would have accepted the secession of the southern States in an effort to rid the nation of slavery. He did not consider it heroic for an individual or country simply to wash its hands of slavery. To do good took sacrifice and work, not just moral posturing.

It would appear that strong ideological and/or domestic political concerns intervened in a process of what would otherwise have been a rational, professional calculation of U.S. interests, benefits, and problems in UNESCO. The language of U.S. criticism to date has been exceedingly strong but surprisingly ill-defined. For the Administration to refuse to produce a detailed case is to acknowledge implicitly that there may be holes in that case. And for the Administration to refuse to submit a laundry list of changes it wants in UNESCO procedures is to imply ideological hardheadedness and a desire not to be serious about reform.

As the United Nations Association testified recently: "It is not constructive to voice superficial complaints without offering suggestions for specific remedies."

The decision to withdraw appears to represent as much an indictment of U.S. policy and performance within UNESCO as it represents an indictment of UNESCO itself. The greatest democracy in the world has been brought to its knees in this important international forum as much by irrational forces at home as those abroad. Political leadership in America has appealed to the lowest rather than the highest instincts of the body politic and in this case allowed nationalistic irrationality to prevail.

In testimony before Congress, Leonard Sussman made an apt analogy to the McCarthy era when he expressed hope that we would "put behind us the scare tactics introduced into UNESCO investigations by former Senator Joe McCarthy. In 1953-54 he conducted the first probe of UNESCO after accusing the American delegates and State Department staffers of being communists. A full-scale investigation was conducted in 1956 and the charges found to have no validity." Sussman concludes, "The McCarthy approach turned us against ourselves, reflecting our inability to influence the world as some would have liked. This phenomenon will always be with us. Its opposite -- accusing other countries of consistent anti-Americanism -- is no less prevalent. The truth generally lies somewhere in between: recognizing that Americans do not always effectively support their own principles and positions, and other countries do indeed have differing national interests which cannot always be accommodated to ours."

Not long ago, we might recall, the U.S. Representative to the U.N. suggested that perhaps we should consider moving the U.N. headquarters to Moscow for six months out of the year. Another U.S. Ambassador said he would gladly stand at the dock and wave goodbye to the U.N. delegates. New York Mayor Ed Koch jumped into the fray by calling the U.N. a "cesspool," and the Senate chimed in by adopting the so-called Kassebaum amendment, which called for major cuts in our contributions to the U.N. and four of its agencies, including UNESCO.

Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and more extremist perspectives were avoided. The President himself went on record opposing the Kassebaum Amendment and told a gathering of U.N. delegates in New York that the U.S. was proud to be the home of the United Nations.

Now, as we face the impending withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO, it is my hope that cooler heads again will prevail and that the President will take a close look at what his subordinates have recommended. There is evidence a review process is under way, but it is unclear how seriously it will be conducted. In a memorandum from NSC Adviser Robert MacFarlane to the Secretary of State last December, MacFarlane states that the decision to withdraw was made with reluctance and that the President wants us to continue to make every effort to bring about meaningful change in UNESCO over the next year. That memorandum also indicates the President's desire that the Department of State consider upgrading U.S. representation to UNESCO and appointing a panel of individuals from the academic, media and corporate world to advise the Administration on this matter. Finally, MacFarlane indicated White House willingness to review the decision if concrete changes materialize in UNESCO this year.

In a second memorandum dated February 11, 1984, MacFarlane stated that in order to carry out the President's wishes, a major campaign to turn UNESCO around during 1984 would be needed. He suggests that such a campaign might include an action plan, the mobilization of international support and more involvement in UNESCO personnel assignments.

In this context it would seem particularly appropriate for Congress to exercise a major oversight role this year. The minimal consultation which took place with Congress about the withdrawal decision reflects unilateral expansion of Executive prerogative. It belies serious efforts to craft bipartisan, bi-institutional approaches to foreign policy.

Accordingly, I have introduced legislation (H.R. 5082) which would go beyond a simple requirement of consultation, to require the President to seek specific authorization from Congress should an Executive recommendation be made to terminate U.S. membership in UNESCO. The Constitution is silent on the subject of terminating international agreements of this nature. Since joining UNESCO in 1946 involved a partnership effort on the part of the Executive Branch and the Congress and an authorizing resolution passed by both Houses it would seem logical that the decision to terminate our membership would likewise be made on a partnership basis. As it stands now, the Congress has simply been presented a fait accompli.

I have reviewed the Constitutional and legal issues raised by the bill with the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service, which outlined a substantial legal and Constitutional case both for and against Congressional involvement.

In support for the approach I advocate, it is important to point out that under U.S. law, the international agreement embodying the UNESCO Constitution is considered to be a Congressional-Executive agreement, not a treaty. President Truman, in accepting membership for the U.S. in UNESCO pursuant to specific statutory authorization passed by both the House and Senate in 1946, cited that law (Public Law 565, 79th Congress) as the basis of his authority in depositing the U.S. instrument of accession at UNESCO.

Second, it should be noted that the Constitution makes no express provision for the making, let alone termination, of international Congressional-Executive agreements. Even where the Constitution does speak to the making of treaties themselves, it makes no mention of their termination or whether the Senate, whose advice and consent is required on their making, is similarly required to concur with their termination. Since the Constitution contains no explicit authority for the making of agreements which are not treaties, it is difficult to assert with total precision that the President maintains unchallengeable authority in this area. Interestingly, it does not appear that our Forefathers ever debated this issue in drafting that document.

Third, if for the purposes of analogy the role of Congress or the Senate with respect to termination of treaties were to be examined, there would appear to be no definitive judicial rulings on the matter. In the 1979 Goldwater v. Carter case, the District Court held that the President's unilateral termination of our defense treaty with

Taiwan was unconstitutional in the absence of the concurrence of either the Senate or both Houses of Congress. However, the Court of Appeals reversed that decision largely, it seems, on the basis that the President has the authority to recognize foreign governments. In the final analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the complaint. Thus, there are contradictory and inconclusive judicial pronouncements to which we might turn in the case before us. What is clear, however, is that there has been no judicial resolution of this question.

Fourth, actual practice with respect to the termination of treaties does not offer a clear guide to the situation before us. There are examples where the President has acted to terminate treaties pursuant to prior authorization by Congress, where he has acted but later received legislative approval for his actions, and where he has acted and received no response one way or another from Congress. However, in reviewing the record of practice up to 1979, the District Court in the Goldwater v. Carter case concluded -- even in the face of some 13 instances cited by the Executive Branch in support of the President's alleged right to act unilaterally on treaty termination -- that as a whole, the "historical precedents support rather than detract from the position that the power to terminate treaties is a power shared by the political branches of this government." Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C. 1979). The Court of Appeals observed, however, in reviewing the same historical record, that in no case was a treaty continued in force over the President's opposition.

Fifth, turning to situations much closer to the one before us, it is instructive to consider the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO. However, the situation is not altogether analogous in that there was little Congressional opposition and no legislative challenge that I am aware of to the Administration's authority like that posed by H.R. 5082.

Thus, in the absence of guidance from the Constitution, case law, or practice, broader, more theoretical arguments become particularly germane. For example, Article II, Sec. 3 of the Constitution cites the duty of the President to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. If the Congress were to pass this legislation, the President would presumably be bound by the Constitutional requirement to honor the law and would be skating on thin ice to proceed with withdrawal from UNESCO prior to obtaining the required statutory authority from Congress to do so. In a frequently cited concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson said:

> When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb...

In addition, Congress possesses a residual foreign affairs power under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18) under which legislative competence could be asserted with respect to international agreements authorizing U.S. membership in international organizations. In the past, Congress has authorized U.S. participation or membership in various international organizations pursuant to joint resolution and has exercised a great deal of authority in the foreign affairs area, as in the War Powers Resolution and Case Act.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the power of Congress to terminate a treaty for purposes of domestic law by enacting inconsistent domestic statutes at a later time. Logically, the same rule could be applied to Congressional-Executive agreements. Thus, if it can be argued that Congress has the authority effectively to compel the President by statute to stop adhering to certain international treaties, might not Congress have the power through statute to compel the Executive to continue adherence?

Membership in international organizations of this nature should never by considered cast in permanent stone. But when termination of involvement in an organization of such stature is under consideration, it is incumbent on the Administration to bring its case to the Congress and the American public. A jointly made decision would certainly give any Administration a stronger position in its efforts to protect and advance American interests.

Finally, there have been allegations of mismanagement within UNESCO, both with respect to finances as well as personnel, and the General Accounting Office at the request of Congress has just begun a review of the agency's management practices. Congress should rightfully be concerned with these allegations and if there is merit to them we should work to rectify the situation. But let us be careful to keep petty abuses of power in perspective. Problems attendant with human foibles should be rooted out, but let's not allow concern for one director's management style mask an ideological pouting here at home. To refuse to stay and fight corruption from within is a denial of international responsibility. It may be a form of corruption itself. Given the weakness of the Administration case as presented to date, I personally welcome the involvement of the GAO in assisting in evaluating UNESCO's budgetary

problems. But whatever the result of an independent investigation of UNESCO's management practices, it should be clear that few in Congress favor the disengagement of the United States from the entire United Nations system.

Here, it must be noted that not only has Director General M'Bow been responsive to U.S. concerns on both the freedom of press and Israeli issues, but just today he has announced a willingness to address certain administrative housekeeping problems. In order to reassess UNESCO personnel matters a joint advisory working group composed of UNESCO officials and outside experts will be immediately established by the Director General. In addition, Mr. M'Bow has announced his intention to delegate authority to make personnel appointments up to a certain level to the Assistant Director General for Administration, George Saddler (an American), until the appointment of a Deputy Director General, at which time the Deputy Director General will be granted this authority in consultation with Assistant Directors General responsible for the sectors concerned.

The Director General has also announced that he will create an internal working group to examine existing programs in order to identify duplication and overlap which has already come to light in implementing the 1984-1985 program. The group will also study the priorities for consideration in drafting the 1986-1987 program and will take into consideration the positions of Member States and non-governmental organizations, the need for program concentration, and the need for orienting UNESCO activities toward concrete action. Mr. M'Bow also plans to establish a joint advisory group of outside high-ranking specialists and UNESCO officials to undertake a complete review of budgeting techniques and to make recommendations on the implementation of new procedures as well as the presentation of the budget of the next biennium. He intends to call together a group of experts to advise him on programming and evaluation matters, and will submit his proposals on this subject to the Executive Board in closed session when discussing the restructuring of the Secretariat.

In any regard, there may be no graceful exit from the dilemma the United States now faces. My own view is that, absent Congressional restrictions, the prospect of the President reconsidering his decision at the end of the year is not great even if changes occur in the methods of operation of the UNESCO Secretariat. The enthusiasm for withdrawal of certain narrow political groupings within the U.S. is of such magnitude as to preclude the likelihood of serious political review. What appears to have occurred is a decision of the Administration to sacrifice UNESCO as one of an array of social compact issues with the so-called New Right. This is unfortunate not only for advancement of U.S. national interests within UNESCO, but for the implications it carries for similar U.N. institutions. If no serious dissent is registered against the Administration's decision, a precedent will be established whereby one by one other international institutions are likely to be targeted by narrow interest groups and a similar approach instigated.

The American people are more deeply committed to the U.N. than many of its critics recognize. A CBS/New York Times poll, for instance, conducted in September 1983 revealed that 89 percent of the public favors the U.S. staying in the U.N. while only five percent favors withdrawal. In commenting on the results of the poll, CBS News noted that the Gallup Organization has asked about U.S. participation in the United Nations since 1951. It has consistently found the public supportive of U.S. participation. But never in its history of asking that question have as few as five percent favored getting out.

The American people seem to understand better than American politicians that isolationism has no place in the world today. If there is any hope of diminishing intolerance and hostility among nations it must come through a greater international commitment to education and mutual understanding which UNESCO symbolizes. Security in the 20th century may in the final measure relate as much to education and cultural advancement as the acquisition of increasingly costly and sophisticated arsenals of war. In a world in which weapons of mass destruction exist, arms control -- while a prerequisite -- is not enough. It is imperative to build up international organizations and advance international techniques of conflict resolution. Centuries ago American settlers could draw wagons around a campfire and provide protection against Indians, but today the only real protection against nuclear weapons is an advancement of human understanding. In this context, it would seem to be the height of folly for the U.S. to renege on our international responsibilities.

# # # #

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The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harries, I want to thank you for taking time to be with us today. We appreciate that you have a wide background in this area, and we appreciate your willingness to testify here.

Senator RANDOLPH. Can I make just a postscript?

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

Senator RANDOLPH. Your familiarity and your understanding of the Australian system is recognized. I want the record to indicate that the country in the world with the highest percentage of its population eligible to vote casts that vote in its election. There is a very heavy penalty if you do not do so.

I have no desire for you to comment, except I think that when I listen to an Australian speak, or someone associated with the policies within Australia, I speak strongly of my approval of a country like Australia, with the highest percentage of those eligible to vote who cast their ballots.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HARRIES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Harries. We appreciate your being here.

Our next witness will be Mr. Maxwell E. Greenberg, honorary national chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Mr. Greenberg, we are grateful to have you here. We welcome you to the committee, and we look forward to taking your testimony. So we will turn the time over to you, sir.

STATEMENT OF MAXWELL E. GREENBERG, HONORARY NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH

Mr. GREENBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to prepare myself to speak without a raspy voice.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I've got one, and water doesn't help me. [Laughter.]

Mr. GREENBERG. Mr. Chairman and Senator Randolph, let me say prefatorily that it is a pleasure to appear at a hearing before Senator Randolph, whose many years of contribution to the deliberations of the Senate have been noted by all Americans, and to have him make the personal sacrifice of coming to this hearing after traveling back from Europe and to participate is an honor and a privilege for us to be here with you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are happy to have you with us.

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you.

Mr. GREENBERG. Mr. Chairman, my name is Maxwell E. Greenberg. I am an attorney by profession, and I reside and practice in Los Angeles, CA, and serve as honorary chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

The Anti-Defamation League, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the ADL, is a worldwide human relations organization. We are primarily organized and operate here in the United States, with 31 offices across the United States. We also have a European office in Paris and a service office in Jerusalem. We maintain a liaison office in Rome and have affiliated offices and bureaus in Central and South America.

The concern of the league about Unesco's now well documented politicization and mismanagement dates back a decade. The Arab bloc, urged on by the Soviet Union and its clients and some third world nations, have sought repeatedly to undermine Israel's legitimacy, and in vote after vote, in matters ranging from archeological excavations in Jerusalem to support for the terrorist PLO, we found the international forum of a United Nations agency trying to discredit and defame a member state for strictly political purposes.

The concern of the league increased as the anti-Israel beat of Unesco became a jumping-off point for a series of votes, pronouncements, and programs which were decidedly against Western nations and against democratic nations both in tone and substance.

This crescendo culminated in the serious discussion of and almost adoption of a so-called new world information order, which would have seen the licensing of journalists and state management of the gathering and dissemination of the news.

We Americans are raised from our earliest days with a reverence and appreciation for freedom of the press. It is one of our most cherished principles. And yet, only a short while ago, our representatives were participating in Unesco assemblies with totalitarian and authoritarian nations whose peoples could benefit from press freedom, seeing the representatives of those nations attempt to choke it off in those parts of the world in which the press does have freedom.

In the light of that, in 1980 and in 1981, the ADL's National Commission and National Executive Committee, our highest policy-making bodies, adopted resolutions calling on the President and the Congress, quote, to withhold further subvention of Unesco so long as Unesco continues to politicize its actions by means of anti-Western, antidemocratic attacks in violation of its mandate, unquote.

Now, we have also been troubled, but not really surprised, to learn of Unesco's fiscal mismanagement, which has been so ably documented in the GAO study. Apparently, so much time is spent on political action, little has remained for professional and accountable accounting procedures.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Randolph, our country has tried the tolerant path. But the attempts to work from within to reform Unesco have been met only by the insolent intransigence of its ponderous bureaucracy.

When we announced our intention to leave Unesco by the end of this year unless significant changes were made, Unesco's leadership made every effort to stonewall and misinterpreted our notice of withdrawal as a threat to the Third World nations. I think that behind their cavalier attitude was the belief that our decision would be rescinded if some superficial changes were made.

But even the recent agreement by Unesco's Executive Committee to consider some as yet more or less unspecified reforms was late and halfhearted, and the moment of truth has arrived. If we really want to see Unesco refocus upon its almost 40-year-old mandate of helping to eliminate illiteracy, to facilitate scientific exchanges for the betterment of mankind, its mandate to improve communications between peoples and foster understanding of the world community's diversity through cultural exchange, I believe—and it is a

difficult decision—but I believe we owe it to ourselves to leave Unesco at the end of this month.

Now, the example we have set in announcing our intention to withdraw from Unesco has already borne fruit. Great Britain's announcement that it will leave the organization by the end of next year is significant approbation of our decision, and we hope that the example our two nations have set will be followed by other countries who care about Unesco's mission and want to see substantive reforms in its present activities. This international pressure could very well be the action needed to rectify Unesco's self-destructive political bias.

In the immediate future, as we await Unesco's internal reforms, our Government should take our allocation and use it for bilateral aid or for private organizations in furtherance of Unesco's lost ideals. We may be able to make some direct grants for scientific symposia or for educational programs or for cultural exchange, and this funding can accomplish two purposes: It can continue essential programs that Unesco previously engaged in; and we can be sending a message to the organization's members which underscores the seriousness of our resolve to remain outside until needed reforms are achieved.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, our Government's announcement of our intention to withdraw from Unesco was made in December of last year. Within a few days, the December 31 cutoff that we have imposed upon ourselves will be here. In the nearly 12 months that have passed, Unesco's administrators have had the time to get the organization back on track. But we have seen only cosmetic changes.

For us to reconsider our decision after having gone this far would undo the courageous signals we have been sending to the world community. To agree to stay at this time, despite no concrete moves to reform, would reward the Unesco administration for its insensitivity, its bent for politics, and its financial mismanagement, and that message would not be lost on the family of nations.

Now, we have not said, "Never." We can rejoin Unesco when it becomes again what it was, an instrument to improve the human condition. Until then, we should follow the dictates of our national conscience and withdraw.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Greenberg follows:]

STATEMENT OF MAXWELL E. GREENBERG

MR CHAIRMAN, MY NAME IS MAXWELL E. GREENBERG. I AM AN ATTORNEY BY PROFESSION AND SERVE AS AN HONORARY NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH. THE ADL IS A WORLDWIDE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, WITH 31 OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN PARIS AND JERUSALEM, A LIAISON OFFICE IN ROME AND AFFILIATED OFFICES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.

OUR CONCERN OVER UNESCO'S NOW WELL DOCUMENTED POLITICIZATION AND MISMANAGEMENT DATES BACK A DECADE. THE ARAB BLOC, URGED ON BY THE USSR AND ITS CLIENTS AND SUPPORTED BY SOME THIRD WORLD NATIONS, SOUGHT REPEATEDLY TO UNDERMINE ISRAEL'S LEGITIMACY. IN VOTE AFTER VOTE, IN MATTERS RANGING FROM ARCHEOLOGICAL EXCAVATIONS IN JERUSALEM TO SUPPORT FOR THE TERRORIST PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF A UNITED NATIONS AGENCY HAS TRIED TO DISCREDIT AND DEFAME A MEMBER STATE FOR STRICTLY POLITICAL PURPOSES.

THAT CONCERN INCREASED AS THE ANTI-ISRAEL BEAT OF UNESCO BECAME THE JUMPING OFF POINT FOR A SERIES OF VOTES, PRONOUNCEMENTS AND PROGRAMS DECIDEDLY ANTI-WESTERN AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE. THIS CRESCENDO CULMINATED IN THE SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF AND NEAR ADOPTION OF A "NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER", WHICH WOULD HAVE SEEN THE LICENSING OF JOURNALISTS AND STATE MANAGEMENT OF THE GATHERING AND DISSEMINATION OF THE NEWS.

WE AMERICANS ARE RAISED FROM OUR EARLIEST DAYS WITH A REVERENCE AND APPRECIATION FOR, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. IT IS ONE OF OUR MOST CHERISHED PRINCIPLES. AND YET, ONLY A SHORT WHILE AGO, WE WERE

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PARTICIPATING IN UNESCO ASSEMBLIES WITH TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN NATIONS, WHOSE PEOPLES COULD BENEFIT FROM PRESS FREEDOM, SEEING THEIR LEADERS ATTEMPT TO CHOKE IT OFF IN THOSE PARTS OF THE WORLD IN WHICH THE PRESS DOES HAVE FREEDOM. IN LIGHT OF THIS, IN 1980 AND IN 1981, ADL'S NATIONAL COMMISSION AND NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, OUR HIGHEST POLICY-MAKING BODIES, ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS "TO WITHHOLD FURTHER SUBVENTION OF UNESCO SO LONG AS UNESCO CONTINUES TO POLITICIZE ITS ACTIONS BY MEANS OF ANTI-WESTERN, ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ATTACKS IN VIOLATION OF ITS MANDATE."

WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TROUBLED, BUT NOT REALLY SURPRISED TO LEARN OF, UNESCO'S FISCAL MISMANAGEMENT, SO ABLY DOCUMENTED IN THE GAO STUDY. APPARENTLY SO MUCH TIME IS SPENT ON POLITICAL ACTION, LITTLE HAS REMAINED FOR PROFESSIONAL, AND ACCOUNTABLE, ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR COUNTRY HAS TRIED THE TOLERANT PATH, BUT THE ATTEMPTS TO WORK FROM WITHIN TO REFORM UNESCO HAVE BEEN MET ONLY BY THE INSOLENT INTRANSIGENCE OF ITS PONDEROUS BUREAUCRACY. WHEN WE ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTION TO LEAVE UNESCO BY THE END OF THIS YEAR UNLESS SIGNIFICANT CHANGES WERE MADE, UNESCO'S LEADERSHIP MADE EVERY EFFORT TO STONEWALL AND MISINTERPRETED OUR NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS A THREAT TO THE THIRD WORLD NATIONS. BEHIND THEIR CAVALIER ATTITUDE WAS THE BELIEF THAT OUR DECISION WOULD BE RESCINDED IF SOME SUPERFICIAL CHANGES WERE MADE.

BUT EVEN UNESCO'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S RECENT AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER SOME (AS YET UNSPECIFIED) REFORMS WAS LATE AND HALF-HEARTED. A MOMENT OF TRUTH HAS ARRIVED. IF WE REALLY WANT TO SEE UNESCO REFOCUS UPON ITS ALMOST FORTY YEAR OLD MANDATE OF HELPING TO ELIMINATE ILLITERACY, OF FACILITATING SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES FOR THE BETTERMENT OF MANKIND, OF IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES AND FOSTERING UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S DIVERSITY THROUGH CULTURAL EXCHANGE, WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES TO LEAVE UNESCO AT THE END OF THIS MONTH.

ONCE BEFORE, IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, THE ROT OF POLITICIZATION AND ANTI-WESTERNISM CAUSED OUR GOVERNMENT TO LEAVE A U.N.-RELATED ORGANIZATION, WITH THE PROMISE TO RETURN IF REFORMS WERE EFFECTUATED. WITHIN THREE YEARS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL A REMARKABLE TURNABOUT IN THE ILO'S AGENDA AND PRONOUNCEMENTS TOOK PLACE. IT RETURNED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ITS FOUNDING CHARTER, WHOSE AIM IT IS TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF WORKING PEOPLE THROUGH THE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS OF BUSINESS, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT. WE BELIEVE A SIMILAR WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO CAN ACCOMPLISH THE SAME RESULT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THE EXAMPLE WE HAVE SET IN ANNOUNCING OUR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM UNESCO HAS ALREADY BORNE FRUIT. GREAT BRITAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION BY THE END OF NEXT YEAR IS SIGNIFICANT APPROBATION OF <u>OUR</u> DECISION. WE HOPE THAT THE EXAMPLE OUR TWO NATIONS HAVE SET WILL BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER COUNTRIES WHO CARE ABOUT UNESCO'S MISSION AND WANT TO SEE SUBSTANTIVE REFORMS IN ITS PRESENT ACTIVITIES. THE PRESSURE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY THIS INTERNATIONAL OPPROBRIUM COULD VERY WELL BE THE ACTION NEEDED TO RECTIFY UNESCO'S SELF-DESTRUCTIVE POLITICAL BIAS.

THERE ARE THOSE WHO WARN THAT OUR LEAVING UNESCO WILL RESULT IN THAT ORGANIZATION BEING "HIJACKED" BY THE USSR AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL CLIENTS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT UNESCO COULD BECOME MORE "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" THAN IT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED OVER THE PAST DECADE AND A HALF. IN ANY CASE, WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND PERHAPS OTHER DEMOCRACIES IN ATTENDANCE, THE TEMPTATION TO BAIT THE WEST WILL DIMINISH.

MOREOVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS WILL REPLACE THE 25% BUDGET CONTRIBUTION TO UNESCO CURRENTLY PROVIDED BY THE U.S. NEVER KNOWN FOR ITS FINANCIAL GENEROSITY, THE USSR WOULD NO DOUBT SHUN THE BURDEN OF UNDERWRITING THE ORGANIZATION. THE SUM OF OUR JOINT ANNUAL ALLOCATION WITH GREAT BRITAIN IS OVER FIFTY MILLION DOLLARS, ALMOST 33% OF THE TOTAL BUDGET. WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THAT HALF OF UNESCO'S MEMBERS FUND ONLY 2% OF ITS TOTAL BUDGET, THE LOSS OF U.S. AND BRITISH MEMBERSHIP WILL BE SEVERELY FELT.

IN THE MEANTIME, AS WE AWAIT UNESCO'S INTERNAL REFORMS, OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE OUR ALLOCATION AND USE IT FOR BI-LATERAL AID OR TO PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF UNESCO'S LOST IDEALS. DIRECT GRANTS FOR SCIENTIFIC SYMPOSIA, EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE CAN ACCOMPLISH TWO PURPOSES: THE CONTINUED FUNDING OF ESSENTIAL PROGRAMS THAT UNESCO PREVIOUSLY ENGAGED IN, AND THE SENDING OF A MESSAGE TO THE ORGANIZATION'S MEMBERS THAT UNDERSCORES THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR RESOLVE TO REMAIN OUTSIDE UNTIL NEEDED REFORMS ARE ACHIEVED.

MR. CHAIRMAN, OUR GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO WAS MADE IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR. WITHIN A FEW DAYS, THE DECEMBER 31 CUTOFF WE'VE IMPOSED FOR OURSELVES WILL BE HERE. IN THE NEARLY TWELVE MONTHS THAT HAVE PASSED, UNESCO'S ADMINISTRATORS HAVE HAD THE TIME TO GET THE ORGANIZATION BACK ON TRACK. WE HAVE SEEN ONLY COSMENTIC CHANGES.

FOR US TO RECONSIDER OUR DECISION, AFTER HAVING GONE THIS FAR, WOULD UNDO THE COURAGEOUS SIGNALS WE HAVE BEEN SENDING TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY. TO AGREE TO STAY, AT THIS TIME, DESPITE NO CONCRETE MOVES TO REFORM, WOULD REWARD THE UNESCO ADMINISTRATION FOR ITS INSENSITIVITY, ITS BENT FOR POLITICS AND ITS FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT. THAT MESSAGE WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE FAMILY OF NATIONS.

WE HAVE NOT SAID, "NEVER". WE CAN REJOIN UNESCO WHEN IT BECOMES AGAIN WHAT IT WAS, AN INSTRUMENT TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION. UNTIL THEN, WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE DICTATES OF OUR NATIONAL CONSCIENCE, AND WITHDRAW.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Greenberg.

Do you believe that the problem with Unesco is primarily a political problem and, to a lesser degree, a management problem? Or do you give equal weight to both?

Mr. GREENBERG. I would say it is at least equal, an equal portion. I do hear Ambassador Gerard, and I have worked with her before in Paris, and I have respect for the positions taken by Ambassador Gerard and Secretary Newell.

I believe that when you have difficulties in an organization whose principles have been distorted and where there have been massive digressions from what should be the mainstream of its activity, it may well be simply the staff. But even if you go far to replace the staff and put in people who will go back to what are the appropriate objectives and programs of the organization, you then have to change the structure to prevent it from happening again, because memories are short and people are mortal, and staff can change.

So I think we have to change the existing staff, and I think we have to improve the structure, also.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you elaborate on what specific reforms Unesco should implement in the near future, assuming we leave and then come back?

Mr. GREENBERG. With deference and appreciation for your question, I don't view myself as having the requisite expertise to do that, other than to repeat to you either things that I have heard in this hearing or that I have read, which I am positive you also have had available to you.

I do believe that we in the United States have had a great deal of experience trying to make organizations democratic and having them run so that the majority prevails without trampling and abusing minority rights. And it has not always been easy in our history. It is not easy in human organizations generally. But I think it is that kind of reverence we should try to instill, a kind of reverence for due process.

We should take away from the staff the capacity to make decisions for the organization which are in no way based upon fact and in no way balanced by the input of factual material which they have been given and, in effect, prevent the staff from having dictatorial powers over the programs of the agency.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you, Mr. Greenberg.

We will turn to Senator Randolph.

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Greenberg, only for the record, what is the membership within your organization that you represent here today?

Mr. GREENBERG. We are part of the B'nai B'rith. The B'nai B'rith men, women, and young people have approximately 400,000 members worldwide.

The Anti-Defamation League has regional advisory boards across the country with men and women who adhere to our work, who want to support us, and who are activists within our own human relations work. Those boards comprise approximately 10,000 people.

But we are not a membership organization. If you did us the honor and said you wanted to join the ADL, I would have to reject

your application because there is no one who is a member of the ADL. We like to encourage our supporters to be members of B'nai B'rith.

Senator RANDOLPH. I thank you very much, and I do consider your organization productive of what I call constructive planning for a world of peace.

Mr. GREENBERG. Well, we understand that that is the primary objective of government today, to keep all men living in peace. All of us look to the future with, as you said, the hope and prayer that the fearful weapons that now exist will never be unleashed. Unesco obviously is a mechanism that can forward peace, but in its present structure and programs, it is not going to do that, and there is no point in our submitting to the bullying which has gone on there for so many years.

The best way to avoid that is to withdraw and bring about its reform, and then to rejoin the work.

Senator RANDOLPH. Would you say I was wrong if I said that Unesco is sinking itself in verbiage rather than record?

Mr. GREENBERG. No; because their programs are not addressed to the educational, scientific, and cultural objectives they should be addressed to. I think a businessman would infer that when 80 percent of your budget is spent in Paris and 20 percent outside of Paris, you are simply not bringing the message and the work to the rest of the world, and that there is a lot of waste in there.

If we simply bring about a change in that, I think it will be an improvement, and instead of the verbiage, we will get some programs and some real improvements in the world outside.

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you, Mr. Greenberg, and you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to thank you, also, Mr. Greenberg. I appreciate Senator Randolph being here and the questions that he has asked here today.

I want to thank you and your organization for being willing to testify. I think, as you know, your organization has great weight with a great number of us here in the Congress because we know that you try to be evenhanded and fair and that you are speaking for peace and justice and, I might add, cultural, scientific, and educational programs all over the world.

So we are grateful you have taken the time to be here with us.

Mr. GREENBERG. Thank you very, very much. It is a pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your being here.

Our last witness today will be Mr. Leonard R. Sussman, who is the executive director of Freedom House and Vice Chairman of the U.S. Commission for Unesco.

Mr. Sussman, we are equally grateful to have you here today and look forward to taking your testimony. Now, your testimony is quite lengthy. I would suggest to you that we will put it word for word into the record, without objection, and I would appreciate it if you would summarize so we would have a few minutes for questions.

STATEMENT OF LEONARD R. SUSSMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FREEDOM HOUSE, AND VICE CHAIR, U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

Mr. SUSSMAN. All right, I will be glad to do that.

I should say that I am executive director of Freedom House, as you indicated, and Vice Chair of the U.S. National Commission, but I am speaking today in my personal capacity. Neither of those organizations has yet acted on the most recent developments in the Unesco situation, so I am not committing them by what I am saying.

I should also point out that for some 8 years, I was probably the most persistent American critic of Unesco in many respects. That period of examination of the organization has provided, I believe, some perspective on two things: First, for the years of American apathy that helped produce the present crisis in Unesco; and the distinct improvements in Unesco the past 14 months.

With the American withdrawal, it is now time to cease the frenetic assault on the organization, which has not always been based on reason and on fact, and strive instead to preserve Unesco's useful values and programs, while reforming those administrative and programmatic practices that led to the present crisis.

I will try to set forth here, at your request, three things: First, some suggestions for American strategy for reforming Unesco; two, some analyses drawn from the analogy of the ILO pullout; and, three, a comment on the leadership role of the present Director General.

I agree with the almost unanimous view expressed by U.S. governmental and nongovernmental agencies that know Unesco best, that there will be serious losses to Americans as a result of our withdrawal from Unesco. That is recorded solely to set the context for minimizing the damage, and not to reopen the debate over withdrawal.

There is needed at the outset a compilation of all the major services performed at Unesco in its various fields of competence. This should be arranged to separate, one, those programs and services which directly benefit Americans—as individuals, nongovernmental agencies, corporations, or as a nation—two, those programs and services which indirectly benefit Americans while directly servicing others—addressing U.S. foreign policy values as well as intrinsic humanistic benefits to other countries—and, three, those programs and services which have little or no positive effect, or a negative effect, on American interests.

Now, there have been extensive assessments of Unesco programs. I suggest only a short but comprehensive analysis of the plusses and minuses for constructive purposes. That compilation should be used to determine which programs should be supported, and which reformed, by U.S. lights.

To make that determination, the respective U.S. interest groups should not only be consulted, but made an active part of the reforming process, and the continuing monitoring of the effectiveness of Unesco.

It may be questioned, then, whether the Department of State would want to create the facility and staffing needed to remain the lead agency in the U.S. relationship with Unesco.

Despite the extraordinarily dedicated efforts of several Foreign Service officers assigned to U.S. delegations to Unesco general conferences, the routine U.S.-Unesco relationship yearround was left to a small mission in Paris and a Washington bureau that rarely included specialists equipped to assess or participate in the complex programs and debates in science, education, communications, and other fields of Unesco's competence.

The United States, therefore, does not provide the level of expertise which the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and others bring routinely to Unesco.

Two decades ago, it was not uncommon for American delegations to include Nobel Laureates. The late Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker represented America at Unesco years ago. So did Senators William Benton, Margaret Chase Smith, Archibald MacLeish, and others of similar stature, but not in recent years.

The U.S. National Commission for Unesco, created in 1946 by an act of Congress, was the logical repository for such diversified expertise. For some years, the Commission included world-renowned scholars and practitioners in science, education, and culture.

In recent years, the Commission has been denied staffing in the State Department, and its views either not solicited or ignored. The Commission should be reorganized and possibly resettled outside the State Department. The Commission is a nongovernmental advisory body, and its independence can be valuable in assisting American citizens to understand Unesco and advising the Government on Unesco matters.

Now, a strategy for both reorganizing the formal U.S./Unesco relationship and the informal U.S. citizen/Unesco relationship should begin with a lesson learned from the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO. Whatever the present nature of the ILO's effectiveness—as our chairman has pointed out—the U.S./ILO relationship has improved because of the creation of a U.S. interagency committee to monitor ILO.

In the days shortly before the withdrawal from Unesco this year, such an ad hoc interagency committee was formed. The final review was brought before representatives of the State Department, National Security Council, Education, and others.

While that formula was an improvement over the solely in-house track of the State Department, it did not satisfy the broader need of meshing American expertise with U.S. interests as projected at Unesco. A new interagency group is needed to reflect the varied American scientific, technological, educational, communications, cultural, naval, copyright, and other interests.

That would require skilled representation from at least the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, Education, State, and the NSC. And paralleling this interagency committee should be a revamped citizen body such as the U.S. National Commission for Unesco.

Now, the postwithdrawal strategy next calls for quiet diplomacy conducted by a skilled negotiator who does not bear the scars of the recent Unesco wars. That person should be the President's per-

sonal ambassador, directed to meet with the responsible representatives of the major forces at Unesco: the Secretariat, including the Director General; the Western Information Group; the Group of 77; and at least one of its primary constituents, the African states, and the Soviet Union.

The special ambassador would be able to employ the compiled assessments of the values of Unesco programs. He would have the advice of the new interagency committee and the reconstituted nongovernmental commission. He would be empowered to negotiate parameters for reforms at Unesco which would reasonably result in America's return to the organization.

The State Department is attempting to devise alternatives to Unesco, and I will discuss those in the question period if you like. But there is a basic difference between the ILO and Unesco. The ILO produces little that directly profits Americans. Unesco returns dollars, data, influence, and other assets.

Leaving ILO was a small loss, and returning was easy. Returning to Unesco would be more difficult. There is no single U.S. constituency that dominates Unesco policy, as American labor influences U.S. policy at ILO. And, too, Unesco is a much more complex mechanism to change.

There are, nevertheless, some lessons to be learned from the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO in 1977 and our return 2 years later. We gained some ground and lost some as a result of our absence from the ILO. Most important, because of the crisis created in 1975 when the President announced our withdrawal, he also established a Cabinet-level committee [CLC], to devise strategy for both reforming the agency and securing the return of the United States.

That committee included the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, the director of the National Security Council, and high-level representatives of the State Department, U.S. labor, and industry.

After the United States returned, the CLC was renamed the Presidential Committee on the ILO. It continues to provide high-level oversight of the administration and programs at ILO. The committee was instrumental in requiring the Federal agencies concerned with ILO to set down specific objectives for our participation in the organization. The United States has never had such objectives at Unesco.

The ILO Committee also assigned special responsibility to government bureaus for implementing those strategies. That has never been attempted at Unesco. The committee also insisted on better preparation of U.S. delegates at ILO. That has not recently been a condition for U.S. participation in Unesco conferences and programs.

The committee further required improved advance consultation by U.S. delegates with those from other countries, particularly the developing countries. At Unesco, advance meetings with opposite members have been mainly on a damage limitation basis, and usually just before a crisis erupts.

It seems clear that the lesson of the ILO withdrawal is more a record of what the United States itself did to improve its performance at ILO than a description of basic changes in ILO that induced the United States to return.

Now, there were some changes in the ILO, and not all were favorable. The pullout seems to have reversed a trend regarded as

negative for U.S. policy. The threat to withdraw from Unesco had the same effect there during the 1983 General Conference, in the reforms begun during the October 1984 executive board sessions, and in the Director General's correspondence with me on the question of news media problems which you may have seen in the New York Times on November 6.

It is likely, however, based on the ILO experience, that most changes, for better or worse, depend on the degree to which U.S. participants maintain intelligent and persistent oversight and act in accordance with U.S. interests.

Some changes in ILO, such as the use of a secret ballot, were the result of the normal development of the organization. At Unesco, for example, majority voting—in which the United States and its friends are likely to be outpolled—was generally replaced several years ago by use of consensual agreements.

There has been reduced budget growth at ILO and improved administration. Steps in that direction are being taken at Unesco. There are other parallels. I include them in the written statement; I won't go into them here.

To your last point that I was asked to address, the leadership role of the Director General: The Director General of Unesco, whoever occupies that chair, is, in the words of one scholar who knows Unesco well, "the most influential actor in Unesco."

This is not the place to analyze in detail the centralization of power in the Director General. The report of the GAO provides a sound analysis. It should be noted, however, that the centralization began before Mr. M'Bow arrived on the scene. His predecessor, a Frenchman, was widely regarded as a dictator, displaying strong central control over administration and programs.

To achieve that power, the Executive Board had to relinquish it, and it did. That left the Director General, whether Rene Mayheu or M'Bow, to wield effective power in budgetary, personnel, and program matters.

As a consequence, the diverse strands of control over the Secretariat and, through it, over the members' own decisionmaking processes, became centralized. But, as eventally happens, the human mechanism becomes overextended. The Director General could not possibly oversee all the details or even all the major divisions in each of the many sectorial programs. Fiefdoms developed, led by subleaders who ran the sectors or lesser programs under only general oversight from the Director General. Such fiefdoms, I think, have produced some of the worst programs that we see in the communications area and in the human rights area.

It is generally forgotten now that after supporting the development of a new world information and communications order, it was Mr. M'Bow who completely gutted the Soviet Union's draft resolution on the mass media in 1978 and substituted a bland Western-oriented declaration that was approved by acclamation. The Americans were greatly relieved and gratified; the Soviets, utterly surprised and defeated.

On issues involving communications, budget and other matters, Mr. M'Bow has been a mediator. Some call it leadership, others call it a clever strategy for keeping before Unesco those controversial issues that are high on the Third World's agenda.

It is likely that whoever succeeds M'Bow, whenever that happens, will have to play a similar role. Unesco is a far more complex organism to lead than the United Nations proper. Unesco deals essentially with all manner of ideas in a far wider range than other global forums. And somebody's ox is bound to be threatened nearly every day.

If the United States pursues its announced policy of pressing for decentralization of power—particularly moving a larger percentage of Unesco staff out of Paris and into the field—the way would be open for vastly greater domination of the Secretariat by the Third World users of Unesco's services. That seems hardly an acceptable change for the United States, but that is the implication of our announced policy.

It is likely that whoever is the Director General, he or she will bear continuous pressure from all the same power centers with which the present and past Directors General have had to deal.

Reform in that area thus may not come from a change in the persona of the Director General, but in the new rules of administration and oversight that strengthen the hands of the member states. The Director General will still have to be a strong leader and probably still the most influential actor in Unesco.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sussman follows:]

TESTIMONY

Leonard R. Sussman

Committee on Labor & Human Resources, United States Senate

December 10, 1984

The Impact of the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO on Prospects for Rejoining the Organization, and the Impact of Our Leaving on Human Resources at Home and Abroad

* * *

I am Executive Director of Freedom House and Vice Chair of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. The views I shall express today are not necessarily shared by either organization since they have not acted on the latest developments on the UNESCO issue.

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the relationship of the United States to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in a context that is both forward-looking and constructive. The impact of the American withdrawal from UNESCO this New Year's day should be examined with the objective of preserving the many useful values and programs that are operated at UNESCO, and reforming those administrative and programmatic practices that have led to the present crisis.

That American commitment to such changes at UNESCO should be the primary goal as the post-withdrawal strategy is formulated. This objective and commitment would affirm that the United States has been earnestly seeking to reform UNESCO this past year, and for three years earlier, not simply exploiting the obvious deficiencies at UNESCO in order to mount similar attacks on the wider UN system. I am not considering here whether there should, indeed, be a public reexamination of the functioning of the General Assembly and other UN specialized agencies; I refer solely to the need to examine UNESCO on its own merits, and fashion a post-withdrawal strategy on the honest premise that UNESCO restored to its charter mode of operations---administratively and programmatically---is eminently worth reforming, whether or not the U.S. finds it possible to return, or whether the organization itself would welcome back the U.S. in the same privileged status as before. Having yielded our Executive Board seat on January 1, for example, it may be difficult to recover that permanent place.

Any new strategy for reforming UNESCO, then, must presuppose a distinct change in the perception of U.S. diplomacy in the UNESCO arena. Over the past year, our allies and friends in Western Europe, Australia, Japan, and among

many moderate developing countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia have been highly critical of American diplomacy at UNESCO. They have all understood and more or less shared our criticism of UNESCO's administration and programs. Indeed, several had for years unsuccessfully urged the U.S. to play a leadership role at UNESCO. That U.S. reluctance, even apathy, for some fifteen years helped produce some of the very flaws we now loudly attack. Since announcing a year ago our withdrawal on January 1, 1985 this country has not provided even its closest allies with a specific list of grievances. Even the lengthy mid-July U.S. letter responding to the draft 1986-87 program and budget did not address the fundamental administrative and programmatic criticisms which, if suitably reformed, would cause the U.S. to remain in UNESCO. It was at first argued that to provide specifics would make bargaining more difficult; that a good negotiator does not reveal his bottom line early in the negotiation. That sounded reasonable in mid-year, but was perceived as unreasonable by October when the time for negotiation was ending.

The first post-withdrawal step, therefore, should be to set forth a clear set of American objectives for operating outside UNESCO to assure a separate U.S. presence in certain fields we will leave behind at UNESCO; to work with friendly countries inside UNESCO to pursue reforms; and to assure our return to UNESCO once reforms are accomplished.

I shall set forth here, at your request: (1) some suggestions for an American strategy for reforming UNESCO, and continuing to monitor those changes; (2) some analyses drawn from the analogy of our withdrawal from the International Labor Organization (ILO); and (3) a comment on the leadership role of the present Director-General of UNESCO.

1. An American Strategy for Reforming UNESCO

I agree with the almost unanimous view expressed by U.S. governmental and nongovernmental agencies that know UNESCO best: There will be serious losses to Americans as a result of our withdrawal from UNESCO. That is recorded solely to set the context for minimizing the damage, and not to reopen the debate over withdrawal. That likely danger is described in detail in the Congressional Staff Study to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,

April, 1984; the extensive National Science Foundation letter to the Assistant Secretary of State October 21, 1983; the 1984 study by the National Research Council on UNESCO science programs; and the advisory from the executive committee of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, "What are the Issues Covering the Decision of the United States to Withdraw from UNESCO?," October 1984.

The Congressional Study concluded (page 2): "U.S. withdrawal will have critical implications for U.S. foreign policy in the areas of education, culture, sciences, communications, human rights, and development." That study for the House Foreign Affairs Committee focused, as expected, on the foreign policy losses the U.S. may expect. These will result from losses to American individuals, agencies and corporations: to American science and technology both in research and in sales; to American education in losing access to the development of educational systems abroad through the multilateral channel of UNESCO, probably the only channel through which many Third World nations will accept American curricular and training assistance; to American multinationals which are threatened with overly-restrictive codes of practice in the UN but had until now successfully negated similar efforts in UNESCO; and other losses to America in trade and human-resource collaboration. Others, I believe, will describe these losses in greater detail. I mention them simply as a starting point for a new American strategy vis a vis UNESCO.

(A) There is needed at the outset a compilation of all the major services performed at UNESCO in its various fields of competence. This should be arranged to separate (1) those programs and services which directly benefit Americans (as individuals, nongovernmental agencies, corporations, or as a nation---keeping in mind for all such purposes the U.S. national interest); (2) those programs and services which indirectly benefit Americans while directly servicing others (addressing United States foreign policy values as well as intrinsic humanistic benefits to others); and (3) those programs and services which have little or no positive effect or a negative effect on American interests. There have been extensive assessments of UNESCO programs; I suggest only a short but comprehensive analysis of the pluses

and misuses for constructive purposes.

(B) That compilation should be used to determine which UNESCO programs should be supported, and which reformed by U.S. lights. To make that determination the respective U.S. interest groups should not only be consulted but made an active part of the reforming process, and the continuing monitoring of the effectiveness of UNESCO. It may be questioned whether the Department of State would want to create the facility and staffing needed to remain the lead agency in the U.S. relationship with UNESCO. Despite the extraordinarily dedicated efforts of several foreign service officers assigned to U.S. delegations to UNESCO general conferences, the routine U.S./UNESCO relationship year-round was left to a small mission in Paris and a Washington bureau that rarely included specialists equipped to assess or participate in the complex programs and debates in science, education, communications, and other fields of UNESCO's competence. The U.S., therefore, does not provide the level of expertise which the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and others bring routinely to UNESCO. Two decades ago, it was not uncommon for American delegations to include Nobel Laureates. The late Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker represented America at UNESCO. So did Senators William Benton and Margaret Chase Smith, Archibald MacLeish and others of similar stature.

(more)

(C) The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, when created in 1946 by an Act of Congress, was the logical repository of such diversified expertise. For some years, the Commission included world-renowned scholars and practioners in science, education and culture.

In recent years, the Commission has been denied staffing in the State Department, and its views either not solicited or ignored. The Commission should be reorganized and possibly resettled outside the State Department. The Commission is a nongovernmental advisory body, and its independence can be valuable in assisting American citizens to understand UNESCO, and advising the government on UNESCO matters.

(D) A strategy for both reorganizing the formal U.S./UNESCO relationship, and the informal U.S. citizen/UNESCO relationship should begin with a lesson learned from the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO. Whatever the present nature of the ILO's effectiveness, the U.S./ILO relationship has improved because of the creation of a U.S. inter-agency committee to monitor ILO. In the days shortly before the withdrawal from UNESCO this year, such an ad hoc inter-agency committee was formed. The final review was brought before representatives of the State Department, National Security Council, Education, and others. The group was headed by the Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

While that formula was an improvement over the solely in-house track of the State Department, it did not satisfy the broader need of meshing American expertise with U.S. interests as projected at UNESCO. A new inter-agency group is needed to reflect the varied American scientific and technological, educational, communications, cultural, naval, copyright and other interests. That would require skilled representation from, at least, the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, Education, State and the NSC. And paralleling this inter-agency committee should be a revamped citizen body such as the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. It should be increasingly supported by private rather than solely governmental funding, with an independent staff and nongovernmental membership

and leadership. The Commission, thus, should be particularly concerned with generating the participation of U.S. citizens, through nongovernmental agencies, in diverse UNESCO programs.

(E) As the inter-agency monitoring group and a revitalized, commission-like nongovernmental agency work for further reforms in UNESCO, the traditional forms of substantive diplomacy should also be employed.

The post-withdrawal strategy, therefore, calls for quiet diplomacy conducted by a skilled negotiator who does not bear the scars of the recent UNESCO wars. That person should be the President's personal ambassador directed to meet with the responsible representatives of the major forces at UNESCO: the Secretariat, including the Director-General, the (Western) Information Group, the Group of 77 (Third World countries) and at least one of its primary constituents, the African States, and the Soviet Union.

The special ambassador would be able to employ the compiled assessments of the values of UNESCO programs. He would have the advice of the new inter-agency committee and the reconstituted nongovernmental commission. He would be empowered to negotiate parameters for reforms at UNESCO which would reasonably result in America's return to the organization.

(F) The State Department is attempting to devise "alternatives" to UNESCO in science, communications and other fields. Those alternatives are theoretically attractive. Many specialists will assuredly provide proposals for projects for which they have previously sought funding. And many such projects deserved support long before the U.S. considered withdrawing from UNESCO. It is

(more)

unlikely that such programs would substitute for UNESCO programs. Bilateral support would not provide the broad impact or recognition which multilateral programs at UNESCO can generate. Nor is it clear that developing countries would accept strictly American aid for such programs as curricular or news-media development.

Yet the U.S. should have shared communications technology and training far earlier and more extensively than we have. We pledged $25 million for such purposes in 1976 and again in 1978---and never provided it. We are just beginning to fulfill our promises. Even if we return to UNESCO such so-called alternatives should continue as bilateral programs.

2. The Analogy of the U.S. Withdrawal from the ILO

There is a basic difference between the ILO and UNESCO. The ILO produces little, if anything, that directly profits Americans; UNESCO returns dollars, data, influence and other assets. Leaving ILO was a small loss, and returning was easy. Returning to UNESCO would be more difficult. There is no single U.S. constituency that dominates UNESCO policy as American labor influences U.S. policy at ILO; and, too, UNESCO is a more complex mechanism to change.

There are, nevertheless, some lessons to be learned from the U.S. withdrawal from the ILO in 1977 and our return two years later. We gained some ground and lost some as a result of our absence from the ILO. Most important, because of the crisis created in 1975 when the President announced our withdrawal, he also established a Cabinet Level Committee (CLC) to devise strategy for both reforming the agency and securing the return of the United States. That committee included the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, the director of the National Security Council, and high-level representatives of the State Department, U.S. labor and industry. After the U.S. returned, the CLC was renamed the Presidential Committee on the ILO. It continues to provide high-level oversight of the administration and programs at ILO. This committee was instrumental in requiring the federal agencies concerned with ILO to set down specific objectives

for our participation in the organization. The U.S. has never had such objectives at UNESCO. The ILO committee also assigned specific responsibility to government bureaus implementing these strategies. Certainly that has never been attempted at UNESCO. The committee also insisted on better preparation of U.S. delegates at ILO. That has not recently been a condition for U.S. participation in UNESCO conferences and programs. The committee further required improved advance consultation by U.S. delegates with those from other countries, particularly the developing countries. At UNESCO, U.S. advance meetings with opposite members have been mainly on a "damage-limitation" basis, and usually just before a crisis erupts.

It seems clear that the lesson of the ILO withdrawal is more a record of what the U.S. itself did to improve its performance at ILO than a description of basic changes in ILO that induced the U.S. to return.

There were some changes in the ILO, and not all were favorable to the U.S. position. The pullout seems to have reversed a trend regarded as negative for U.S. policy. The threat to withdraw from UNESCO had the same effect there during the 1983 General Conference (see the testimony of Edmund Hennelly, chair, U.S. delegate to that conference in "U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO," hearings, House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and International Operations April 25, 1984; the reforms begun during the October 1984 executive board sessions of UNESCO; and the Director-General's correspondence with this writer, particularly Mr. M'Bow's October 20, 1984 letter* disavowing further UNESCO support for programs the Western news media regard as threatening, unless Western journalist groups themselves support such programs). It is likely, however, based on the ILO experience, that most changes---for better or worse---depend on the degree to which U.S. participants maintain intelligent and persistent oversight, and act in accordance with U.S. interests.

Some changes at ILO (such as use of the secret ballot) were the result of the normal development of the organization. At UNESCO, for example, majority voting (in which the U.S. and its friends are likely to be outpolled) was generally replaced several years ago by use of consensual agreements.

*See NY Times, November 6, 1984, "UNESCO Reported to Move Away From Issue of Licensing Reporters"

There has been reduced budget growth at ILO, and improved administration. Steps in that direction are being taken at UNESCO. Changes in the ILO human rights report have been mainly cosmetic, and have not resulted in better compliance with ILO standards. Indeed, the USSR and Poland have recently undercut further ILO examinations in Eastern Europe. The bitter debate at UNESCO over "peoples rights" is a theoretical discussion with no immediate pragmatic consequences. Indeed, the debate itself could be largely redirected into channels stressing individual rights as the precondition for peoples rights, otherwise known as self-determination (a concept as American as Wilson and his Fourteen Points).

There has been better staffing at the ILO since the U.S. withdrawal. But then Americans were dropped from the ILO staff when their government left, and it may take until the year 2000 before the U.S. regains the number of staff positions it lost through the pullout.

2. The Leadership Role of the Director-General

The Director-General of UNESCO, whoever occupies that chair, is "the most influential actor in UNESCO," according to one scholar who knows UNESCO well.* That view would be shared by Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow's harshest critics as well as his enthusiastic supporters. And he has both in all the "worlds"---first, second and third. France's representative on the UNESCO executive board called Mr. M'Bow "a man of remarkable stature." The U.S. Ambassador to the 1983 general conference, Edmund Hennelly, regards Mr. M'Bow as "a man of unsurpassed talent," who assisted the U.S. in getting much of what it sought at last year's meeting. A London Times writer who perenially attacks Mr. M'Bow sees him as a "dictator" with a subserviant "court." And Owen Harries, another bitter opponent, says that Mr. M'Bow is what makes UNESCO "particularly pernicious." Third World delegates, including those from democratic developing countries, regard Mr. M'Bow as their spokesman.

This is not the place to analyze the centralization of power in the Director-General. The forthcoming report of the General Accounting Office will provide a sound analysis of such matters. It should be noted, however, that the

*Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "The Political Role of the Director-General of UNESCO," paper prepared for International Studies Association/West, Denver, CO, Oct. 25, 1984 (mimeo)

centralization began before Mr. M'Bow arrived on the scene. His predecessor, a Frenchman, was widely regarded as a dictator displaying strong central control over administration and programs. To achieve that power the Executive Board had to relinquish it; and it did. That left the Director-General, whether Rene Mayheu or M'Bow, to wield effective power in budgetary, personnel and program matters. As a consequence, the diverse strands of control over the Secretariat and, through it, over the members' own decision-making processes, became centralized. But as eventually happens, the human mechanism becomes over-extended. The Director-General could not possibly oversee all the details or even all the major divisions in each of the many sectorial programs. Fiefdoms developed---led by subleaders who ran the sectors or lesser programs under only general oversight from the Director-General, and still less frequently from the Executive Board or General Conference. Such fiefdoms in communications, human rights and other sectors pressed those highly controversial issues that helped produce the U.S. withdrawal.

It is generally forgotten now that after supporting the development of a "new world information and communication order," it was Mr. M'Bow who completely gutted the Soviet Union's draft resolution on the mass media in 1978 and substituted a bland Western-oriented declaration that was approved by acclamation. The Americans were greatly relieved and gratified; the Soviets, utterly surprised and defeated. On issues involving communications, budget and other matters, Mr. M'Bow has been a mediator. Some call it leadership, others call it a clever strategy for keeping before UNESCO those controversial issues that are high on the Third World's agenda.

It is likely that whoever succeeds Mr. M'Bow, whenever that happens, will have to play a similar role. UNESCO is a far more complex organism to lead than the UN proper. UNESCO deals essentially with all manner of ideas in a far wider range than other global forums. And somebody's ox is bound to be threatened nearly every day.

If the U.S. pursues its announced policy of pressing for decentralization

of power---particularly moving a larger percentage of UNESCO staff out of Paris and into the field---the way would be open for vastly greater domination of the Secretariat by the Third World "users" of UNESCO's services. That seems hardly an acceptable change for the U.S, yet that is the implication of our announced policy.

It is also likely that---whoever is the DG---he or she will bear continuous pressure from all the same power-centers with which the present and past DGs have had to deal.

Reform in that area, thus, may come not from a change in the persons of the DG, but in new rules of administration and oversight that strengthen the hands of the member states. The DG will still have to be a strong leader, and probably still "the most influential actor in UNESCO."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sussman, for your excellent statement here today.

Now, you have stated that perhaps the State Department should not be the lead agency for Unesco, and if the country is pulled out of Unesco but then returns, or if it stays in Unesco, what do you think should be the lead agency?

Mr. SUSSMAN. I think the interagency group ought to be the dominant factor, and it should be strengthened to be that. It should draw to it, it seems to me, the expertise it needs to provide that function. That would be a sizable function, far larger than in the ILO situation, because of the much more diverse activities in the Unesco setting.

The CHAIRMAN. In your written statement, you seem to give an implied view that an ILO-like President's commission could have prevented the present crisis. Would you comment on that and tell me if I have interpreted it right? And, second, if that is so, why?

Mr. SUSSMAN. Well, I had not thought of whether it would have prevented the present crisis. I think it could have gone a long way to preventing it. Indeed, almost any concentrated American effort oier the past 15 years might have done that.

There have been years when our friends in Western Europe pleaded with the American delegations to take a leadership role, and we did not, and this goes back 10 or 12 years, so that it has been a developing situation.

There have been members of the Unesco Secretariat who privately have asked us to take a much more forceful and a much more continuing stance in the Unesco setting.

We seem to have appeared every 2 years when a crisis erupted in the communications sector. Other than that, we have done very little in between in the last 10 or 12 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you.

Senator Randolph.

Senator RANDOLPH. I thank the witness for his helpfulness to us and for the depth with which he went back and brought us up to a current moment. Thank you.

Mr. SUSSMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you so much. This will now conclude today's hearing. I think we have picked up a great deal of knowledge here, both in the written statements and in the oral statements as well. I want to thank all of the witnesses for appearing.

This is a very serious problem because it does appear to me that the United States will withdraw from Unesco. That being the case, can the necessary reforms take place, or will we lose more than we gain, as Mr. Sussman has indicated here today? My personal feeling is that although the comparisons, perhaps, are not to be well presented or well set, the fact that we benefited from the withdrawal from the ILO may or may not be a precedent that may help us here with Unesco.

Nevertheless, I think it is important for the organization that the right decisions be made. My personal feeling is that we will gain by withdrawing from Unesco at this time. I realize that there are good and valid arguments to the contrary, and this hearing has brought some of those out.

On the other hand, I think there is a discontent among American citizens to be funding 25 percent of this U.N.-affiliated organization, and then finding that Western values and Western views are just trampled upon, at least in the eyes of some. It is time perhaps in the eyes of many in this country to stand up, be counted, and let international organizations realize that we don't mind working in a consistent good-faith, reasonable manner with them for the betterment of conditions throughout the world—and, in the case of Unesco, for scientific, cultural, and educational purposes—but we are tired of the United States getting dumped upon, and we certainly are tired of our friends getting dumped upon in ways that really are unjustified, ill considered, and even downright detrimental to good relationships.

In conclusion, I want to say is that it is a difficult set of problems and set of questions. I hope that they work out for the best for all countries, but in particular our own Nation, as we continue to try to serve with other nations in the community of worldwide fellowship and belief.

I want to thank all witnesses for testifying here today. I think it is important that we have held this hearing and that we have had the airing of some of these viewpoints. We will look forward to receiving any additional statements or any additional information that we might receive and we will also look forward to compiling a hearing record so that the public can study it and draw their own conclusions.

Senator RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, could I ask you a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator RANDOLPH. Do you propose further hearings on this subject?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, at this particular point, I do not anticipate a further hearing, but we could, depending upon what the decision of our country is, hold further hearings next year to see just what reforms have occurred, regardless of what the decision is today.

Senator RANDOLPH. It will be a continuing subject in your mind and others on this committee. I think, during the coming weeks, perhaps exploratory discussions could take place, and the study of certain situations that seem to have brought us to this hour might produce further hearings that you could lead that would be construtive.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if that is the case, we will certainly do that. I have taken a particular interest in the ILO, World Health Organization, and now Unesco, and I intend to followup on this and see that our colleagues are informed as well as people in our country. There is a lot to be discontented with at Unesco. There are two sides to be argued, as I think we have seen here today—both are intelligent sides—and I think it remains for all of us to make up our own minds, but at least look at this in the most intelligent intellectual way we possibly can, and in the best interests of not only our country but the world community.

So again, thanks to all of the witnesses who have been here.

[Additional material supplied for the record follows:]

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Senate Hearings: Committee on Labor and Human Resources

December 10, 1984

UNESCO Reform

I am Katherine M.L. Camp, member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO; former President of national and international Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; special adviser to U.S. delegation to U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, 1978; active with Non-Governmental Organization committees at United Nations. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom enjoys consultative status at the United Nations ECOSOC, UNESCO, FAO and ILO.

My organization feels the United States must not withdraw from UNESCO.

We agree that UNESCO and its members would benefit from improvements in administration and program.

We are pleased that reforms are underway to such an extent that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations committee has stated: "Meaningful progress towards UNESCO reform has been achieved."

The far-reaching proposals of the United States for specific changes in UNESCO's program seem reasonable for the most part, and worthy of adoption. We agree in principle that practicality is desirable and duplication is not. However, we strongly disagree that theoretical considerations and explorations are inappropriate for UNESCO. On the contrary, UNESCO is mandated to advance "the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of humankind" through the medium of "the minds of men" and women, on a level that is more intellectual than political. My organization deplores the Administration's reluctance to consider even on a theoretical level issues of peace, disarmament, international understanding and international security at UNESCO, especially in this time of tension and deadlock on these matters in the U.N. General Assembly and in negotiations for arms limitations. It is conceivable that greater exploration of these issues through UNESCO could help promote solutions on the political level. UNESCO may indeed be the best possible forum for dealing with such urgent matters in a less charged atmosphere than at the UN General Assembly itself.

We strongly believe it would be detrimental to the United States and to the rest of the world were the U.S. to withdraw from UNESCO now.

1) With reform underway at the specific behest of the United States, it is proper for the U.S. to remain on hand to oversee its continuation. The most appropriate forum for addressing UNESCO reform is UNESCO.

2) Should the U.S. leave, the momentum for reform may well be lost.

3) Much more is at stake than the simple or temporary withdrawal of one nation. If the U.S. leaves, others will also. If the U.S. leaves UNESCO, it may also leave other U.N. agencies as has been suggested. The United Nations system will be seriously weakened as will the total of cooperative efforts in the scientific and educational professions.

4) Since the U.S. has made reform a condition for remaining, yet does not remain though reforms are being achieved, the sincerity of our motives may be doubted; we may be suspected of trying to exploit for our own advantage a divisiveness we would have helped create. Our actions may be seen as trying to weaken UNESCO, possibly with a view to setting up a counter-UNESCO. This is a frightening prospect, as it could lead to increased tension and anxiety, furthering a worldwide scramble for arms, which would in turn increase the likelihood of local, regional and intercontinental warfare.

In seeking reform, we want to rectify, not wreck, UNESCO.

The fact of global interdependence requires a universal forum where the most urgent and difficult problems, most of them global in nature, can be worked out.

In the view of my organization, it is the duty of the United States actively to participate in the great debates now taking place on UNESCO's agenda with expert delegations to exert positive leadership and help UNESCO realize its noble aspirations.

All nations must have been heartened by President Reagan's words to the General Assembly on September 24th of this year: "Let me emphasize our unwavering commitment to a central principle of the United Nations system, the principle of universality, both here and in the United Nations technical agencies around the world." To uphold that principle is very much in the national interest as well as the international. Peaceful international cooperation relates directly to our own economic and national security interests because it furthers the goal of world peace.

Katherine L. Camp
Past president, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

STATEMENT OF

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

BEFORE

THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

ON

"PROSPECTS FOR UNESCO REFORM: HUMAN

RESOURCES IMPACT OF U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO"

Monday, December 10, 1984

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

STATEMENT ON UNESCO

Last December, the United States announced its intention to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of 1984 if that agency failed to reverse political tendencies inimical to democratic values as well as to reform its management and budgetary practices.

Notwithstanding its original mandate to promote international cooperation for the advancement of education, science and culture, and the genuine contribution it has made to these fields, in recent years UNESCO has increasingly occupied itself with contentious political issues. These issues have included ideologically oriented proposals of peace and disarmament, new world economic and information orders, and Israel's policies in the administered territories. Not only have these issues been dealt with in a manner that serves the global propaganda purposes of the Soviet Union, the P.L.O. and radical Third World states, but they have also in most cases duplicated consideration of the very same issues in the political bodies of the U.N.

Currently, the U.S. Government is assessing the results of the recently-concluded UNESCO Executive Board meeting, at which reform proposals submitted by the U.S. and several West European states were considered. These proposals, in addition to addressing questions of budget and management, were intended to reverse the politicization and anti-democratic direction of the agency, initiatives we wholeheartedly support. Reports of the Executive Board meeting indicate that positive developments occurred, although unresolved issues remain. The U.S. Government is to announce its final decision with respect to withdrawal before the end of the year.

The American Jewish Committee, in light of the tentative but nonetheless generally positive results of the Executive Board Meeting, and our traditional support for the ideals and purposes of UNESCO and for institutions of genuine international cooperation, calls on our Government to postpone the decision on withdrawal for one year.

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During this period there will be the opportunity to assess the willingness of the member states and of the Director-General to comply with the letter and spirit of UNESCO's constitution and in particular to avoid political issues that are outside the agency's jurisdiction. There will also be several more occasions to pursue proposals for reform at next year's Executive Board meetings and especially at the next biennial General Conference, UNESCO's highest policy-making body, in 1985. At that time, our Government will be in a better position to evaluate more definitively its future relationship with UNESCO. Meanwhile, we acknowledge and support our Government's decisive and firm position of withdrawing from UNESCO if appropriate reform is not accomplished. That posture should be maintained and implemented if, in another year, real progress is not apparent.

Adopted by the National Executive Council
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U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: SUCCESSFUL PRECEDENT FOR UNESCO?

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SUMMARY

The United States has announced its intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at the end of 1984. The only other time the United States withdrew from a United Nations agency was in 1977, when the United States left the International Labor Organization (ILO). The United States stayed out of the ILO for two years, returning in February 1980. At that time, the United States was convinced that the ILO members were intent that the agency would live up to its principles and promise. Many observers view the ILO withdrawal as a successful instrument of change in the organization and see it supporting the case for U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. Others deny that it was successful and still others claim that the differences between UNESCO and ILO are so great as to make what happened in the ILO useless as a prediction of how UNESCO would respond to a U.S. withdrawal.

This paper addresses some of the questions that have arisen in connection with the ILO and UNESCO situations. It is based primarily on a series of interviews with U.S. officials and delegates to the ILO. The purpose of the interviews was to gain perspectives of informed observers on three questions. First, has the ILO altered its behavior and incorporated changes to meet the U.S. demands since the withdrawal? Second, were the changes in the ILO the result of U.S. withdrawal or of other factors? Third, can U.S. withdrawal from the ILO serve as a precedent for withdrawal from UNESCO?

Many, but not all, of the authorities interviewed have seen an improvement in the ILO since the late 1970s. No one has called the change a dramatic improvement, but it was described in interviews as a reversal of a downward trend. There was, however, also no consensus on the significance of the changes or their cause. Many saw the changes as merely minor evolutionary developments

in the organization caused either by changes in the international political situation or the passage of time. Others suggest that the changes were more dramatic and significant and the result of two U.S. actions: withdrawal from the ILO and improvements in U.S. participation in the ILO. None of the those interviewed indicated that withdrawal alone was responsible for the improvements in the ILO.

Some of the changes cited by those who see improvement in the ILO include the adoption of a secret ballot in the ILO Conference, improvements in the ILO annual report on member states' compliance with the ILO human rights conventions, a reduction in attempts to condemn member states for violating the conventions without investigation, and an overall decline in Conference discussion of extraneous political issues. Additionally, they see other improvements such as reduced budget growth and a more efficient administration.

Critics contend that in many of the areas cited above, there has either been no improvement at all, the improvements are insignificant, or they occurred as a result of some factor other than withdrawal. These critics describe the adoption of the secret ballot as a natural evolution of the agency supported by most members and unrelated to U.S. withdrawal. They suggest that changes in the human rights report are merely rhetorical and have not improved compliance with ILO conventions. There has been no change in ILO rules, they argue, which allow the condemnation of a country for violating ILO conventions without an investigation and no reduction in the amount of conference time spent on extraneous political issues.

There was consensus among those interviewed that any improvement in the ILO was at least partly caused by changes in U.S. participation in the ILO. U.S. improvements in staffing and coordination of the delegation, the establish-

ment of goals, and the examination of the ILO program and budget were acknowledged by all who have seen improvements in the ILO as a very important part of the reform of the ILO.

There was disagreement, however, on whether improved staffing alone could have brought about the changes the United States sought in the ILO. Supporters of withdrawal argue that the shock value of U.S. withdrawal was necessary to provide the United States with the leverage needed to reform the ILO. Critics contend that a major problem all along had been lack of adequate U.S. attention and leadership in the agency, and that simply correcting that situation was the key to reforming the ILO.

Those who saw U.S. withdrawal from the ILO as evidence that a comparable effort would be effective in UNESCO cited the similarity of the problems faced in the two agencies, the similarity of issues involved, and the current UNESCO movement toward reform as evidence that the results would be similar. Critics contend that the differences in the domestic and international constituencies of the two organizations, differences in their structures, and differences in U.S. commitment to the two organizations preclude the same sort of success in UNESCO that the United States achieved in the ILO.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: SUCCESSFUL PRECEDENT FOR UNESCO?

INTRODUCTION

On December 28, 1983, the United States announced its intention to withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at the end of 1984. Although 1977-79 withdrawal from the International Labor Organization (ILO) was not cited as a precedent, many argue that the success of that effort suggests that our present action in UNESCO could yield similar benefits. Other observers argue that the ILO withdrawal was a unique event and should not and cannot serve as a precedent.

Some Americans are convinced that under no circumstances should the United States withdraw from UNESCO. They see the agency, its problems notwithstanding, as important to U.S. interests and U.S. participation as essential. Others insist that the United States should withdraw from UNESCO. They argue that such a corrupt, anti-American organization cannot be reformed and that it is a waste of U.S. money to remain. This paper does not address the issues that divide these two groups. Others, however, acknowledge that UNESCO, though it has serious problems, also serves U.S. interests, and may well be subject to reform so that it could be significantly more in tune with American interests than it is now. These people are searching for a way to improve UNESCO. Some of them argue that U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO could be an effective instrument for reform of the agency. Others argue that withdrawal will not improve the

agency and may hurt U.S. interests. It is toward exploring and illuminating that debate that this paper is directed.

On November 5, 1975, the United States announced that it would withdraw from the International Labor Organization after the two-year waiting period required by the ILO constitution. The announcement was made in a letter from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to ILO Director-General Blanchard which also outlined the four U.S. concerns in the ILO. Upon returning to the ILO in February of 1980, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Agencies in Geneva, Gerald B. Helman, said that the United States was persuaded that the majority of the membership was intent on assuring that the organization would live up to its principles and promise.

The purpose of this paper is to explore these questions: 1) whether the ILO has altered its behavior and incorporated changes to meet the U.S. demands since the United States withdrew, 2) whether improvements in the organization were due to U.S. withdrawal or to other factors, and 3) whether withdrawal from ILO can serve as a useful precedent for U.S. action in UNESCO.

In order to gain insights on the above questions, interviews were conducted with many individuals who were involved in the decision to withdraw, the decision to return, and in U.S. activities with respect to the ILO before and since withdrawal. In a few instances, interviews were conducted with persons familiar with both the ILO and UNESCO situations. Interviewees included officials from the Departments of State, Labor, and Commerce, as well as present and former officials of the ILO and the AFL-CIO, and other delegates from private nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, several academic studies, many U.S. Government documents, and press accounts were consulted.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first is a background section describing U.S. interests in the ILO and the four areas of U.S. concern

in 1975. The second describes the arguments in favor of, and in opposition to, the proposition that U.S. withdrawal from the ILO was successful. The third discusses whether or not the changes in the ILO can be attributed to U.S. withdrawal. The fourth assesses whether or not the situations of the ILO and UNESCO are comparable.

I. BACKGROUND

A. U.S. Interests in the International Labor Organization

The ILO is an international technical agency bringing together representatives of government, business, and labor and focusing on labor and employment issues. The U.S. Government, the business community, and labor organizations have been associated with the ILO since its founding in 1919, although the United States did not formally join the ILO until 1934. Observers generally agree that in two particular areas the ILO supports U.S. foreign policy objectives.

1. Support for Worker-Related Human Rights

The organization was established to assist in raising labor standards and improving working conditions throughout the world. This has been attempted through the adoption of labor standards in the form of (1) conventions, which member countries are urged to ratify and which, as treaties, bind the parties to their implementation, and (2) non-binding recommendations which establish guidelines for governments. It is the ILO machinery, developed to encourage and assist countries in moving toward compliance with these labor standards -- particularly those on freedom of association, right to organize, nondiscrimination, and abolition of forced labor, which accounts for ILO's unique role among international organizations. It is the one organization which has an ongoing program to improve the human rights performance of member governments.

2. Technical Assistance Programs

Since the mid-sixties, with the increasing membership of developing countries, the ILO has moved more heavily into development assistance programs, emphasizing national and regional training programs, advisory missions, surveys, and other activities designed to provide direct assistance to member states. These programs are generally in accord with the goals of U.S. bilateral aid. The ILO has been hailed for developing innovative technical assistance programs and in 1969 won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work in this area. U.S. bilateral aid programs in recent years have shared the approach of innovative ILO programs in emphasizing appropriate technology and targeting assistance to the neediest.

B. The Reasons for U.S. Withdrawal

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger notified the Director-General of the ILO of the U.S. intent to withdraw on November 5, 1975*. In his letter, he expressed concern about four trends in the ILO. These were: 1) erosion of tripartism; 2) selective concern for human rights; 3) violation of due process; and 4) politicization. A brief discussion of each of these issues is necessary.

1. Erosion of Tripartite Representation

ILO's tripartite structure is unique among international organizations. In the ILO, workers and employers have equal representation with governments. As originally established, the labor and employer delegates were to be chosen independently by the most representative labor and employer organizations of

* U.N. Document A/C.5/1704, Annex, 6 November 1975.

member countries, and the employer and worker groups in the ILO were to operate autonomously, without interference by governments.

The U.S. concern in 1975 was that the right of the worker and employer groups to represent their own interests had been eroded through interference by governments that did not have independent labor unions or employers. The problem was especially serious in the Governing Body, where worker and employer groups chose their members without government influence. The United States, some employers, and some workers had fought for years to prevent imposition of employer and labor delegates from Eastern European countries on the Body itself and in positions of importance in the various ILO committees through a geographic seat distribution system or some other government-imposed rule. The fight continues to this day in the employer group, although the worker group has reached an accommodation within itself. The United States was also concerned with Eastern European nationals assuming positions of importance in the International Labor Office which gave them greater influence over ILO programs. Attempts by the Soviet Union and its allies to curtail the autonomy of the worker and employer groups were increasingly being supported by many Third World countries.

2. Selective Concern for Human Rights

In the years since its establishment, the ILO has adopted several worker-related human rights conventions. These include conventions on freedom of association, right to organize, discrimination in employment, equal remuneration, forced labor, and working conditions. Over the years the ILO had established elaborate procedures for monitoring and encouraging compliance of members with ILO conventions.

Monitoring of the conventions was done by the highly respected Committee of Experts and by the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR). The procedure for monitoring involves investigating reports of violations, requiring reports from countries accused of violations, and finally, publishing by name the countries in violation of the conventions in a report adopted by the Conference.

In the Kissinger letter, the United States expressed concern about the selective application of the ILO conventions. The letter complained that the ILO pursued the violation of human rights in some states and granted immunity from citation to other states. The United States was concerned that this undermined the credibility of the ILO's support for freedom of association and strengthened the proposition that worker-related human rights were not applicable to all countries in the same way, but would be interpreted differently for states with different political systems.

3. Disregard for Due Process

The ILO procedures allow a member government to complain to the ILO about another member which appears to violate an ILO convention. ILO experts then investigate complaints and advise the governments of their findings. In his letter, Henry Kissinger indicated that the U.S. concern in this area was that in recent years resolutions condemning particular member states had been adopted in complete disregard of the established machinery and procedures. His letter also noted that the trend had been accelerating.

4. Increasing Politicization of the Organization

Far too many ILO members, in the U.S. view, were using the Organization as a forum to expound their own political viewpoints on issues outside the mandate of the organization. While the United States acknowledged that there are political issues which fall within the ILO mandate, the U.S. concern was that extraneous political issues, i.e., those not germane to the organization, had disrupted ILO proceedings and seriously detracted from the legitimate technical work of the ILO.

After the required two-year waiting period, the Cabinet Level Committee determined that the ILO had not resolved the specific problems outlined in the Secretary of State's letter. The United States announced its plans to withdraw on November 1, 1977.

II. HAS THE ILO IMPROVED IN THE AREAS OF U.S. CONCERN SINCE WITHDRAWAL?

Those who argue that the ILO has improved since U.S. withdrawal identify specific changes that occurred in the ILO but also emphasize that a more general, if difficult to define, improvement took place in the atmosphere at the ILO. The perceived improvement in atmosphere is considered by these experts to be the most significant change in the ILO. Indeed, they often cite it as a precondition for improvements in the specific areas of our concern. This change is not seen as dramatic, but is described in terms of "trends being reversed" and ILO now "being on an upward curve."

These people argue that the U.S. withdrawal resulted in improved support for U.S. leadership by our Industrial Market Economy Countries (IMEC)* allies, moderate Third World countries, and the Director-General. The IMEC countries, they maintain, began to play a greater role in efforts to improve the ILO. Since our withdrawal, the United States has found it easier to rally Western governments against the actions of the Eastern European countries or the radical Arab countries. The moderate Third World countries were less willing to vote in a bloc with the Soviet bloc and radical Third World countries. They began to play a more independent leadership role and also became more supportive of the United States. U.S. relations with the Secretariat improved. There is, as a result of withdrawal, greater willingness to solicit U.S. views and support them, and less tolerance for the views of the Soviet bloc and radical Third World members. The change in atmosphere is also seen as the cause of other improvements in areas which the United States did not identify publicly as concerns.

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* The IMEC group is a loose coalition of western countries generally the same as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.

Those who do not see improvements in the ILO express two viewpoints. Some argue that there has been no improvement in the agency. The problems the United States had before withdrawal are still problems. They argue that the improved atmosphere perceived by some is the result of U.S. acceptance of the status quo in the ILO and not of any changes in the agency. Others acknowledge improvements in the ILO since withdrawal but argue that any changes in the agency are temporary. They attribute them to the effects of external events, such as the crushing of the Polish union, Solidarity or to the natural evolution of all agencies or to changes in U.S. participation, rather than to U.S. withdrawal. The few changes that do seem more lasting occurred, they argue, not because the United States withdrew, but because the majority of members perceived that the change was in their own national interest.

The arguments for and against the success of U.S. action in specific issue areas are as follows:

A. Yes, the ILO Has Improved.

1. Tripartism

The major U.S. concern in this area had been Soviet pressure on the independent labor and employer groups in the ILO. Those who see withdrawal as a success state that the most important change was the 1979 International Labor Conference amendment to the rules of procedure to allow for a secret ballot vote in the Conference under certain conditions. This encourages greater autonomy by worker and employer delegates by allowing them the opportunity to vote without government controls, according to these observers.

Those interviewed also point out that there has been no further erosion of tripartism and no move to increase government pressure on independent worker

and employer groups. Additionally, several resolutions adopted by the Conference which stress the importance of tripartism have been translated into a wide variety of specific programs and activities which supporters claim increase tripartism.

2. Selective Concern for Human Rights

The major U.S. concern in this area had been the reluctance of the ILO to criticize the Soviet bloc countries for violations of the ILO human rights conventions. Those who see withdrawal as a success point to the improvements in the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations report to the General Conference and the increasing support this report receives as the most significant improvement in the ILO.

The procedures of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations were opened for amendment during the period of the U.S. absence following passage of a resolution introduced by the Soviet Union in an attempt to weaken the CACR. The changes that were made at the 1980 Conference (after our return) actually strengthened the machinery. The ILO Conference adopted changes that strengthen the report of the CACR by more clearly delineating the categories of violations by members. The report also became easier for many members to support because it was amended to list cases where countries have shown progress in applying the conventions. The success of the ILO Conference in adopting these changes indicated strong support by the members for the role of ILO in monitoring labor rights violations by members. At the 1984 Conference, the Soviets introduced another resolution calling for a working party to review the ILO supervisory machinery. This new resolution was denied consideration by the Resolutions Committee.

The report of the CACR, which has included criticism of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on occasion since the U.S. withdrawal, has gotten greater support in the General Conference since U.S. withdrawal. This is another sign of the members' increasing support for the monitoring role of the ILO, according to this argument. The vote for the CACR report had been 41 percent in 1974 and 39 percent in 1977 when the United States left. Support for the report reached 59 percent in 1982, and 61 percent in 1983. The 1984 report was adopted by consensus, and it was not possible to measure the intensity of support. In both 1981 and 1983, the report of the CACR was approved despite attempts by the Soviet bloc to prevent its passage because of the inclusion of Soviet bloc countries. The United States played an active role in the adoption of these reports.

3. Disregard for Due Process

The major U.S. concern in this area was the disregard of the established ILO procedures for calling attention to violations of conventions by members. Supporters note that the representatives to the ILO are generally more supportive of the due process issue in the General Conference. They cite the conference treatment of the continuing series of resolutions condemning Israel without benefit of the investigating procedures of the ILO as evidence that the membership has increased its support for the established procedures of the ILO. The ILO had a long history of anti-Israel resolutions, and even in 1980, the Conference adopted an anti-Israel resolution despite strenuous U.S. objection. In 1982, the United States managed to keep another anti-Israel resolution in committee. The 1983 version of anti-Israel resolution was defeated in the Conference and the defeat was attributed to the use of the secret ballot adopted in 1979. In 1984, no anti-Israel resolution was introduced.

4. Politicization

In this area, the U.S. concern was that political issues not germane to the ILO were taking an increasing amount of the time and attention of the ILO and were becoming part of the ILO program. Those who see improvement in the ILO cite the greater efforts by the chairmen of the various ILO groups to stop extraneous political speeches. In recent years, the practice has been adopted of countries rising and asking for a right of reply to a speech being made, and then both speeches are postponed until the end of the day's session. Those who examine ILO publications note that there are fewer outrageously biased statements in ILO publications. Supporters also note greater efforts by the IMEC to push the ILO toward favorable changes in the composition of the Governing Board, and to concentrate ILO resources on proven programs. One improved program is the World Employment Program, which has become more practical and less ideological, supporters of this view claim.

5. Improvements in Other Areas

In addition to improvements in the four areas of U.S. concern, other unexpected changes also occurred, according to this view. First, U.S. withdrawal had a substantial effect on other international organizations, according to some observers. There was less overall political manipulation in U.N. agencies following U.S. withdrawal from the ILO, many believe. For example, there was a general decline in anti-Israel resolutions, and a decrease in politicization of technical programs in other U.N. agencies, according to these observers.

Second, the ILO began to move seriously toward reducing the rate of budget growth. In a February 1983 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on

international organization budgets,* ILO officials are said to cite U.S. withdrawal as the major reason for reduction in real-term budget growth between the 1978-79 and the 1982-83 budget periods. (Overall growth of the ILO budget during the two-year period of 1984-85 was 4.5 percent with 1.9 percent real program growth.)

Third, the rapid loss of 25 percent of ILO funds due to U.S. withdrawal resulted in improved efficiency of the Secretariat, according to this view. The Director-General took that opportunity to improve the bureaucracy, cutting primarily headquarters personnel and budget, rather than field personnel and programs. The result was a less headquarters-heavy organization.

B. No, the ILO has not improved.

Many supporters of this view insist that the ILO hasn't changed at all. The same problems exist at the ILO that have always existed, they argue. The United States still lacks support for reform from our allies, and the ILO still has a double standard in human rights violations. Non-germane political issues still consume too much of the time and budget of the ILO. One observer maintains that although the ILO hasn't changed, the United States will now tolerate a greater degree of previously unacceptable behavior in the ILO than before our withdrawal. Others do see improvements in the ILO, but insist that these would have occurred without withdrawal. The combined specific comments of both groups in the four areas of U.S. concern are:

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* U.S. General Accounting Office. Delaying U.S. payments to international organizations may not be the best means to promote budget restraint; report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Washington, G.A.O., 1983. GAO/ID-83-26, Feb. 15, 1983. p. 29.

1. Tripartism

None of the actions taken by the ILO to encourage tripartism and discourage government interference with the worker and employer groups have yet resulted in concrete action except for the secret ballot in the Conference, according to these observers. Despite U.S. concern about Soviet bloc pressure to allow governments to play a role in selecting members of the employer and worker groups, the overall structure issue (the question of which members should be on the Governing Body and how they should be chosen) has not yet been resolved. The Committee on Structure has met for years without resolving any of these structure issues, including Soviet bloc representation in the employer group. (The workers group has reached an accomodation within itself to include Soviet bloc members. This in itself may signify a decline in tripartism.)

The secret ballot is an example of a development that would have occurred with or without U.S. withdrawal, it is argued. There was great support for it among the Third World delegates, especially employer and worker delegates.

2. Selective Concern for Human Rights

The double standard in this area has not changed, many believe. Although reports of the CACR citing Soviet bloc countries were adopted in 1980, 1981, and 1983, in many cases they contained only vague and imprecise criticism of those countries. In contrast, the General Conference did not adopt the CACR report at all in 1982, due largely to Soviet bloc resistance to more serious criticism of Poland in the report.

There has been no decline in Soviet bloc attacks on the human rights machinery and the constant search for special treatment for themselves. As

recently as 1984, the Soviets attempted again to restructure the CACR machinery. Their effort failed, but there is no indication that they have given up.

Those charges which have finally been leveled against the Soviets and their allies are paper criticism. Initially a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crushing of Solidarity in Poland, there has not been any lasting or effective criticism of these countries. The double standard still exists.

3. Disregard for Due Process

There has been no change as yet in the Conference rules to screen out debate or resolutions that attempt to circumvent the procedures of the ILO, the major U.S. concern in this area.

The 1982 victory of the United States in keeping the anti-Israeli resolution bottled up in committee was hollow, since the inability of the Resolutions Committee to report the resolution prevented all other resolutions from being considered by the Conference. Only the anti-Israeli resolution was considered by the committee, and no other resolutions were reported, even those favored by the United States. The Resolutions Committee was paralyzed, they maintain.

The Israeli issue is not gone, it is argued, and will remain a problem as long as the Middle East is a problem. The debate on Israel has just shifted for now to another part of the ILO, and those countries that want to keep it alive continue to do so. For example, during 1984, the anti-Israeli issue became part of the debate on the structure of the ILO. Arab and radical Third World members attempted to prevent Israel from belonging to any of the regional groups, thus, in effect, depriving the country of one essential aspect of membership. The issue was not settled and is expected to be part of the next Conference.

4. Politicization

Instead of a decline in non-germane political issues in the Conference and the programs of the ILO, these observers see extraneous political issues, such as disarmament, becoming a permanent part of the ILO program and publications. ILO has funded studies, published documents, and debated disarmament, for example.

The Director-General has not yet been persuaded by the United States to use his existing authority under article 17 to screen out political resolutions in the Conference, nor has any other agreement been reached to screen out political resolutions. Too much time is still devoted to extraneous political resolutions.

5. Withdrawal's Effect in Other Areas

Those who think that withdrawal damaged our situation in the ILO point to a significant change in the number of U.S. nationals employed in professional positions by the ILO. This number dropped drastically while we were out and has recovered only slightly since 1980. (From 72 U.S. nationals employed in professional positions in November 1977 to 50 in November of 1979 and 58 in November of 1984. This was a drop from 13 percent to 7 percent, according to one critic.) These critics comment that it will take 20 years to bring the U.S. personnel numbers back to their 1977 level, which was considered unreasonably low in 1977.

The critics also point out that the budget cuts made when the United States withdrew from the ILO were made across all the programs of the ILO. No attempt was made to cut funding primarily in the program areas which the United

States considered unacceptable. Programs we liked were cut as well as those we disliked.

Critics also question whether U.S. withdrawal had a significant effect on other international organizations. Using the anti-Israel activities as an example, these critics point to the resolutions adopted by substantial margins by the World Health Organization in 1977 and 1978 expressing concern for the health of Arabs in the occupied territories and condemning Israel's practices, and the 1979 UNESCO Executive Board resolution condemning Israel, as proof that the issue of Israel was still alive in other international organizations. These critics contend that actions against Israel were caused by the actions of Israel and had very little to do with U.S. withdrawal from ILO.

III. DID WITHDRAWAL CAUSE CHANGES IN THE ILO?

Beginning with this section, the paper concentrates only on the comments of those who acknowledge that there have been changes in the ILO since the late 1970s. For this group, the second question was whether the changes in the ILO that they observed were the result of our withdrawal, or were due to some other cause.

First, all those interviewed saw U.S. participation in the ILO before withdrawal as having been quite inadequate, particularly before the United States announced its intention to withdraw. Three General Accounting Office reports written between 1970 and 1977 had pointed out U.S. inadequacies. Second, many stressed the difficulty of separating out changes brought about by U.S. withdrawal from changes brought about by external events. Some of these events have already been mentioned. The worldwide reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, the ongoing crisis in Poland, and Israeli activities in the Middle East stimulated actions not only at the ILO but also in other U.N. agencies where there was no U.S. threat to withdraw. Third, a change in U.S. labor leadership following the death of George Meany in January 1980, some suggested, significantly changed the character of U.S. participation in the ILO. Meany's antagonism toward the European trade unions and his longstanding opposition to Soviet bloc participation in the ILO were well known and shaped the overall American approach to the organization. Finally, organizational changes brought about by the natural evolution of the agency over time rather than due to the actions of one country, may have been the cause of changes in voting procedures or ways of controlling debates, for example.

When the effects of external events are put aside, those who support the idea that withdrawal was the key to changing the ILO argue that other actions

by the United States had been tried and failed. The United States had withheld funds from the ILO for two years in the early 1970s. The United States had threatened to leave before. None of this had roused the membership to U.S. concerns. Only withdrawal was dramatic enough and unexpected enough to bring about a change in direction at the ILO, according to this argument.

Those who disagree argue that the changes that occurred in the ILO were the result of increased U.S. attention to the ILO and not a result of withdrawal. Beginning shortly before withdrawal, at the direction of the Cabinet Level Committee, the United States greatly expanded and improved the attention paid to the ILO.

This section discusses first the comments of those who see withdrawal as the major cause of changes in the ILO, and second, the comments of those who see changes in U.S. participation in the ILO as chiefly responsible for improvements in the ILO.

A. Yes, Withdrawal Was the Reason for the Changes.

Supporters of withdrawal as the key to improving the ILO cite three effects of U.S. withdrawal that would not have occurred without the drastic measure of withdrawal. Greater effort alone, they argue, would not have been adequate.

1. Withdrawal Shocked the IMEC Group, the Third World and the ILO Secretariat.

U.S. efforts to challenge the CACR double standard prior to 1977 had fallen on deaf ears. The allies of the United States and most of the Third World had implicitly gone along with a double standard for the Soviet bloc countries for

many years. After the U.S. withdrawal, it is argued, complaints against the Soviet bloc countries began to be filed. Our allies had also been willing to go along with the majority on the other issues of U.S. concern. The IMEC group viewed issues such as politicization as an inevitable consequence of the growth of the agency to include the Third World countries and the desirability of obtaining universal membership. U.S. withdrawal stimulated the IMEC group to focus on the direction the ILO was taking and to join together to change it.

U.S. withdrawal separated the moderate Third World countries from the radical Third World/Soviet bloc group. The moderate countries, particularly the African and Latin American countries, began to be more supportive of U.S. concerns and to play a more active leadership role in the ILO, according to this view.

U.S. withdrawal emphasized our concerns to the Director-General and gave him the excuse to cut the budget and inefficiency in the personnel system, according to supporters of withdrawal.

2. Withdrawal Improved U.S. Credibility.

The United States had threatened to withdraw before, but had not carried out the threat. By actually pulling out this time, the United States demonstrated the level of its dissatisfaction and improved the atmosphere for the desired changes. Subsequently, when the United States improved its domestic staffing on ILO issues and began to focus more attention on improving the ILO, our leadership was readily accepted, according to this argument. This improved atmosphere, many maintain, has resulted in even greater changes in the ILO. For example, the United States presented the Director-General with alternative

program suggestions for the program and budget for 1984 and 1985. He adopted one-third of these into his own presentation. The final budget passed by the 1983 ILO General Conference was the closest to U.S. interests of any passed in recent years. In another example, the ILO has agreed in principle to allow the U.S. Department of Labor to begin evaluating the field programs of the ILO. Supporters of withdrawal argue that this type of agreement showing support for U.S. expertise in evaluating field programs could not have been made in the atmosphere existing prior to U.S. withdrawal.

3. Rapid Loss of Funds Forced the Director-General To Make Personnel and Administration Changes.

The Director-General used the opportunity offered by a reduction in funds to streamline management. Although it was not a major U.S. concern, withdrawal helped the United States achieve its objectives of controlling the bureaucracy and thus the budget of the ILO. One of the conditions for the U.S. return to the ILO, was that the budget cuts made due to its absence had to remain. Press reports indicated that though the budget was cut by 21.7 percent, and that 240 of 2,750 jobs were eliminated, most of the cuts were made in the Geneva headquarters rather than in the field. Attention and staffing were necessary to achieve these results, but without the rapid loss of funds, it is unlikely that such significant improvements in personnel and budget would have been achieved, according to this argument.

b. Improved U.S. Participation Was the Reason for Changes in the ILO.

Those critics of the withdrawal decision who agree that the ILO has improved argue that the same improvements would have occurred if the United States had stayed in the ILO and fought for change or had returned to the

agency sooner. The withdrawal of the United States had nothing to do with the improvement in the ILO, from their perspective. The real problem, these critics contend, had been lack of U.S. leadership in the ILO. It was not until shortly before its withdrawal that the United States began to focus attention on the ILO and improve our participation by increasing and improving the U.S. staffing in the ILO area. It was this action that made the difference, and U.S. withdrawal would have achieved very little without improved U.S. participation. In this view, U.S. attention to international labor issues improved while the United States was not part of the ILO. U.S. Government observers continued to participate in the major ILO meetings and work for changes in the ILO. And the United States gave the ILO a large grant while it was out of the organization to signal U.S. approval of reform actions taken by the ILO.

The critics of withdrawal point to three GAO investigations made between 1970 and 1977 which emphasize that problems in U.S. participation were the key aspect of U.S. difficulties at the ILO. The GAO finding stated that U.S. participation in ILO alternated between crisis management and neglect, that the United States had no clear and measurable goals or objectives for participation in the ILO.* GAO found little interagency coordination, insufficient coordination among delegates, and little consultation with employer and labor organizations. The United States had little knowledge of ILO budget and programs and no strategy for achieving its objectives in the ILO, according to the GAO.

Meanwhile, a series of major improvements in U.S. participation were

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* U.S. General Accounting Office. Need for U.S. Objectives in the International Labor Organization. May 16, 1977. ID-77-12; Numerous Improvements Still Needed in Managing U.S. Participation in International Organizations. July 18, 1974. B-168767; U.S. Participation in the International Labor Organization Not Effectively Managed. Dec. 22, 1970. B-168767.

undertaken. At the time of the U.S. announcement of our intention to withdraw in 1975, the President established a Cabinet Level Committee (CLC) to monitor the progress of any ILO improvements, and to coordinate U.S. efforts to reform the agency. This committee consisted of the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the Director of the National Security Council, and high level representatives of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the AFL-CIO (the respective U.S. employer and worker delegates to the ILO). It met several times during the two-year period of consideration, and generated several studies of U.S. participation in the ILO as well as increased staffing of ILO affairs. After our withdrawal, the CLC continued to function as a coordinating body and to monitor improvements in the ILO in preparation for the day when the United States would return to the agency. After the United States returned, it was renamed the Presidential Committee on the ILO and continued to function virtually unchanged.

Some of the more important changes made at the request of the CLC were the following:

(1) The Cabinet Level Committee required the three agencies involved in the ILO (the Department of Labor, the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce) to establish long term goals for U.S. participation in the ILO. The CLC approved these goals and now sets more specific annual goals and objectives for the United States. This helps focus the staff work done in the ILO area on key areas of U.S. concern.

(2) The CLC designated the Department of Labor as the agency that would maintain expertise in ILO matters. The staff of the Bureau of International Labor Affairs of the Department of Labor was expanded, and has survived a change of administrations and agency reductions-in-force essentially intact.

The staff includes budget and program analysts who begin examining the budget and program prior to the beginning of the budget preparation process in the ILO.

(3) The CLC called upon the three agencies to improve the preparation of U.S. delegations to the ILO. The U.S. Government and employer and worker organizations concentrate on increasing the expertise and preparation of U.S. delegations. Several days of delegate briefings are conducted prior to each Conference. The discussions cover the issues expected to arise during the meeting, U.S. goals in the ILO, and strategy for the meeting. The United States has concentrated on choosing highly qualified delegates for technical committees with the cooperation of the worker and employer organizations. The committees had not previously been a major concern of the United States. Briefings are held for these representatives as well. The staff of the Department of Labor also assesses the results of each Conference. This assessment includes a published delegation report with comments and background material from the Departments of State and Commerce.

(4) Improvements have also been made in the official performance of the delegates at ILO meetings at the request of the CLC. Consultation and cooperation with our allies have been stressed. The U.S. delegates also seek out and consult with Third World delegates. This change responded to a criticism by many ILO members that the U.S. delegation did not consult with them on issues of importance to the United States.

Critics of withdrawal argue that U.S. credibility in all areas of the ILO, including the political areas, has improved because it is now obvious to members that the United States is well staffed on the technical issues, and is paying close attention to the ILO. The increased ability of the U.S. delegates to participate in the technical work of the ILO has lead to the better atmos-

phere in the Conference, according to these critics. This improved participation has also convinced the ILO membership that the United States takes the ILO very seriously, and this has resulted in a better audience for U.S. ideas.

IV. IF WITHDRAWAL HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON REFORM IN THE ILO, CAN WE EXPECT SIMILAR IMPROVEMENTS IN UNESCO TO RESULT FROM U.S. WITHDRAWAL?

The third question which this paper attempts to address is whether the ILO situation in 1977 is sufficiently comparable to the UNESCO situation in 1984 to result in reforms similar to those that followed our withdrawal from the ILO? This section relies on the opinions of those who have seen an improvement in the ILO since U.S. withdrawal. Once again, the arguments of those who feel withdrawal from the ILO can serve as a useful analogy are presented first, and those of observers who feel it does not are presented last.

A. Yes, the Situations Are Similar and ILO Can Serve as a Precedent for UNESCO.

Although it is impossible to anticipate results, and one cannot predict the future, there are several similarities between the two situations that could lead to the same results, say supporters of this argument.

1. Problems of Support for Reform in UNESCO Are Similar to Those in the ILO.

Those who say that reform in UNESCO has a good chance of occurring if the United States withdraws suggest that, just as in the ILO, U.S. credibility is an issue. Early in 1984, Department of State spokesmen stated repeatedly that the U.S. withdrawal was necessary in part because of the lack of support that other member states had given to U.S. appeals for reform. Advocates state

that other governments acquiesced in the radical Third World programs which supported statist solutions to development, for example. The Secretariat of UNESCO also did not take our warnings seriously. Although the rhetoric improved at the 1983 Conference, there was no change in the program and budget proposed by the Secretariat to indicate that the U.S. concerns about extraneous political issues becoming part of UNESCO programs were being addressed. As in the ILO, the advocates of withdrawal argue, not just intent to withdraw, but actual withdrawal, will be necessary to convince the governments concerned that the reforms are necessary for the continued membership of the United States. Just as in the ILO, they suggest, governments that would like to see reform have been willing to accept the rule of those who wanted to use UNESCO in ways and for purposes that were contrary to Western interests. Only since the United States announced its intention to withdraw has the subject of reform been given any consideration.

Withdrawal is a measure of last resort and is perceived that way by all concerned. Withholding funds (which the United States tried in the mid-seventies) has had no lasting effect, nor has the U.S. Government's attempt to encourage reform from within UNESCO.

2. The Issues Involved in Reform of Both Agencies Are Similar.

Despite differences in language describing U.S. reasons for withdrawing, the main concerns in both the ILO and UNESCO are political, according to this view. In UNESCO, just as in the ILO, the United States is concerned about the growing toleration by the members of irrelevant political attacks on members. As in the ILO, the attacks are unrelated to the work of the agency and also do not solve the problem concerned. The examples cited by a supporter of this view are the Arab resolutions introduced in UNESCO to prevent program money

from being spent in Israel in protest of the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Aside from occupying the time and attention of UNESCO, such attempts do not result in any action which improves the situation of the Arabs in the West Bank. Resolutions such as these serve merely to harrass the Israelis. As in the ILO, the United States is concerned about the amount of time devoted to this type of political issue.

Secondly, just as in the ILO, the United States is concerned about the injection of unrelated political issues into the program and budget of UNESCO. As in ILO, the U.S. concern is that these programs detract or derail the legitimate and badly needed programs of UNESCO.

The additional U.S. concern with budgetary growth in UNESCO, while not one of the U.S. concerns in the ILO, was one of the areas of reform in the ILO. An improvement in this area is likely as well in UNESCO according to this argument.

3. UNESCO Has Already Begun To Change, Just as the ILO Did After U.S. Withdrawal.

The U.S. threat to withdraw, perhaps made more credible by our earlier withdrawal from the ILO, has already begun to have an effect at UNESCO.

After months of resistance, the Director-General of UNESCO has begun to take an active part in bringing about specific reform measures. He has been more responsive to criticisms of his management system and has established advisory groups to look into reform. Since the U.S. announcement, several of our European allies and many Third World representatives have begun to talk of reform and to work together to bring about specific reform measures. These developments indicate that UNESCO, like the ILO, is an international organization that is capable of reform under pressure from the United States, according

to this argument.

Advocates of withdrawal argue that it is not clear that the current reform measures will be extensive or permanent enough to meet the U.S. objections, however, so that withdrawal will still be necessary.

B. No, the ILO Is Not a Good Precedent for UNESCO.

Supporters of this view emphasize that the situations are so completely different, that it is impossible to expect comparable results.

1. The Two Agencies Have Completely Different Constituencies.

Domestically, the ILO has always enjoyed strong support from the U.S. labor movement, some parts of the business community, and the three federal agencies (State, Labor, and Commerce) which serve these constituencies. It was this strong support from the American labor movement which ensured the U.S. return to the ILO, and even caused the U.S. Government to maintain relations with the ILO in our absence. Internationally, the ILO has strong support from Western European governments and labor unions. The Soviet bloc countries have always had little interest in an organization devoted to free labor movements, and many Third World governments have only a modest interest in this area as well. The weak interest of the Soviet Union, coupled with the strong U.S. interest, made reform of the agency more likely.

UNESCO, on the other hand, has no unified domestic constituency in the United States even though many Government agencies and private business and academic organizations are affected by its work. Critics argue that unless some organized domestic constituency is developed, there will be little incentive for the U.S. Government to return. The agency is widely known in the

Third World and has become a major instrument of the non-aligned countries. The seriousness with which UNESCO is viewed in the Third World makes it of great propaganda value to the Soviet Union. These critics are concerned that the strong interest by both the Third World and the Soviet Union will mean that it is less likely that U.S. withdrawal will influence UNESCO to reform. U.S. withdrawal, these critics contend, is likely to consolidate Soviet and radical Third World influence in UNESCO, not enhance U.S. influence.

2. Membership in the Two Agencies Is Completely Different.

The tripartite membership of ILO had a tremendous effect on the U.S. decision to withdraw. The influence of George Meany of the AFL-CIO, the U.S. worker representative, cannot be underestimated. The original decision to leave and the letter of withdrawal were the products of the AFL-CIO and, observers maintain, approved by the president over the objections of the Department of State and the National Security Council. The establishment of the Cabinet Level Committee and the continued high-level U.S. Government interest in the ILO are largely a product of this tripartite membership. Internationally, the tripartite organization made the possibility of reform greater. U.S. labor delegates had strong relations with, and thus influence over, the labor delegates of other countries, and the United States also had many allies among the employer delegates of many countries. Their autonomy from government influence made reform more likely.

There is nothing comparable within the United States or internationally for UNESCO. There is no George Meany and no active, cohesive private-sector interest. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO has basically ceased to exist. There is no substantive backstopping Government agency. Without any single, strong advocate for UNESCO in the United States, either private or

governmental, there is less likelihood that the United States can influence the government members of UNESCO to change, especially in light of strong Soviet and Third World interest in the agency.

3. The United States Is Not Prepared To Take the Same Positive Steps in UNESCO That Were Taken in ILO.

The ILO withdrawal was a tactical, short term policy decision which was expected to lead to U.S. re-entry into the organization. Throughout the time of our absence, the United States maintained representatives at the ILO and even continued some funding. The Cabinet Level Committee sought to improve U.S. participation in anticipation of our return.

In the UNESCO situation, there is no evidence of a similar Government effort. There has been no UNESCO staff buildup comparable to the ILO staff buildup in the Department of Labor. There has been an active search for alternative methods of maintaining a U.S. role in the UNESCO fields, which would seem to lessen U.S. interest in returning to UNESCO in the near future. There is no evidence of high-level interest in UNESCO beyond U.S. withdrawal. There has been no request for the interim funding necessary to finance the UNESCO activities which the United States finds worthwhile until alternative programs can be established. There has also been no request to fund the alternative organizations which will be necessary to continue many of the UNESCO programs that have been identified by the Administration as worthwhile.

• American Association for Adult and Continuing Education •

November 7, 1984

Chairman, Standing Committee
on Labor and Human Resources
United States House of Representatives
2328 Rayburn Office Building
1st Street and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20510

Honorable Chairman:

On November 7, 1984, the Commission of Professors of Adult Education and the International Associates unanimously passed a resolution during their Annual Business Meeting. This resolution has been forwarded for action to the Board of Directors of the parent organization, the American Association for Adult and Continuing Education.

As Secretary and Executive Board Member of the Commission of Professors of Adult Education, I would like to respectfully submit this recommendation for your careful consideration.

WHEREAS, the American Association for Adult and Continuing Education supports the spirit of the UNESCO Charter and in particular, its program for adult education, which provides for:

1. the promotion of policy evolution in favor of adult education;
2. the advancement of information sharing in adult education, and
3. the increase of knowledge for theory and practice in the development of adult education.

AND WHEREAS, UNESCO had made efforts to meet with the reforms suggested by the United States.

• 1201 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W., SUITE 230 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-7866 •

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the United States reconsider its proposed withdrawal from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984. Further, it is recommended that the United States, in cooperation with other UNESCO member states, take a strong leadership position in the reform in, and the future direction of the organization.

Sincerely,

Paulette T. Beatty
Secretary, The Commission
of Professors of Adult Education

PTB/nmg

AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION
50 EAST HURON STREET CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60611 (312) 944-6780

RESPOND TO
School of Library and Information Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
412/624-5230

Statement of

Thomas J. Galvin

Dean

School of Library and Information Science

University of Pittsburgh

For Inclusion in the Record of Hearings of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on UNESCO

As a member of the International Relations Committee of the American Library Association and as the representative of that Association to the United States National Commission for UNESCO, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement for the hearing record on the future relationship between the United States and UNESCO. These comments assume that the Administration will carry out its stated intention to withdraw from UNESCO before December 31, 1984, although no formal announcement has been made at the time of this writing. I wish, therefore, to focus on those UNESCO programs and activities that will merit the continuing attention of both the Administration and the Congress after January 1, 1985, because of their importance to American educational, scientific, cultural and economic interests.

The American Library Association, founded in 1876, is the oldest and largest national library association in the world. It is the only

non-governmental organization at the national level representing all types of library and information services. Almost 40,000 member libraries, librarians and information specialists, library trustees, educators and communicators share the common goal of promoting and improving library services to all.

The American Library Association is committed to encouraging the open and unrestricted flow of library materials and of all forms of information in print, audio-visual and electronic formats throughout the world. This commitment to the free flow of information across national boundaries and to the goal of equal access to information for all the peoples of the world has led the American Library Association to support UNESCO's book, literacy, bibliographic and information programs from the founding of that organization. Although modestly funded, these UNESCO programs have produced results of profound importance to the U.S. library community. Therefore, the Council of the American Library Association on January 11, 1984, and again on June 25, 1984, expressed its concern at the prospect of termination of U.S. participation in and support of these valuable UNESCO programs. Copies of these resolutions are appended to this statement. We regret that our calls for negotiation of differences and for a one-year postponement of withdrawal appear at this eleventh hour to have gone unheeded.

We now call upon the Congress to assure that vital U.S. interests in the information field are protected in the aftermath of withdrawal from UNESCO. Specifically, it is essential that effective means be found to support the UNESCO General Information Program, which is highly regarded in the U.S. and world library communities, in its important work of bringing the world's output of recorded knowledge under effective bibliographic control and in linking the world community of scholars together through

electronic information technology. In a time when three-fourths of all scientific and technical research and development is being done outside the United States, our scientists and research workers must be assured of continuing access to both print materials and to electronic data bases in other countries. Similarly, the interests of the U.S. business community must be protected by assuring the uninterrupted daily passage of computerized data across national boundaries. In particular, it must be recognized that these vital scholarly and commercial communications linkages may be placed in jeopardy by the absence of United States' representation in the several UNESCO forums in which technical norms and standards and policy issues governing computers and telecommunications are addressed. Of equal concern is the threat to overseas markets for the products and services of the U.S. information industry, which currently enjoys the dominant share of a $60 billion world market.

Other UNESCO program areas of special significance to the U.S. library, information and publishing communities include copyright, archives, book development, worldwide literacy training, the education of library and information professionals in the less developed countries and the Florence and Nairobi agreements for elimination of import duties on books, other educational materials and scientific instruments. Fortunately, the United States National Committee for the UNESCO General Information Program, which has its secretariat in the United States National Commission on Libraries and Information Science, has developed plans to temper the potential negative impact of U.S. withdrawal on many of these vital activities.

In your review and oversight of the alternative mechanisms and activities promised by Secretary Newell in his December 10, 1984 statement to this Committee, we ask you to assure that a high priority is given

to book library and information programs, including those UNESCO programs that enjoy broad support or address areas not amenable to bilateral negotiation.

We urge as well that the Congress assure that funds continue to be authorized, appropriated and expended by the Department of State to support the United States National Commission on UNESCO, the citizen body authorized by law (PL 565) to advise the State Department on UNESCO matters. If the Administration's goal, as Secretary Newell and others have so often stated, is to resume full membership in a reformed UNESCO, then the expertise of this Commission will be essential in monitoring and evaluating the changes that do occur in that organization, as well as in assuring that both current and future U.S. interests are understood and safeguarded in the period of our absence.

Finally, we would urge that the Congress give close attention to the several thoughtful recommendations presented to this Committee on December 10, 1984, in the testimony of the distinguished Executive Director of Freedom House, Leonard R. Sussman. Mr. Sussman, who is well known and highly respected as a vigorous and dedicated advocate of press freedom, is surely correct in his assertion of the need for "a distinct change in the perception of U.S. diplomacy in the UNESCO arena." We support his view that "the first post-withdrawal step...should be to set forth a clear set of American objectives for operating outside UNESCO to assure a separate U.S. presence in certain fields we will leave behind at UNESCO; to work with friendly countries inside UNESCO to pursue reforms; and to assure our return to UNESCO once reforms are accomplished." It is to these ends that this statement is addressed.

RESOLUTION ON UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

WHEREAS, The United States has given notice of its intention to withdraw from the membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization effective December 31, 1984; and

WHEREAS, The Council of the American Library Association, on January 11, 1984, called upon the U.S. Secretary of State and the Director-General of UNESCO to initiate negotiations leading to timely and satisfactory resolution of differences in order to preserve the many positive benefits of continuing U.S. participation in UNESCO; and

WHEREAS, These negotiations have not yet been initiated; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the American Library Association express its support for the concepts embodied in H.R. 5686 extending United States membership in UNESCO to December 31, 1985 and requiring consultation with the Congress prior to any decision concerning termination; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, appropriate members of Congress, the Director-General of UNESCO, the United States National Commission for UNESCO and other appropriate bodies.

Adopted by the Council of the
American Library Association
Dallas, Texas
June 27, 1984

(Over for January 11, 1984
Council resolution on UNESCO)

CONTINUED UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNESCO

WHEREAS, The United States was a founding member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and

WHEREAS, UNESCO's programs are vital to the international flow of publications and information, to Universal Bibliographical Control, to international copyright, to the worldwide promotion of books, libraries, publishing and literacy; and

WHEREAS, The American Library Association has been a longstanding member of the United States National Commission for UNESCO; and

WHEREAS, ALA has a strong and continuing concern for the issues of press freedoms which are addressed in the UNESCO forum; and

WHEREAS, The United States National Commission for UNESCO, on the basis of an extensive study of the views of the American Library Association and other U.S. non-governmental organizations qualified to evaluate the UNESCO program, affirmed on December 16, 1983, that continued United States membership in UNESCO is in the national interest; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the American Library Association deeply regrets the decision of the President of the United States, on recommendation of the Secretary of State, to issue notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from membership in UNESCO effective December 31, 1984; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Library Association calls upon the Secretary of State and the Director-General of UNESCO to initiate prompt, serious and productive negotiations leading to timely and satisfactory resolution of differences in order to preserve the many positive benefits of continuing U.S. participation in UNESCO; and, be it

FURTHER RESOLVED, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State and the Director-General of UNESCO and other appropriate bodies.

Adopted by the Council of the
American Library Association
Washington, D. C.
January 11, 1984
(Council Document #21)

NEWS FROM FREEDOM HOUSE
WILLKIE MEMORIAL BUILDING
20 West 40th Street New York N.Y. 10018 • 730-7744
Freedom House is a non-partisan, national organization devoted to the strengthening of free societies
For additional information Leonard R. Sussman (nights and weekends call YU 8-5137)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

UNESCO Says Mass-Media Work Conditions
Should be Resolved "Entirely" by Journalists;
Policy Reassessment Follows Series of Letters and Meeting

New York, Nov. 3---The Director-General of UNESCO states categorically that the working conditions of journalists, including their physical safety, should be resolved "entirely" by the professional organizations of journalists.

In the past, some participants in UNESCO meetings have proposed governmental licensing and monitoring of journalists in return for granting assurances of personal safety. UNESCO itself has never approved the licensing or censoring of journalists.

As an example of present policy, UNESCO now clearly states that it will neither provide funds nor participate in a meeting in Mexico City next March. That conference on news media conditions is scheduled to discuss the protection issue.

The meeting will be run by several international organizations of journalists. Plans for that meeting were discussed in June with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. UNESCO contributed $7,000 for that meeting.

The latest communication from Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, UNESCO's Director-General, apparently follows a reassessment of UNESCO's policy on this issue. The letter dissociates UNESCO from further planning and participation in the meeting where protection of journalists will be on the agenda.

The statement was made by Mr. M'Bow in a letter dated October 20 to Leonard R. Sussman, executive director of Freedom House. Mr. Sussman, a long-time critic of UNESCO's programs in the field of international communications, is also vice-chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. He participated, July 16-20, in a consultation in Paris to advise UNESCO on its public information programs.

Mr. Sussman learned then that UNESCO, with the ILO and the Red Cross, had met in

Geneva to plan the Mexico City conference on working conditions, including the protection of journalists.

In a private meeting with Mr. M'Bow in New York City August 4, and in a letter to the Director-General August 8, Mr. Sussman recalled that "UNESCO is perceived in the West as using the 'protection' issue to advance press controls." The proposed program "will be seen as continuing an objectionable pattern," Mr. Sussman wrote.

Mr. M'Bow responded September 29 by stating that five international organizations of journalists had informally asked the three intergovernmental agencies participating in the June meeting---ILO, Red Cross and UNESCO---to cosponsor the proposed 1985 conference. Mr. M'Bow acknowledged the concern expressed by Mr. Sussman and said he was "giving the matter my personal attention." He indicated that he had not had a formal request for UNESCO to cosponsor the event.

The five organizations seeking UNESCO's sponsorship were FELAP, a Latin American journalists' union; the Prague-based International Organization of Journalists; International Federation of Journalists (Brussels); International Catholic Journalists Union; and the Union of African Journalists.

Mr. Sussman responded October 2 that the NGOs listed did not represent all international organizations of journalists. He mentioned three groups of Western journalists which had already expressed apprehension over the 1985 meeting. "Since there is no unanimity among professional organizations on this subject," Mr. Sussman wrote, "UNESCO should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve matters of working conditions of journalists." He concluded with the hope that the Director-General would "act promptly to make it clear that UNESCO will neither be involved nor participate in the proposed meeting in Mexico."

Mr. M'Bow answered October 20. He recalled that after receiving Mr. Sussman's letter of October 2 he addressed the Executive Board of UNESCO in Paris on this subject. He told the Board there was no approved program or "budgetary provision" for the Mexico City conference. The NGOs had met again in October to plan the 1985 conference and

"UNESCO did not attend the meeting," Mr. M'Bow said. He told the Board that "questions concerning the working conditions of journalists should be settled by the journalists themselves." He expressed the "personal hope" that "on a matter which is essential to journalists' free exercise of their profession and their physical safety, the professional associations will come to an agreement among themselves."

His letter to Mr. Sussman continued:

> "You stated in your letter (Oct. 2) that, since there is no unanimity among the professional organizations on the subject of the proposed conference, UNESCO should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve the matters involved. Indeed, this is precisely the position taken by UNESCO."

Mr. M'Bow noted, further, that UNESCO had received requests from organizations of Western journalists inviting UNESCO to intervene on the "protection" issue. "At present," he said, "UNESCO finds itself in the middle of a controversy," because some organizations of journalists had asked UNESCO to help plan the 1985 conference. Mr. M'Bow said he urged the nongovernmental organizers to hold a preliminary planning meeting in the United States to which all print and broadcast media would be invited.

He concluded by expressing concern over the "alarming conditions under which journalists work in many parts of the world."

Mr. Sussman's further response, October 31, welcomed Mr. M'Bow's statement to the UNESCO Executive Board and his assurance in the letter of October 20. Wrote Mr. Sussman:

> "I know you have clearly opposed any form of censorship, and stated that licensing of journalists is not an objective of UNESCO. You have also personally and effectively interceded on behalf of journalists who have been victimized because of their professional work. We are particularly grateful for your efforts.
>
> "You wisely suggest in your letter of October 20 that the NGOs organizing the meeting in Mexico City---and not UNESCO---hold a preliminary meeting in the United States to permit Western journalists representing print and broadcast media to discuss their views on all the issues related to the protection of journalists. Perhaps it would then be seen how complex is the protection issue, on the one hand; linked as it has been to the fear of content-control; and how simple it can be, on the other hand; requiring only governmental adherence to the already-established Geneva conventions on the treatment of civilians in dangerous zones."

//

Editors: Text of the correspondence is available from this office.

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Freedom's Advocate the World Over

October 31, 1984

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Leonard R. Sussman,
Executive Director

*Executive Committee

The Honorable Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow
Director-General, UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75700 Paris, France

Dear Mr. Director-General:

Thank you for your important letter of October 20 regarding UNESCO's position on the protection of journalists and particularly the NGO meeting scheduled next March in Mexico City.

I welcome your statement of October 5, 1984 to the Executive Board following my letter to you of October 2 on this subject.

It is reassuring to learn in your reply that neither the program nor the budget for 1984-1985 contains provision for the scheduled meeting on the working conditions of journalists, including the protection issue. It is additionally reassuring to learn that UNESCO's position, properly described, maintains that the working conditions of journalists should be settled entirely by journalists themselves.

I am glad you share my view that since there is no unanimity among the professional organizations on this subject, UNESCO will leave it to the professional organizations to resolve the matter if they can.

I recognize that some professional organizations of journalists, including several with large Western memberships, have solicited UNESCO's participation in some aspects of the protection issue. This occurs because the protection of journalists, particularly on dangerous missions, is a deep concern to journalists everywhere. But concern for their physical safety does not eliminate the concern Western journalists also feel about their professional integrity, access to sources, and freedom in reporting. In the past, when such professional matters have been linked to proposals for increasing physical safety, those discussions proved fruitless, and aroused the suspicion of Western journalists.

I know you have clearly opposed any form of censorship, and stated that licensing of journalists is not an objective of UNESCO. You have also personally and effectively interceded on behalf of journalists who have been victimized because of their

professional work. We are particularly grateful for your efforts.

You wisely suggest in your letter of October 20 that the NGOs organizing the meeting in Mexico City---and not UNESCO---hold a preliminary meeting in the United States to permit Western journalists representing print and broadcast media to discuss their views on all the issues related to the protection of journalists. Perhaps it would then be seen how complex is the protection issue, on the one hand; linked as it has been to the fear of content-control; and how simple it can be, on the other hand; requiring only governmental adherence to the already-established Geneva conventions on the treatment of civilians in dangerous zones.

Thank you for clarifying UNESCO's position on this complex issue, and placing it entirely in the hands of the diverse organizations of journalists.

I appreciate the consideration you have given this matter during this period of great reassessment at UNESCO.

Most sincerely,

Leonard R. Sussman
Executive Director

jm

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organisation des nations unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture

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The Director-General

reference DG/1994

20 October 1984

Dear Mr. Sussman,

I appreciate the trouble you have taken to write a second letter, of 2 October 1984, further elaborating your views on Unesco's involvement in the proposed NGO meeting on the working conditions of journalists, scheduled to take place in March 1985 in Mexico City.

On 5 October 1984, I made a statement at the present session of the Executive Board (document 120 EX/INF. 6 prov.) where I referred, among other things, to this matter, saying that :

> "The programme and budget approved for 1984-1985 by the General Conference does not foresee the organization of such an activity and therefore contains no corresponding budgetary provision. Several leading journalists'unions announced lastJuly, however, the convening in Mexico City in 1985 of a world conference on the working conditions and security protection of journalists, in view of the considerable danger to which pressmen are exposed in the course of their work. Three of the associations concerned - the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), and the Federation of Latin-American Journalists (FELAP), met last week to prepare this world conference. Unesco did not attend the meeting.

Mr. Leonard R.Sussman
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.../...

42-841 O—85——12

It is true that the international and regional journalists'associations concerned have indicated their desire that the world conference be placed under the joint auspices of Unesco, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but we have so far received no official request.

I should like to take this opportunity to recall that Unesco's attitude so far in this field has been that questions concerning the working conditions of journalists should be settled by the journalists themselves.The Organization confines itself to providing support, to the full extent that its resources allow, and as is customary, to professional organizations which have submitted a request through the usual channels. I personally hope that, on a matter which is essential to journalists'free exercise of their profession and their physical safety, the professional associations will come to an agreement among themselves."

You stated in your letter that, since there is no unanimity among the professional organizations on the subject of the proposed conference, Unesco should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve the matters involved. Indeed, this is precisely the position taken by Unesco.

I should however point out that we have been receiving requests from several non-governmental organizations inviting us to intervene in one way or another. Some requested us to intervene in specific cases (US Committee to Protect Journalists), others wanted Unesco to co-sponsor with them meetings on the subject (International Press Institute), a third party requested Unesco to finance studies (International Federation of Journalists), and yet another solicited our participation in and contribution to meetings on the subject (Dutch Association of Journalists).

Furthermore, I have personally been approached on many occasions to contact a number of governments, so that journalists could perform their duties in better conditions. As you know, these contacts have always been carried out with complete discretion and without public announcement.

.../...

At present, Unesco finds itself in the middle of a controversy because of a decision taken by a number of professional organizations to convene a conference on the subject and because they expressed their wish that Unesco, together with another organization of the United Nations family (ILO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, should co-sponsor this conference. I have been informed by my collaborators, that when the subject came up at a meeting at the ILO office in Geneva, the Unesco delegation made it quite clear that all parties concerned with the working conditions of journalists should participate in any undertaking in this field. Publishers, broadcasters and news agency were mentioned in particular. Following the meeting, this was repeated in writing in letters sent to the Secretaries-General of FELAP, IFJ and IOJ, the members of the preparatory commission of the conference. It was also the Unesco delegation to the Geneva meeting which proposed that before a conference takes place, the commission would do well to hold one of its meetings in the United States so that contacts could more easely be established with organizations there.

You will thus realize that any decision with regard to the preparation of the conference, let alone the items on its agenda, rests in the hands of the professional organizations concerned.

On this occasion, I would like to express my concern over the alarming conditions under which journalists work in many parts of the world. I received with great distress the report of a recent meeting of the Association of Foreign Correspondents in Mexico, chaired by the CBC correspondent, which disclosed that one hundred and fifty-four journalists were killed and fifty-two disappeared in Latin America alone in the course of the last ten years. Last week, during a television interview I was asked what Unesco could do to help in the movement to free a French journalist at present prisoner in Afghanistan.

Any suggestion you may have on a possible Unesco action in this connection would be appreciated. As for the proposed conference in Mexico, the views I have expressed in this letter will be made known to all the organizations concerned ; unions of journalists, employer organizations, as well as other international organizations concerned with communication problems.

Once again allow me to express my appreciation for your continuing interest and your cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow

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Freedom's Advocate the World Over

October 2, 1984

The Honorable Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow
Director-General, UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75700 Paris, France

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Executive Director

*Executive Committee

Dear Mr. Director-General:

I appreciate your September 29 response to my letter discussing the proposed NGO meeting next March on the working conditions (including the protection) of journalists.

I welcome your restating that such matters are of direct concern to the professional organizations of journalists, and that UNESCO can be involved only at the request of the NGOs themselves.

You listed four organizations of journalists which support the meeting scheduled for 1985. These four NGOs do not represent the entire field of international organizations of journalists. At a meeting in Washington, September 28-29, 1984, for example, representatives of journalists organizations from several continents discussed with apprehension the proposed conference in Mexico City.

Two responses are already available: The magazine Editor and Publisher reflecting thousands of newspapers in the United States, advised in the headline over its only editorial this week, "Don't Relax on UNESCO." The editorial was devoted entirely to the Mexico City conference in which "protection" would be discussed. The editorial warned that this meeting shows that "licensing of journalists, an imposed code of conduct, rules for the content of news...are all still on the UNESCO agenda."

Similarly, the American Newspaper Publishers Association passed a special resolution, September 19, saying it is "alarmed at UNESCO's participation in and support for a new meeting now scheduled in Mexico City on 'working conditions and security of journalists.'" The ANPA stated it "would welcome signs (UNESCO) will move from such controversial and confrontational activities, to constructive programs supporting UNESCO's original commitment to a free flow of information."

I deeply regret this compounding of UNESCO's problems vis-a-vis the news media in many countries at the very moment when substantive changes in administrative procedures and programs are being debated by the Executive Board. My letter of August 8 was written precisely

to help avoid this development.

Even now---or should I say, particularly now?---I believe a salutary step should be taken.

You have restated your and UNESCO's position: intergovernmental organizations can be involved in such deliberations as the working conditions of journalists only at the request of the professional organizations concerned. It follows, then, that you cannot be involved in such deliberations if some professional organizations advise you not to become involved, even while others take the contrary position. Since there is no unanimity among professional organizations on this subject, UNESCO should leave it entirely to the professional organizations themselves to discuss and possibly resolve matters of working conditions of journalists.

You know my position on communications issues generally. I believe that UNESCO has the responsibility to examine many aspects of the communications revolution that affect every country and every citizen. It is particularly appropriate for UNESCO to help developing countries expand their communications capabilities, and their access to information in many fields, and to international dialogues in general.

I sincerely hope you will act promptly to make it clear that UNESCO will neither be involved nor participate in the proposed meeting in Mexico.

Please let me know if I can be helpful.

Sincerely,

Leonard R. Sussman
Executive Director

jm

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organización de las naciones unidas para la educación, la ciencia y la cultura
organisation des nations unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture

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Le Directeur général

29 SEP. 1984

Dear Mr Sussman,

Thank you for your further letter of 8 August 1984, which I very much appreciated, expressing your concern about the likely impact of the proposed NGO meeting on the working conditions of journalists, scheduled to take place in March 1985 in Mexico City.

First let me re-state my position and of course that of Unesco, which has been and will continue to be that questions of the working conditions of journalists, including the protection of journalists, are of direct concern to the members of that profession, and it is not for us but for the journalists themselves and their non-governmental professional organizations to discuss and deliberate on them. Intergovernmental Organizations such as Unesco can only be involved in such deliberations at the request of the professional organisations concerned.

The meeting in question will eventually be convened in 1985 by FELAP. At present, to my knowledge, this has been supported by the following organizations :

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.../...

. International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) ;
. International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) ;
. International Catholic Journalistic Union (ICJU) ;
. Union of African Journalists (UJA).

The interorganization meeting which was held at the ILO headquarters in Geneva in June 1984, requested that ILO, International Committee of the Red Cross and Unesco prepare the following information documents :

a) ILO : Selected problems related to employment
b) CICR : Protection and safety of journalists -
c) UNESCO : Implications of new technologies.

This meeting also expressed the wish that Unesco, the International Labour Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross co-sponsor the proposed 1985 Conference. However no formal request to this effect has been made.

Let me assure you that I am already giving the question you raised in your letter my personnal attention and that I shall take the concerns you have expressed into consideration when it comes to any action relating to Unesco's involvment or participation in the proposed meeting

Yours sincerely,

A.M. Bow

Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow

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Freedom's Advocate the World Over

August 8, 1984

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The Honorable Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow
Director-General, UNESCO
7, place de Fontenoy
75700 Paris, France

Dear Mr. Director-General:

I was glad to take part in the recent consultative meeting on UNESCO's public information affairs. As the record will attest, I intervened many times at that week-long meeting to state my conviction that the content of UNESCO's debates and programs are one inescapable factor in projecting a negative image of the organization in some countries.

UNESCO's programs in the communications sector have for nearly a decade been regarded as threatening by Western news media.

It is unfortunate, I believe, that the understandable desire of many developing countries to participate in the Information Revolution has been termed a demand for some still undefined New World Information and Communications Order. The yearning is valid and understandable; the term NWICO is regarded as threatening statist control of news and information media. I also know some member-states do indeed seek that objective; most do not. And such an objective has never been approved at UNESCO.

Yet some debates and programs at UNESCO have lent credence to such Western fears. This despite the fact that substantial steps were taken at the last General Conference to dispel such fears.

Now, however, a disturbing sign has appeared.

I learned in Paris that a meeting was held in Geneva last month to plan a seminar in Mexico next March that will discuss, among other matters, the protection of journalists. That and related subjects also on the agenda seem to repeat the pattern of the acrimonious meeting at UNESCO in February, 1981. Many of the same nongovernmental organizations are sponsoring this as the last. And the use of identification cards for journalists---a form of licensing---already is being discussed as part of the new as the past meeting.

I regard the proposed UNESCO cosponsorship of the meeting in Mexico and elsewhere on the subject of "protection of journalists," among other matters, as certain to end any chance of the United States remaining inside UNESCO for years to come. I know I need not spell out the reasons, and I also know the organizational explanations for having convened the recent meeting in Geneva to plan this meeting in Mexico. All of that notwithstanding, I have absolutely no doubt that the mere planning of such a meeting with UNESCO participation will provide a completely predictable negative reaction in the United States, the United Kingdom, and perhaps elsewhere. In that renewed combatative climate, all the earnest efforts to improve the functioning of the organization will be submerged in a new emotionalized attack that will easily carry the day.

You have asked me to provide my best judgment on matters of public information. I said repeatedly at the consultation that no organization, certainly not UNESCO, can separate the content of its programs and debates from the public image it projects. Wholly deserved or not---I believe by now you know my balanced view of this matter---UNESCO is perceived in the West as using the "protection" issue to advance press controls. No Western government can ignore that issue when perceived as a challenge to basic rights. And at this moment, such a challenge would be regarded as a distinct rejection of Western concerns.

UNESCO will not avoid attack because another international agency may claim to run the "protection" segment of a trilateral meeting. UNESCO will be charged with major responsibility for the entire meeting, and this will be seen as continuing an objectionable pattern that helped bring UNESCO to its present crisis.

I hope you will understand my concern: for the real safety of journalists (who can be protected only as all civilians are protected from malicious attack), and for the strengthening of UNESCO.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Leonard R. Sussman
Executive Director

jm

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1984

Unesco Reported to Move Away From Issue of Licensing Reporters

By ALEX S. JONES

A longtime critic of the communications policies of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization said yesterday that the agency's Director General had sent him a statement of Unesco policy that represents a "significant shift" away from involvement with the issue of licensing journalists.

The letter comes only weeks before President Reagan is scheduled to review his decision to withdraw the United States from Unesco as of Jan. 1, 1985. When he announced the decision last December, Mr. Reagan said it was subject to change if Unesco made changes this year in areas such as management and its policies on the free flow of information.

The policy statement was contained in a letter dated Oct. 20 from Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, Director General of Unesco, to Leonard R. Sussman, executive director of Freedom House, which has monitored Unesco policies on the press.

In the letter, Mr. M'Bow described guidelines for a policy that, according to Mr. Sussman, would seem to rule out Unesco sponsorship or financing for meetings on the working conditions or safety of journalists — subjects considered by many Western press organizations to include the licensing issue — unless asked to do so by "all parties concerned," including the Western press.

Mr. Sussman, who has been a critic of Unesco's communications policies for many years, said he viewed Mr. M'Bow's letter as "categorically" leaving such issues to professional organizations of journalists, thus defusing part of the criticism that has been leveled at Unesco.

Mr. M'Bow's statement was a response to a letter from Mr. Sussman about Unesco's possible involvement as a sponsor or source of financing for a journalists' conference scheduled to be held in Mexico City in March. The planned meeting has been denounced by several Western news organizations, including the American Newspaper Publishers Association, as a likely forum for promoting the licensing of journalists.

But some other journalists and Government officials expressed reservations about the precise meaning of the guidelines in Mr. M'Bow's letter.

"It's possibly encouraging, but falls short of setting every fear to rest," said Dana Bullen, executive director of the World Press Freedom Committee, which has also monitored the Unesco debate on the press. Mr. Bullen noted that the letter did not explicitly state that Unesco would not take part in any way — as an observer, perhaps — or provide any financing for the Mexico City meeting.

Broad Concept

Many Western news organizations view licensing as a means of exerting government control on journalists and the flow of information under the guise of improving safety conditions for journalists. The issue has come to be associated with a "new world information order," a broad concept that includes increasing technical and professional assistance to developing nations.

According to Doudou Diene, a Unesco spokesman in New York, the statement by Mr. M'Bow was an "important clarification" of Unesco policy, but was not a change in policy. Mr. Diene added that it was hoped by Mr. M'Bow that the "clarification" would "have an impact on the press perception of what Unesco is."

The proposed meeting in Mexico City has become an important test of Unesco's attitude regarding communications issues, according to Gregory J. Newell, an Assistant Secretary of State whose area of responsibility includes the Unesco withdrawal.

The meeting is being sponsored by five organizations: the Prague-based International Organization of Journalists; the Latin American Federation of Journalists, which is described by Mr. Bullen as the sister organization to the Prague-based group; the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists; the International Catholic Journalists Union, and the Union of African Journalists.

Meeting in Geneva

A group including the sponsoring organizations met in June in Geneva to discuss the feasibility of a conference on "working conditions," and, according to Mr. Diene, Unesco representatives were there only as observers. Unesco did provide $10,000 to finance the meeting, according to Mr. Diene, but not directly. Each year, Unesco gives $10,000 to the Consultative Committee of Unions of Journalists, Mr. Diene said, and it was the committee's decision to use the money for the Geneva meeting.

At a later meeting in Prague in late September, no Unesco representatives took part, and Unesco provided no financing for the meeting, according to Mr. Diene.

But the official minutes of that meeting indicate that the participants were anticipating significant financing for the proposed conference from Unesco. The minutes refer to contributions from Unesco of $20,000 for working papers, $20,000 for travel of participants and up to $10,000 for a meeting of working journalists to take place at the same time as the conference.

Statement Last Month

Challenged on the apparent contradiction, Mr. M'Bow issued a statement in early October that "Unesco's program does not include the organization of such a conference and its budget does not provide for any financial support for it."

In his letter to Mr. Sussman, Mr. M'Bow expanded on the earlier statement, declaring that "all parties concerned with the working conditions of journalists should participate in any undertaking in this field" and mentions "publishers, broadcasters and news agency" representatives. This marks the first time such guidelines have been so explicit, Mr. Sussman said.

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Freedom's Advocate the World Over

November 12, 1984

Mr. Lacy A. Wright, Director
Office of Communications and UNESCO Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Lacy:

I am responding as rapidly as possible to your letter of October 31 which reached here late last week. I hope that writing this is not an act of futility because the decision to withdraw from UNESCO, no matter what reforms are made there, may have long since been taken.

Please regard as part of this letter the attached copy of my exchange of correspondence with Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow.

You asked for my reaction to the omnibus resolution approved by the recent Executive Board meeting of UNESCO, with particular reference to Major Program III (Communications).

There is little value in analyzing at length the Board's draft program and budget for 1981-83. Clearly, however, the new program and budget in the communications sector is an improvement. The former draft still looked to the MacBride Report for guidance and action. MacBride has been virtually shelved, and no formal action has been taken to implement it as a whole or in its parts. It remains on the shelf to be read; and, indeed, serves as a caution to press-freedom advocates.

The presumed stingers have also not materialized at two other major points in the 1981-1983 program: "Follow up the Declaration of the Mass Media," and give "further consideration" to "a new world information and communication order, especially after publication of the final report of the IPDC." As I indicate below, press-freedom advocates and the United States in particular should do much more to promote rather than attack the Mass Media Declaration of 1978. It is virtually our document, and the U.S. counter-productively treats it as a Soviet propaganda piece. The reference to NWICO may have sounded ominous then, but it was basically linked to IPDC---and that was our doing, and our trade-off in exchange for muting hostile ideological campaigns. The earlier draft stressed the IPDC (paragraph K) and so does the latest document.

In brief, the elements Americans find most objectionable in the communications sector have been steadily diffused in both the 1981-1983 draft and the present one. That is not to say that the Board has adopted an entirely Western stance in these matters. But it has structured the new draft program so that movement is decidedly in our direction.

Some comments about the Board's 120th meeting and its decisions on communications:

1. "High priority" be given the development of communications facilities in developing countries. This is precisely the U.S. emphasis. Indeed, the U.S. would prefer to eliminate the theoretical programs in communications. "High priority" does, however, emphasize the American objective of supporting technical transfers and training---steps which the U.S. has long professed to support but for which it has just begun to allocate funds.

2. Theoretical analyses of communication problems ("democratization of communication, access to and participation in communication, and the right to communicate" and the theme of a new world information and communication order) be held at the present level of analysis. Rather than advancing these concepts, the Board called for "collating the work already accomplished." Its conclusion would be analyzed, but there is a clear amber signal cautioning against developing new theory on "democratization," "access," and the "right" to communicate. All have been highly controversial concepts opposed by American and Western critics. The Board, moreover, reemphasized the 1983 decision to regard a new information order as "an evolving and continuous process." That formulation was introduced in 1983 by the Norwegians and the British, and welcomed by the Americans (including this writer who as an American delegate helped negotiate the communications issues at the General Conference).

3. The highly controversial issues concerning the working conditions of journalists should be left primarily to the "initiatives taken by the competent professional associations," the Board decided. This is a distinct change from prior programs which thrust UNESCO into direct conflict with Western news media. They assumed UNESCO had a distinct series of objectives for altering the journalists' professional procedures (as well as the content of the news products). This section of the Board's directive should be read in parallel with the subsequent commitment Mr. M'Bow made to this writer in an exchange of letters widely published in the United States and abroad since November 6, 1984 (see below).

4. The 1978 Mass Media Declaration should be further examined. This declaration is a bland statement of overwhelmingly pro-Western news-media concepts. The declaration in this form was introduced without the knowledge of the Soviet Union after its own draft had been killed the night before mainly through the good offices of Mr. M'Bow. The Soviets were appalled. Yet Americans continue to regard the declaration as an anti-Western statement. The better course for U.S. diplomacy would be to use the declaration as a clear statement advancing press freedom.

5. "Special importance" should be given the strengthening of the International Program for the Development of Communication. The IPDC was largely an American creation. We supported it as a trade-off for diminishing the ideological conflict over communications. For six years we welched on formal pledges to provide concrete aid for Third World communications facilities and training. Now, belatedly, we are beginning to keep some promises. The Board's stress on the IPDC is directly in line with present U.S. policy.

6. The convening of a European conference on communication policies was again put off---as Westerners prefer.

7. Book-promotion programs are to be merged, as the U.S. wanted.

8. And, finally, the Board hoped that nongovernmental organizations in the communications field will be more closely associated with UNESCO activities. American NGOs have already said they would increase their activity at UNESCO, and one (the World Press Freedom Committee) is seeking a better consultative status.

These eight categories of reform in communications programs move precisely in the direction set forth in official U.S. demands. These projected changes also demonstrate significant progress in meeting the explicit criticism that I have made for nearly ten years. I recognize that these are recommendations that must be implemented to demonstrate actual reforms accomplished. I also recognize that the main thrust of Third World expectations concerns the expanded capability of developing countries to share the values and opportunities embodied in the continuing communications revolution. That revolution will accelerate, and the expectations of Third World communicators will never be sattiated---nor should they cease as long as they cannot participate adequately in the growing world-wide communications systems. It is America's advantage to help---not ban---their entrance into those systems. That is what a new world information order is mostly about.

I also recognize that the Western Information Group should not impose its values and procedures on all others any more than they should impose their values and procedures on us. That means that communications issues will be discussed from many standpoints at UNESCO whether the U.S. stays or leaves. But whether we are there or not, UNESCO should not seek to develop a single, universal norm for communications, domestic or international. Failure to avoid the appearance of such norm-setting has generated much opposition bordering on hatred by Western journalists. Mr. M'Bow has repeatedly denied the intention of supporting censorship, the licensing of the press, or other norm-setting. But debates and programs have, nevertheless, included speakers who---mainly from press-control countries---frightened Western journalists.

To resolve such misunderstanding, this author engaged Director-General M'Bow in frank correspondence from August 4 to October 31, 1984. That exchange clearly produced a commitment that this writer regards as a change of basic policy and which one UNESCO official maintains is, rather, a "clarification." The reader may judge.

Mr. M'Bow had invited me to participate, July 16-20, in the consultation group he organized to advise him on reforms in the field of public information. The group of 19 was chaired by Mohamed Heikal, former Minister of Information of Egypt. From the outset, Mr. Heikal and I agreed that the main purpose of the consultation should be to discuss those basic matters that influence the global perception of UNESCO---programs and debates. The majority of the consultation, however, felt we should devote the week to recommending improvements in UNESCO public information office. The final report includes an appendix in which I expressed my belief that member-states must demonstrate restraint in proposing communications programs, if UNESCO is not to suffer divisive, harmful reactions.

On August 4, 1984 I met privately in New York City with Mr. M'Bow to express my concern over the specific issue of the protection of journalists.

I wrote Mr. M'Bow on August 8 and the full exchange of letters follows. This correspondence breaks new ground in these ways:

1. It accepts the premise that in the absence of "unanimity" among professional organizations UNESCO should leave the matter "entirely" to the journalists themselves to discuss and possibly resolve.

2. It properly points out that Western journalists continue to ask UNESCO to aid journalists in trouble, and Mr. M'Bow has quietly sought to do so. Such

efforts have brought neither him nor UNESCO the public adknowledgement of the news media.

3. UNESCO did not attend the second planning meeting for the proposed "protection" conference.

4. Mr. M'Bow, in effect, has suggested that American and other Western news media have virtual veto power over the content of future international communications conferences that UNESCO would finance and participate in. He urges that a planning meeting (for the Mexico conference) be held in the U.S. with the participation of "publishers, broadcasters and news agency" representatives. These would be Westerners, and not likely to approve an agenda or content for any conference they find objectionable. That would provide a de facto veto for UNESCO's support and participation in the conference, if it is subsequently held without Western approval.

I hope you will find this helpful.

Sincerely,

Leonard R. Sussman
Executive Director

jm
enclosures

The Washington Times

TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 1984

ORRIN G. HATCH

Get rid of M'Bow to save UNESCO

The latest theme in the UNESCO debate is that "science and culture will suffer" if the United States withdraws from UNESCO at the end of 1984. As chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee which oversees the Department of Education, the National Science Foundation, the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities, I stand second to none in my support for international science, education, and culture.

However, given the atrocious state of affairs of UNESCO at this time, I believe the United States should go ahead with its plans to withdraw — unless by some miracle UNESCO substantially improves in the coming months.

In my view, there is only one way to save UNESCO: Director-General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow must go!

Mr. M'Bow is indisputably the captain of this very leaky ship. He is the key person responsible for the partisan anti-Western bias and the mismanagement that permeate UNESCO. Since Mr. M'Bow took the helm in 1974, UNESCO has gone on a radical left-wing ideological tangent. A double standard is systematically invoked in which the West, particularly the United States, is portrayed as an evil empire while the proponents of socialism receive preferential treatment.

Under Mr. M'Bow's iron hand, an array of "new orders" have been formally instituted, such as the New International Economic Order. NIEO is a blatant anti-free-market campaign whose purpose is "the redistribution of wealth." You may be interested to know that Mr. M'Bow's target date for achieving the NIEO is the year 2000.

Another one of Mr. M'Bow's pet projects is the establishment of a "New World Information Order" designed to restrict the Western press, particularly in the Third World, while enhancing the role of the pro-socialist press.

Our U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO, Jean Gerard, has done an outstanding job of representing the United States at an international forum that plays with a heavily stacked deck. Unfortunately, trying to get Mr. M'Bow to play fair is like trying to get the wind to blow in the opposite direction. At a June 1983 meeting with Ambassador Gerard and Assistant Secretary Gregory Newell, the illustrious leader of UNESCO implied that the United States was racist in its attitude toward him and Third World nations and that it has a "deep psychological problem."

Amadou Mahtar M'Bow

Functionally, UNESCO is a mess. As former Australian Ambassador to UNESCO Owen Harries has so aptly stated, "As an administrator, M'Bow combines authoritarianism with inefficiency." Peter Lengyl, who was editor of one of UNESCO's oldest and most respected publications for 22 years, recently resigned in protest. In his letter of resignation he stated that under Mr. M'Bow UNESCO is characterized by an "unyielding centralization of power." As a result, translation and production services have greatly declined and the expert advice of program specialists is routinely ignored.

Unfortunately, the program specialists don't have a prayer as long as Mr. M'Bow is in command. The Secretariat operates in lockstep obedience to his demands. As with any dictatorship, when the dictator is out of town it ceases to function. During Mr. M'Bow's frequent absences things come to a halt.

Given UNESCO's plush Paris headquarters, one wonders why Mr. M'Bow must be out of town so much. UNESCO Budget Director T.C. Young estimates that UNESCO spends 70-80 percent of its funds at its Paris headquarters and only 20-30 percent in the field — a curious ratio for an organization that is ostensibly concerned about the welfare of the oppressed people living in the Third World. Interestingly, 81 percent of UNESCO employees are based in Paris and only 19 percent are based in the field.

As I stated earlier, I believe there is only one way for UNESCO to shape up, and that is for Mr. M'Bow to ship out. Mr. M'Bow's replacement should take a close look at the director-general of the International Labor Organization, Francis Blanchard. To his credit, Mr. Blanchard is the antithesis of Mr. M'Bow in terms of fair play and managerial skills.

Since he assumed office in 1974, Mr. Blanchard has helped to depoliticize the ILO and to improve its day-to-day operations. An ILO veteran, Blanchard has been with the ILO since 1951, through "thick and thin," as they say, including the 1977 U.S. withdrawal from the ILO. Largely as a result of that action, I believe, substantial improvements were made at the ILO and the United States rejoined in 1980.

I sincerely hope that at some future date the United States can rejoin UNESCO in good conscience. At the present time, however, we should not continue to subsidize a leaky ship with an incompetent captain at the helm who only knows how to steer in one direction: far left.

Orrin G. Hatch is a Republican U.S. Senator from Utah.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, we will recess these hearings until further notice.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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